

Integrated Water Resource Management MTR

Final Report



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Acronyms

ARA-Centro	Regional Water Management Administration for Central Mozambique
ARA-Norte	Regional Water Management Administration for Northern Mozambique
ASAS	Apoio Sectoral no Abastecimento de Agua e Saneamento (Sector Wide Approach)
DNAAS	National Directorate for Water Supply and Sanitation in Mozambique
DNGRH	National Directorate for Water Resources Management in Mozambique
DRRP	Disaster Risk Reduction Plan
DWA	Department of Water Affairs (eSwatini)
EF	Expert Facility
EKN	Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FM	Fund Manager
FO	Final outcome
GoM	Government of Mozambique
INMACOM	Incomati and Maputo Watercourse Commission
IO	Intermediate outcome
IP	Implementing partner
IWRM	Integrated Water Resource Management
KII	Key Informant Interviews
MFA	Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MNRE	Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy (eSwatini)
MTR	Mid-Term Review
ORIA	Organisational Risk and Integrity Assessment
PMU	Programme Management Unit
PRIMA II	Second Phase of transboundary programme for Incomati and Maputo Basins
PROCADI	Projecto de Capacitação e Desenvolvimento Institucional (at DNGRH)
PRODIAS	Programa de Desenvolvimento Institucional do Sector de Abastecimento de Água e Saneamento (at DNAAS)
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature





1 Executive summary

Objectives scope of the MTR

MDF Training and Consultancy was contracted by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN) in Maputo to conduct the Mid-Term Review of its 'Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM)' programme in Mozambique. The 4-year programme started in 2019 and has the intended impact to achieve improved water security for at least 1.5 million by supporting IWRM at the decentral, transboundary and central levels.

The MTR covered the five 'projects' of the individual Implementing Partners (IPs), the Expert Facility, role of the EKN and the Fund Manager, during August 2019 to December 2021 while developments in the first half of 2022 were also taken into account.

The MTR was meant to provide insight into 1) the results achieved by the IWRM Programme; 2) recommend interventions ensuring that the programme outcomes and outputs will be achieved within the lifetime of the IWRM programme; 3) and provide advice on the decision to continue or not with the IWRM programme, or with certain projects within the programme, and/or the continuation of the involvement of the Fund Manager.

Methodology and limitations

MDF applied a theory-based approach to the evaluation, reconstructed and elaborated the ToC through which the programme logic was tested and analysed, in order to assess progress. The team used the following methods: desk review, portfolio analysis, Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with key (internal and external) stakeholders.

The MTR team selected interviewees based on a stakeholder mapping, to ensure a good representation of the various programme interventions and of both internal and external stakeholders. Furthermore, a SWOT analysis of the partnership was applied, and a sense-making workshop conducted with key programme representatives to present and discuss preliminary findings and recommendations, with the latter being categorized by importance/difficulty of implementation.

The main limitations of this MTR were related to the inconsistencies and insufficient details in the M&E and budget data that the evaluation team was supplied with, which resulted in a more time-consuming portfolio analysis and a limited efficiency and budget assessment. In addition, it was difficult to define the contribution of institutional support and transversal activities of the IPs solely from this programme implementation, rather than their general operations. Finally, having in mind the stakes in the continuation of the programme, a certain degree of response bias from IPs and FM should be considered.

Conclusions per MTR criteria

The conclusions from the MTR findings related to relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability are as follows:

Relevance

The EKN supported IWRM programme has **continued relevance for national and regional policies and priorities**, and the SDGs. It is a continuation of achievements in past programmes, however, in the case of PRIMA I to II, a long gap between programmes has eroded the gains achieved in the previous phase.

The design of the programme **partially followed lessons and recommendations from the IOB country study** with regard to the focus of the programme, inclusion of national level actors and the implementation of activities supporting capacity development. A fund manager was created, although allowing a stronger emphasis on ownership at IP level.



The programme shows a useful combination of institutional development and practical implementation, in which the latter serves the capacity building. The consolidated Result Framework, which lacks details on outputs, means of verification, and risks and assumptions, is merely focused on the practical implementation, while the relevance of the institutional and other non-technical components remain largely invisible.

Coherence

The five different projects have been developed before the overall IWRM programme logics were conceptualized, which resulted in **projects that have a list of activities that show weak links between each other**, hampering the overall programme coherence and intervention logic. The **coherence between the four Mozambican projects is also rather weak**, as coordination, active partnership and synergies are missing.

External coherence is actively sought with Blue Deal. The SC mostly provides space for exchange but does not ensure internal and external coherence, nor does the support by FM. The Covid-19 lock-down was a complicating factor, and while there is progress on uniformity of the RF and annual reports, this does not yet contribute to internal coherence and synergy. The current design causes confusion about the leadership between EKN, FM and/or SC, and who should bear responsibility for what part of the programme coordination and implementation, resulting in weak programme management.

Effectiveness

The **programme is generally not on track, both in terms of activity implementation and budget expenditure.** External (Covid-19, insecurity in the north of Mozambique) and internal (short inception period, weak implementation capacity from IPs, lack of dedicated project teams, inefficient procedures for contracting and procurement) factors contributed to weak progress and major delays. **Progress on the Final Outcomes (FOs) by individual IPs is mixed.** In general, 50% of the contract budget will be committed by the end of 2022 and almost 60% when all activities planned for 2022 will come under contract.

The FM provided support to the IPs in the projects management, although their lack of knowledge of national regulations, the weak support in the procurement processes, and the unclarity of its role within the programme vis-à-vis EKN contributed to their poor performance. The EF utilization was severely undermined by differences on expectations (in terms of type of service and budget required) and ToRs of poor quality.

Efficiency

The **limited progress made at IP level resulted in limited budget spent.** The plans and reports submission, review and approval (from all parties) was not done in a timely fashion and the development of the ToRs for contracts/service provision was also considerably delayed, and below expectations.

Budget allocations have varied considerably since 2020, and there is significant underspending for all activities of the programme. Estimations suggest that **by the end of 2022, only 33% of the total budget will be spent, with another 15% committed.** The slow use of budgets can in part be explained by slow procurement, HR shortage at IPs and EKN, and delays in and underutilization of FMs programme management support.

Sustainability

There are **currently no programmatic sustainability or exit strategies**, other than some explorations of (new) funding mechanisms. While the main focus for the self-sustainability of the ARAs should be on obtaining (more) financial autonomy, little progress has been made in this regard.



The procedure manual that was produced by the FM, is valued as an output that is considered likely to endure and continued to be used, and thus sustainable. Maintenance and retention of trained staff is verbally considered, but not addressed in practice.

The factors and/or circumstances that may negatively affect the sustainability of the programme are weak human and institutional resource capacity, continuing uncertainty over (coordination and management) roles within the programme, and insecurity about for retention of expertise in the international component of PRIMA II.

Recommendations

We present recommendations on the programme design, set-up, human resources and programme management, and we have identified recommendations that should be considered before the end of the IWRM EKN grant, and those that can be taken on for future programmes beyond 2023.

Recommendations until the end of the IWRM EKN grant

On Programme design:

- Seek more space to collaborate between IPs, developing joint activities, trainings and other programme components

On Programme set-up:

- The role of SC could be strengthened to create more synergy. Expand the SC to serve as a platform of coordination of the IWRM programme, rather than internal exchange of IP information.
- The functioning of TA needs to be clarified, both for thematic and project management TA. Consider using EF and additional FM budgets for additional project management TA such as organisation of joint trainings.
- Improve the description of the mandate of the project management TA provider (FM; if continued) and let them act in line with this. FM should become more pro-active and involved in the process.
- Since too much work is still going to the EKN, contract and resources for the FM should be reconsidered to be able to deliver in line with expectations from EKN and IPs. Expectations should be better communicated to all and define processes to allow these expectations to materialize.

On Human Resources:

- The EKN should arrange more capacity, for instance by attracting new staff to act as programme manager. Additionally, find ways to limit the current programme management burden on EKN, such as other definition of threshold for need for approval; a more stepped procurement set-up; more mandates and some operational budget. Alternatively, the current set-up can be abandoned and continued as individual projects, while formulating the present FM function to a TA function on project management.
- Incentives (e.g. training opportunities) to staff would help improve efficiency and sustainability).

On Programme management:

- Planning and approval (of annual plans, with associated budgets) by EKN should be concluded by September of the preceding year.
- The budgets need a full revision. The planned figures might be accurate now, but absorption capacity is hindered by slow and inefficient processes, hence planned expenditures could be revised to bring them closer to implementation reality. Financial projections also need to include commitments made in contracts.



- For improved use of time and resources, there could be more harmonisation with national planning cycles.
- In order to increase the impacts of the activities of the programme in risk reduction DNGRH should promote a better alignment between the activities within the ARAs i.e Blue Deal project dealing with flood forecasting and early warning systems in several rivers basins in the country but also with the World Bank funded project at INGD that is investing in disaster earlier warning systems in the country.
- To enhance the sustainability of the programme activities and results, it is recommended to still formulate an exit strategy for all components as part of the annual plans, pursue leverage from other donors, and organise additional joint trainings to consolidate capacity on programme management and planning at IP level to maintain gains beyond the programme's lifetime.
- With regards to sustainability, priority should go to activities that lead to increase of revenue (register, licensing, fees) and capacity on fund acquisition in line with expectations on financial sustainability.
- Add a one-year budget-neutral extension to the programme to compensate the loss of the first 1.5 years in delays. Components for which this budget neutral extension would be most beneficial are the ARAs that could be allowed to materialize the progress on starting activities, as well as work on their increase of revenues that ensures financial sustainability. For PRIMA II a close next year would likely mean that a new programme would start from scratch again, while current gains on establishment of the secretariat means momentum to start delivering results is finally there.

Recommendations beyond 2023

Programme design:

- Conduct a programme design workshop to jointly re-formulate the programme's Theory of Change. Activities should be related to each other to jointly contribute to the programme outcomes, and institutional Outcome(s) and transversal activities should be better linked to the Intermediate and Final Outcomes of the programme. After re-designing the ToC of the programme, the Result Framework can be revised to better link activities to outputs, define outputs, define which IP is contributing to what in detail, and set output and outcome indicators. Discuss how gender mainstreaming (and to a certain extent private sector development) can be made more visible and explicitly aligned in the programme, its components and activities. The new Result Framework should also better describe how indicators are going to be measured, and the means of verification should refer to actual tools (and not just reports) that are used for project management (training records, meeting minutes, list of attendees, project documents, surveys, etc.). Make use of the 30 sub-indicators of SDG6.5.1 to measure progress on institutional development¹. Finally, assumptions and risks should be developed per Intermediate Outcome at least, so to contextualize them and propose mitigating measures that are tailored to the planned objectives. Please refer to Annex 7 to appreciate how a consolidated programme results framework should be structured and what is the level of detail necessary for its composing elements.
- Redefine the programme by moving from silos of implementation to joint activities: aim for fewer and clearer themes, have a common strategy and TA agenda, joint projects, trainings, tenders and communication.
- Alternatively, 1) the idea of one programme can be abandoned, and continued as individual projects, with the FM function reformulated as a TA function on project management alone,

¹ DNGRH already produces such reports and 70% of these SDG sub-indicators are addressed by the programme.



or 2) a PMU can be designed to coordinate the programme while it continues to strengthen and safeguard ownership of the programme at IP level.

- Partnership building should be included as a focused activity during inception. The Dutch Sustainable Development Fund had developed excellent tools for this, in co-operation with the PPP-Lab². In addition, ORIA's should be repeated in line with the changes at organisation levels, such as the merged ARAs.

On Programme set-up:

- An EF should be closer to the programme, and more informed on its activities. Clarify the process flow, who is responsible for what, ensure that ToRs receive better quality and feasibility checks, and expectations and risks are well communicated.
- Ensure that IPs adequately budget for the necessary staff for the implementation of activities.

² See for example 'Building Partnerships' - <https://www.ppplab.org> > PPP-Serie-A2-spreads1



2 Introduction to the evaluation

2.1 Introduction to the scope and purpose

MDF Training and Consultancy was contracted by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN) in Maputo to conduct the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of its Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) programme in the country. There are five Implementing Partners (IPs) in this programme:

- Two national-level projects with implementing partners the National Directorate for Water Resources Management in Mozambique (DNGRH) and the National Directorate for Water Supply and Sanitation in Mozambique (DNAAS);
- Two regional-level projects with implementing partners the Regional Water Management Administration for Northern Mozambique (ARA-Norte) and the Regional Water Management Administration for Central Mozambique (ARA-Centro)
- One international project with the eSwatini Department of Water Affairs (eSwatini DWA), which is within the Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy and representing the three countries (South Africa, Eswatini and Mozambique).

For the programme a Fund Manager(s) was contracted to strengthen the programme management capacity of IPs, and give support on planning and management issues.³ Thematic Technical Assistance could be provided by an Expert Facility, which consist of three implementing partners: Acacia Water B.V. & Euroconsult, Sweco Nederland B.V. and Royal Haskoning DHV Nederland B.V.

The MTR was meant to provide insight into 1) the results achieved by the IWRM Programme; 2) recommend interventions ensuring that the programme outcomes and outputs will be achieved within the lifetime of the IWRM programme; 3) and provide advice on the decision to continue or not with the IWRM programme, or with certain projects within the programme, and/or the continuation of the involvement of the Fund Manager.⁴

By contract, the MTR covered the five projects of IPs, the Expert Facility, the role and performance of the EKN and the Fund Manager, during August 2019 to December 2021, To be more up to date, we have included the first half of 2022 in the review, based on updates presented during the Steering Committee of 26th of July 2022 and information provided during interviews.

The evaluation questions central to this MTR were the following:

Relevance

1. Do the programmes and projects, their outputs and outcomes have continued relevance to the Mozambican national and regional water policies and the SDGs that are targeted?
2. Were the objectives of the projects clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established schedule and with the allocated resources (including the additional external management support and technical assistance)?⁵
3. To what extent have the programme and projects been taking into account the lessons learned from past IWRM programs in Mozambique?
4. How appropriate are the results frameworks and its elements?

³ Public Service Contract Fund Management for IWRM Programmes in Mozambique, between the state of the Netherlands, and Act for Performance in combination with Prowater Consultores, 26th July 2019.

⁴Terms of Reference for the Mid-Term Review of the IWRM Programme, p. 6

⁵ Since this this question is closely connected to question 13 under Efficiency, as well as several questions under coherence, we answer this question under those sections only.



Coherence

5. How do you judge the coherence between the various components within each project (in terms of consistency and synergy, i.e. whether the components are logic and contributing to the same outputs and outcomes)?
6. How do you judge the external coherence, in terms of synergies and interlinkages between the four (4) Mozambican projects, and synergy or overlaps with other programmes, if any (for example through the World Bank and African Development Bank)?⁶
7. How do you judge the roles of the Steering Committee and Fund Manager to create internal and external coherence?
8. Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more coherent?

Effectiveness

9. To what extent are the programme and projects on track to achieve their goals, objectives and results?
10. To what extent has the support of the Fund Manager contributed to a more effective and a higher quality of implementation, for example through their support to procurement of goods and services? (somewhat linked to question 15)
11. How do you judge the involvement of Technical Assistance by external service providers including the Expert Facility?

Efficiency

12. To what extent did programme stakeholders timely executed their tasks and duties within the framework of the programme?
13. How do you judge the efficiency of resource use (human resources and financial resources) to achieve the outcomes and outputs of the projects?
14. To what extent has the administrative setup (Agreements with IPs and EKN, MoUs between FM and IPs) been appropriate for the proper (results-based) project- and programme management?
15. To what extent did the FM contribution in the programme ensure an efficient, coordinated and organized rollout of the activities?

Sustainability

16. To what extent is there a clear strategy for sustainability of impact, and which strategy is adopted?

We operationalised the review questions in the KII guide (see annex 2).

2.2 Approach and methodology

MDF applied a **theory-based approach** to the evaluation. In order to assess the effectiveness of the programme the team first needed to reconstruct and elaborate the ToC which we present in annex 3, since the ToC/LogFrame in its initial form was not very helpful for evaluation purposes. During the data collection phase we used the elaborated ToC to test the programme logic and analyse whether proposed activities adequately address the outcome and impact statements. The elaborated ToC provided a better understanding of the causal relationships and logic underpinning the IWRM programme and a solid basis for a common language.

⁶During analysis, this question was split in internal and external coherence, since we consider the question on synergy between the 4 IP components to rather be on the internal coherence at programme level.



The team used the following methods: desk review, Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with key (internal and external) stakeholders. A desk review and **portfolio analysis** provided an overview of the various interventions, activities and budgets, and pathways of change.

We selected interviewees based on a **stakeholder mapping**, to ensure a good representation of the various programme interventions and of both internal and external stakeholders. We identified stakeholders in three broad categories (i) directly involved or benefiting from the project interventions, (ii) those with experience in implementing programmes in cooperation with the IPs and (iii) those participating as services providers or external parts with possible interaction with the programme.

Table 1: Planned versus realized interviews per stakeholder category

	CATEGORY	LOCATION	KIIS PLANNED	KIIS REALIZED
1	EKN Maputo (and special advisor)	Maputo/distant	3	3
2	Fund Manager	Maputo, South Africa (distant) and Netherlands	5	7
3	IPs	eSwatini (distant), Tete, Nampula, Maputo	20	12
4	Expert facility	Distant	3	5
5	External stakeholders and experts in Mozambique	Maputo and some distant	10	9
6	External stakeholders in Netherlands and international	Distant	4	3
TOTALS			45	39

Furthermore, we conducted a SWOT analysis of the partnership. During a sense-making workshop on 8th of September 2022, with representatives from IPs, EKN, and FM, the MTR-team presented analysed primary and secondary data as well as draft recommendations. Participants were provided with preliminary evaluation findings prior to the workshop. As a result of the joint sense-making, the evaluation findings were enriched, the analysis was completed and contextualised, and the potential options for moving the programme forward were discussed in detail. The results of this discussion have been incorporated in this report.

During the workshop, and in a follow-up session organised on the 14th of September 2022, MDF also discussed the recommendations with key stakeholders by using the human-centred design methodology of the Importance/Difficulty matrix⁷, and ranked each recommendation on a scale from least to most important, and from least to most difficult, aiming to understand which recommendations should be prioritized for the near and long term future of the IWRM in Mozambique. The Importance/Difficulty matrix resulting from the discussion can be found in Annex 4.

2.3 Limitations and bias

The M&E and budget data that the team was supplied with contained inconsistencies and lacked sufficient level of detail. This made several components of the evaluation more challenging: 1) Portfolio analysis was made difficult by a multiplicity of data sources with inconsistent figures. 2) A

⁷ For more information on the methodology please consult <https://www.luma-institute.com/importance-difficulty-matrix/>

budget overview and assessment of efficiency is limited by how homogeneous data and indicators are across these components.

For the many IWRM programme activities that were transversal or related to institutional development, it is not always easy to distinguish the programme's involvement from the general operations of the IPs, whether funded from their own resources or with support of third parties. This is limiting the ability to attribute certain institutional improvements to the programme.

Despite mitigating measures, a certain degree of response bias should be considered. Respondents from IPs and other programme stakeholders expect and have a stake in continuation of the programme, and this expectation can naturally lead to socially-desirable responses.



3 Programme context and background

3.1 Context

The four-year IWRM programme, which spans from August 2019 to August 2023, is taking place in an ever-changing environment. Where former IWRM support was originally conceived to support one Directorate (DNA), the present programme is working with the two directorates that were created in 2017, DNAAS and DNGRH. The programme had to accommodate the new institutional context resulting from the territorial expansion when the two supported ARAs merged with two other ARAs, bringing the total covered territory to more than two-thirds of the country. The Covid-19 pandemic and the consequent lockdowns had a high impact on the operations of work, efficiency and trust building. A violent battle, staged by a group linked to internal terrorism, is raging in the far north, causing widespread instability and internal displacement. Moreover, the country is experiencing a much higher frequency of tropical storms, compared to the last decades.

Since Mozambique's independence, the Dutch government has supported the country's water sector. From national coordination to local implementation, the Dutch government has been committed to institutional strengthening of the main sector organisations, both for water supply and sanitation and for water resources management. From 2002 till 2015, the institutional support was integrated in the five consecutive sectoral budget support contracts (ASAS/Apoio Sectoral de Água e Saneamento). This sector wide support came to an end. Factors that contributed to this were the lack of progress in implementing the proposed reform of DNA by the Mozambican government (2013), administrative shortcomings and later on the end of budget support by the donor community in reaction to the so-called 'hidden debt' crisis in 2016.⁸

The institutional context in Mozambique is one of decentralisation and increased autonomy of specific management functions, as well as increased (desired) private sector participation, as originally defined in the water law of 1991 and the water policy of 1995. For the urban water sector this was elaborated in the so-called Delegated Management Framework, approved in 1998. Both national directorates are concentrating on their governance responsibilities, while the decentralized entities are in charge of execution, i.e the ARAs for the management of water resources, FIPAG for urban water supply in the main cities and AIAS for the water supply in smaller towns and for urban sanitation and drainage infrastructure. The direct hierarchical relationship of these autonomous public institutions is with the sectoral Minister, while (some) coordination is expected by two National Directors in representation of the Minister.

The guiding documents are the Water Law (1991), the National Strategy on IWRM (2007), and the Water Policy (2016), which places far more emphasis on IWRM than its predecessors, which had prioritised drinking water and sanitation. It also includes a section on capacity building. Nevertheless, staffing and budget shortages continue to be a problem at all levels of the sector.

3.2 Programme background and set up

The development of a new programme for institutional support was prompted by the outcomes of an IOB evaluation. The 2017 IOB country evaluation of the Dutch IWRM support programme 2006-2016 was critical of the former programme, and institutional support at the national level was deemed rather ineffective yet necessary to ensure the success of other initiatives.⁹

⁸ Büscher, C. (2021) Water aid and trade contradictions: Dutch aid in the Mozambican waterscape under contemporary capitalism, thesis University of London/SOAS/Dep. of Development Studies; <https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/36056/>


⁹ Turner, S. (Dec 2017) IOB Evaluation: Policy review of Dutch aid policy for improved water management, 2006-2016 Mozambique country study; no 418



The new programme was further influenced by the split of the former National Directorate for Water Affairs (DNA) into a National Water Supply & Sanitation Directorate (DNAAS) and a National Water Resources Management Directorate (DNGRH). The latter has a department for International Rivers. This is relevant because the Dutch support programme also includes the continuation of the previous transboundary coordination project (PRIMA), through the Incomati and Maputo Watercourse Commission (INMACOM) housed within the offices of the DWA in Mbabane, Eswatini. Thus, the programme has been built on these five IPs – two National Directorates, two ARAs and DWA.

Delayed implementation was an issue of concern emerging from the IOB evaluation. As a result, it was decided to contract a supporting organisation referred to as Fund Manager and create a facility for external thematic Technical Assistance, referred to as Expert Facility. This set-up was expected to reduce the bureaucratic load for the EKN, to bring more synergy in the Institutional Development efforts, and to professionalise the administration and make it more efficient.¹⁰ In addition, it could stay away from the restrictions on direct budget support to national public entities, still in place in the aftermath of the 'hidden' debt crisis. The set-up was inspired by a DFID supported rural WASH Fund for the PRONASAR programme, for which UNICEF was contracted as Fund Manager and SNV as TA provider¹¹ except that in the case of the current programme, funds disbursement remained at the EKN level directly to the IP.

Figure 1: IWRM programme set-up



The National Directorates have given their institutional development programmes a special name PRODIAS for DNAAS and PROCADI for DNGRH.

With the reorganization of the Mozambican ARAs from five to three, the programme now supports two of the three remaining ARAs. Interestingly, the programme portfolio contains four river catchments that make part of the designated area of the third ARA, ARA Sul, namely the transboundary basins of the Maputo River, the Incomati River (both basins under PRIMA) and the Umbeluzi River and Save River (both activities covered by DNGRH).

The programme has a (draft) Results Framework¹² and a Theory of Change (ToC) that was developed by the FM together with the IPs in 2021, which includes final results, indicators, baseline data,

¹⁰ EKN Maputo (2019) Activity Appraisal Document ODA Integrated Water Resource Management Fund Public BEMO, p, 23

¹¹ <https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-204856/documents>

¹² The consolidated Results Framework developed by the FM together with the IPs is also presented in Annex 8.

targets, sources of information, a description of the indicators, as well as assumptions and risks¹³.

Table 2: Simplified results framework of IWRM programme

Result Framework (derived from version April 2022)			
Impacto		Indicadores	
Maior segurança da água para pelo menos 1.500.000 pessoas.		Número da população que teve a sua segurança da água reforçada pelas actividades do programa IWRM	
Resultados Finais	Resultados Intermédios	Indicadores	Explicação Resultado Final
FO1 Alocação equitativa de água	I01. Aumento do conhecimento dos recursos hídricos (alimenta FO1, FO2, FO3 e FO4)	1. Implementação de estudos e modelos das bacias e sistemas subaquáticos selecionados (Nº)	<i>O recurso hídrico é equitativamente partilhado por todos os sectores socioeconómicos: famílias, indústrias, explorações agrícolas, etc., lidando com uma realidade que mostra que esta distribuição é desigual, e alguns países e sectores são mais favorecidos do que outros.</i>
FO2 Redução do risco de cheias e secas	I02. Melhor entendimento do risco de cheias e secas (alimenta FO2)	2. Cobertura para as áreas de risco mapeadas em detalhe (%)	<i>O objectivo é reduzir a exposição da população ao ciclo recorrente e cada vez mais frequente de cheias e secas. Devem ser pastas em prática acções concretas e integradas para mitigar estes fenómenos naturais e assim permitir um desenvolvimento sustentável e harmonioso da actividade humana.</i>
	I03. Reforço do sistema de monitoria da rede hidrográfica (alimenta FO1, FO2, FO3 e FO4)	3. Estações hidrometeorológicas operacionais (%)	
	I04. Reforço da cooperação transfronteiriça (alimenta FO1, FO2, FO3 e FO4)	4. Acordos assinados ou actualizados (Nº) 5. Iniciativas* desenvolvidas dentro do Quadro dos acordos assinados (Nº)	
FO3 Melhoria de quantidade e qualidade de água	I05. Desenvolvidos instrumentos e capacidades conducente à melhoria da qualidade e quantidade de água (alimenta FO1, FO3 e FO4)	6. Estudos, projectos, modelos e intervenções em fontes de água	<i>A qualidade das fontes de água (superficiais e subterrâneas) é mantida ou melhorada, prevenindo e/ou combatendo a contaminação ou degradação devida à actividade humana.</i>
		7. Legislação produzida, unidades de controle de qualidade de água estabelecidas (Nº)	
FO4 Aumento de disponibilidade de água	I06. Estabelecida a sustentabilidade financeira das instituições do sector das águas (alimenta FO1, FO2, FO3 e FO4)	8. Evolução do nível de cobertura do orçamento de funcionamento anual com recurso a receitas próprias das ARAs (%)	<i>Para alcançar este resultado, uma maior quantidade de água (bruta e potável) estará disponível devido à melhoria da captação, tratamento, e distribuição.</i>
		9. Regulamento para reforço da autonomia das ARAs elaborado e submetido à aprovação do Governo (Nº)	
Questões Transversais	I07. Salvaguardar questões do género e desenvolvimento do sector privado	10. Mulheres beneficiárias do programa (acesso à água, protegidas dos eventos extremos (%M))	<i>Para alcançar um impacto relevante nestas matérias é necessário que mais mulheres sejam beneficiadas tanto no acesso a água como, maior segurança em situações de cheias e secas assim como sua participação nos órgãos de decisão. O sector privado é incentivado a participar nas actividades do programa através de competição aberta e transparente nos concursos públicos.</i>
		11. Empresas privadas e individuais contratados para prestação de serviços de consultoria, construção e instalação de equipamentos no âmbito do programa (Nº)	

The results identified are in line with those presented in the 2019 BEMO¹⁴ as being the final/intermediate outcomes and impact of the IWRM programme. The only difference is that one overarching 'output' linked to the four intermediate outcomes related to the institutions being able to carry out their duties with respect to water management was in the BEMO, but not included in the consolidated results framework. It should also be noted that the results framework and the ToC have a different outcome statement for Intermediate Outcome 5, since in the ToC document it is phrased as: "Project preparedness improved" instead of "Developed instruments and capabilities

¹³ To be noted that the FM was supposed to develop one consolidated Results Framework, shown above, and support the IPs to develop their individual Results Frameworks, as agreed during inception. As indicated in the 2021 FM Annual report, the FM plans to work with the IPs on their individual Results Frameworks during the second project management training planned for 2022. This has yet to materialize.

¹⁴ To be noted that compared to the consolidated results framework that focuses mostly on outcomes, in the BEMO each outcome has associated outputs that are categorized at Central and Decentral levels, and for Outcome 1 and 2 at Transboundary level too.

leading to the improvement of water quality and quantity” as presented in the consolidated results framework. Despite this descriptive difference, the activities proposed are similar in their essence.



4 Evaluations findings

4.1 Key findings of the IWRM Programme

4.1.1 Relevance

Do the programmes and projects, their outputs and outcomes have continued relevance to the Mozambican national and regional water policies and the SDGs that are targeted?

The programme responds to the link between WASH and IWRM, and was designed to focus on UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6, Water and its sub targets: 1) implementation of integrated water resources management at all levels, 2) restore water-related ecosystems and 3) expand international cooperation and capacity building by 2030. The programme also complies with SDG 13 on Climate Change, calling for urgent action to combat impacts of climate change and assist developing countries to adapt to climate change.¹⁵

The IWRM programme addresses functions two until five of the eight functions in total of IWRM: (1) Water resources planning; (2) water resources monitoring; (3) pollution control; (4) water allocation; (5) managing extremes (droughts and floods); (6) economic management; (7) information management and (8) stakeholders participation. While not complete in terms of having a fully transformative role for IWRM implementation in Mozambique, it provides a very good contribution.

It covers very diverse areas and themes, such as a transboundary river basin authority, hydrometeorological stations for EWS, regulatory frameworks, and infrastructure for flood and drought management. By incorporating specific studies of important groundwater resources, the programme also contributes to improved water security for urban water supply in specific towns. There are also studies for Nacala and Revubue basins that directly link to water security and address the need to protect vital water resources from pollution.


The design of the programme benefited from existing national strategic studies i.e. the National Water Resources Management Plan developed in 2018; and the Water Sector Action Plan for the Implementation of SDGs 2015-2030. Mozambique is also very active in transboundary cooperation implementing the regional Water Policy that promotes cooperation between riparian states as a means to avoid conflicts and achieve sustainable management of shared water resources. The geographical focus of the programme is well aligned with priorities in Sector Plans¹⁶; while the area to cover by the two ARAs in the Centre and North of Mozambique is vast, as illustrated in the map below. With the merger of the ARAs the scope of the capacity building and institutional development and planning has widened to cover the needs of the 'new' ARAs as a whole.

¹⁵ EKN Maputo (2019) Activity Appraisal Document ODA Integrated Water Resource Management Fund Public BEMO, p, 4

¹⁶ DNGRH (October 2020) Instrumento de Inquérito do País para o Indicador 6.5.1 do ODS; <http://iwrmdataportal.unepdhi.org> > Mozambique



Map 1: River basins and ARA's project sites



	Activities with specified location	
FO1 Equitable allocation		
P1.1, 1.2	Ruvubue Basin	C
P1.3, 1.4	Agreement and Stakeholders	P
P1.5	Umbeluzi Transb (DNGRH)	G
P1.6	Save Transb (DNGRH)	G
FO2 Flood (and drought) risk reduction		
P2.1	Luenha gauging station	C
P2.4	Messalo Flood model	N
P2.5	Flood level info to stakeholders	P
FO3 Water quality		
P3.1	River borders near Tete	C
P3.2	Nhartande aquifer	C
P3.3	Water quality monitoring Tete	C
P3.4	Office Metangula for Lake Niassa WQuality	C
P3.5	Offices Lichinga (a) and Mocimboa dP (b)	N
P3.7	Aquifer use Palma (a) and Metuge (b)	N
FO4 Availability of water		
P4.1	Small dam Tete (a), others not yet	C
P4.3	Songo Polytechnic training	C
P4.6	Raw water alternatives Quelimane	C
P4.8	Sediment flow Zambeze dam sites	C
-	Aquifer of Nacala (DNGRH)	G
P=PRIMA, G=DNGRH, C=ARA-Centro; N=ARA Norte		

The programme was designed as continuation of the former budget support yet with a long-term focus to strengthen regulatory frameworks and support the decentralization of functions to ARAs. It is aligned to an on-going institutional transition from implementation at central level to 'contract management' and devolution of functions to decentralized institutions such as ARAs. Under this current setup the central level entities such as the National Directorate they will concentrate on developing regulation, securing sector funding, strategic national studies and ensuring national coordination and harmonization of practices across the country. This type of transition also demands that capacity is created at IP level for outsourcing of certain services and activities.

The underlying plans and activities were formulated by the IPs most already in 2018), hence it is based on their own core activities and institutional priorities. The BeMO elaborated the four overarching priorities/objectives for the programme: 1) Equitable allocation for water, 2) Flood risks reduced, 3) Water quality improved, and 4) Availability of water for water users increased. Some IP stakeholders were of the opinion that EKN had added these priorities quite late into the design of the programme, sometimes after they had already designed their proposals based on own national result frameworks, as related during interviews and noted during a Steering Committee meeting in

March 2020.¹⁷ While the annual plan tries to link all these priorities, this feels as a slightly artificial exercise.

The programme is putting a lot of emphasis on floods and droughts. Floods, droughts and cyclones occur several times per decade, spread over the country, with variable impact on people and economy.

Table 3: Number of people affected by natural disasters (occurrence 1980-2020)¹⁸

	Drought	Flood	Storm
People > 10.000	12	18	10
People >100.000	12	12	8
People >1.000.000	7	1	2

An inventory on risk profiles of primary schools in Mozambique shows the vast spreading of these disasters.¹⁹ The report found 72% of the schools being located in a high risk area for at least one of the four natural disasters. Annex 5 provides a map of the high risk zones.

Table 4: Risk profiles of primary schools in Mozambique

N-16.764 schools	High Risk	Medium Risk	Low Risk
Cyclones	30%	33%	37%
Floods	8%	32%	60%
Drought	19%	64%	17%
Earthquake	18%	48%	34%
At least one of them	72%		

Analysis of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) tool Waterrisk filter²⁰ on climate change risks do not show an increase of flood risks, despite the higher cyclone intensity of the last years, but they show a moderate increase of drought risks. Drought risk management is captured under all objectives/outcomes (allocation, risk management, water quality and availability) of the IWRM programme, but far less visible than flood risk management, while droughts have much larger negative impacts than floods on casualties and economy than floods.

The programme is rather limited to the technical side of risk reduction, while communication and prevention campaigns are also relevant. To achieve the expected impact the programme would have to actively seek partnership and complementarity with an on-going programme led by the National Institute for Disaster Management funded by the World Bank with the objective of ensuring the dissemination of disaster related information to the last mile.²¹ In 2017, Mozambique approved its Disaster Risk Reduction Plan (DRRP) covering 2017 – 2030, and the current activities within the IWRM programme contribute to the goals set in the DRRP by investing in infrastructure for collection of hydrometeorological information.

Overall the programme has continued relevance on the national and regional policies and priorities, and the SDGs.

Were the objectives of the projects clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established schedule and with the allocated resources (including the additional external management support and technical assistance)?

¹⁷ Minutes of the IWRM Steering committee, 13 March 2020

¹⁸ Main sources for analysis: US Office Disaster Register and Wikipedia

¹⁹ UEM-FAPF (2015) Safer Schools Project in Mozambique "Developing Guidelines in School Safety and Resilient School Building Codes in Mozambique", Executive Summary of Diagnosis and Recommendations

²⁰ <https://waterriskfilter.org/explore/map>; for some maps see Annex 7

²¹ ARA-Centro stated to have sought alignment with other actors on sensitization activities in communities on flood risks in the Zambezi basin, and on good environmental practices such as in the Nhartanda Verde project.



At IP level the stated objectives were clear and realistic, but this was much less the case at programmatic level, which leaves a big space between activities and the intended final outcomes of the programme. For the original project plans, the budget for the direct activities, related to the result framework is 33%, while the combined institutional support and transversal activities reach at 67% of the budget.

Allocated resources were badly estimated, as planned expenditures were over/under estimated from year to year, when comparing annual plans with reports (especially from initial budgets to 2020 budget, and from 2020 to 2021 budget). FO1 (allocation) had 9%, FO2 (risk reduction) had 9 %, FO3 (water quality) had 5% and FO4 (Water availability) had 10% of the budget.²²

To what extent have the programme and projects been taking into account the lessons learned from past IWRM programs in Mozambique?

The IWRM programme is a continuation of achievements of past programmes, most notably of ASAS, WB IWRM, PRIMA I, ARA-Zambeze I. For instance, the improvement of hydrological monitoring is an exact result from previous programmes. However, in some cases a long gap between programmes has eroded the gains achieved in the previous phases. The almost 7 year gap between the closing of PRIMA I and its restart as PRIMA II is a case in point, in which the long space between the two halted the progress made in the first phase.²³ PRIMA II had to re-establish an institutional set up from where to operate as well as bringing the identified actions and strategies in PRIMA I forward.

The design of the programme followed lessons and recommendations from the IOB country study with regard to the focus of the programme, inclusion of national level actors, and the way capacity development was provided to ARAs before, such as implementation activities supporting capacity development. The IOB recommendation to place emphasis on sub-regional level (ARAs)²⁴ was partly followed up by the development of a new partnership with ARA-Norte, but the recommendation is not sufficiently translated when the budgets of the IPs are compared (€ 8.2 million at ARA level against € 7.5 million at national level).

Another recommendation to strengthen the coordination role of the EKN²⁵ also stayed without follow-up, as it was expected that the FM would reduce the work load for EKN. The first IOB recommendation had included the suggestion to create a fund manager²⁶, which was by then considered by the EKN, following an earlier suggestion from the ASAS MTR²⁷. But the outsourcing of Government to Government funding to a private fund manager was obstructed by the MFA for legal reasons. The labels Fund and Fund Manager were maintained, however, while these didn't match with the actual function.

The IOB country study also concluded that it was difficult to assess effectiveness in a programme that was dominated by institutional development²⁸; an observation that is still very valid, and omitted in the set-up of the present programme. Looking at the evaluation questions in the overall IOB evaluation of Dutch IWRM programmes²⁹, many of them are still valid and cannot be positively assessed in the present programme, such as those related to cross cutting themes (climate,

²² Analysed from the 4 Mozambique project plans that were part of the BeMo (2019)

²³ Reasons for this long gap were political and organisational changes that affected decisions on hosting of the secretariat, and delays in formulating the current IWRM programme in its current form.

²⁴ Turner, S. (2017) IOB Evaluation; Policy review of Dutch aid policy for improved water management, 2006-2016 Country Report Mozambique no. 418 Recommendation 1 under Effectiveness

²⁵ Turner (2017) Recommendation 9 under Efficiency

²⁶ Turner (2017) Page 100, recommendation 1: "...The mechanism of a fund manager, already used by DFID and under consideration by the EKN, is a promising way of maintaining GOM authority over expenditure decisions while controlling disbursements through external channels."

²⁷ Act for Performance (30 June 2016) Power Point presentation MTR and Value for Money study of the Apoio Sectoral ao Sector de Aguas (ASAS) program; slides 23 and 24

²⁸ Conclusion 13 on Policy Development: "The analysis of efficiency is more than usually difficult for a portfolio that emphasised institutional development."

²⁹ IOB Evaluation (Dec 2017) Tackling major water challenges, Policy review of Dutch development aid policy for improved water management, 2006-2016; no. 418 |Box 1 with evaluation questions at page 35|



environmental sustainability, gender and pro-poor). Apart from the IOB country study, the programme design could have incorporated more of these observations from the IOB evaluation.

How appropriate are the results frameworks and its elements?

When analysing the results framework with the annual plans and annual reports from the IPs, it becomes clear that the FM attempted to combine activities of the four different Mozambican projects while identifying common intermediate objectives so to start developing a “programme” logic. However, the result lacks coherence and from a results-based management perspective there are some gaps that need to be addressed, if the results framework is to be used actively and owned by the IPs. The main gap in its design is the absence of outputs/results to which activities can contribute to. The results framework in its current form provides a list of indicators connected to the intermediate outcomes (IOs) and final outcomes (FOs), although the link to these (mostly) outcome indicators is not clear, as there is no mention of the activities related to them. Moreover, the indicators do not seem to be fully connected to the range of activities implemented by the IPs, as they only provide a partial overview of what needs to be tracked within the IWRM programme. In addition, it is unclear how the range of activities of different nature (directly linked to FOs, institutional support or transversal) are currently contributing to the achievement of the identified indicators, as the level of aggregation does not allow for such comparison.

There are several logical links that are currently missing from the RF. The main link that is missing is the one between the institutional support and transversal activities, and the identified indicators and intermediate outcomes. The RF is focused on direct implementation, while the majority of activities and budget is on institutional development or transversal aspects. Of the 2022 budget, just 45% of the planned budget has a direct relation with the FOs, while 25% is for institutional strengthening and 30% for transversal activities, but all identified indicators and IOs are mostly related to the direct activities addressing the FOs of the programme. Another link that is missing is the one between the IOs in their current formulation - in fact many of the IOs link to several FOs at the same time, and some IOs are rather “immediate” outcomes needed for the intermediate outcomes to materialize - for example IO3 is needed for IO1 to occur, and IO1 is needed in order to reach IO2. This logic chain is missing from the RF, which could have had different levels of achievement - by defining outputs, the link between IOs would have been more explicit. Moreover, some indicators do not seem to have any tangible link with the activities implemented by the IPs - such as indicators 8 (level of coverage of the annual operating budget from Ara’s revenues) or 10 (programme’s women beneficiaries) and the format of the Excel sheet is misleading. Finally, IO7 related to gender mainstreaming has no direct and visible activities linked to it. Combining the IO and indicators for all IPs only works if the links to the IPs activities are clear, which is not the case considering that for now they are all mixed and there are no output indicators that would be the logical step of aggregation before identifying overarching outcome indicators that look more at the outcome of the programme as a whole. For this reason, the consolidated and PRIMA II results frameworks indicators are largely phrased as operational plans, and the majority of targets are quantified as percentages without a clear link to necessary outputs to achieve them, which makes the appreciation of progress challenging.

As for the elements that constitute the RF, there are few considerations to make. The sources of information are not accurate, as they mostly mention the annual report or field visits/meetings, but it is unclear what the actual source of monitoring information is. The annual report is supposed to present the results but it is not a working document where IPs can track progress. The indicator descriptions provide context related to the indicator but do not define how the indicator will be measured/calculated, which is the key information to insert. Finally, risks and assumptions are incomplete and generalized, as they are not sufficiently linked to the individual intermediate outcomes, so it is difficult to appreciate whether contextual and contributing factors for the implementation of the specific activities have been taken into account when developing the indicators and targets of the programme. For example, the risk of security events in Cabo Delgado only has an influence on activities implemented in the north of Mozambique, while now it is indicated as a generalized risk. Similarly, the generalized assumption that there has to be stability of the institutional framework would have benefitted from more details on the institutional framework of



reference, which IPs are concerned and for which IOs specifically. Finally, there are no measures included on how risks can be mitigated.

4.1.2 Coherence

How do you judge the coherence between the various components within each project (in terms of consistency and synergy, i.e. whether the components are logic and contributing to the same outputs and outcomes)?

The five different projects have been developed before the overall IWRM programme logics were conceptualized, which resulted in having projects that have a list of activities that show weak links between each other. Each IP has identified a set of direct activities that were later categorized as contributing directly to different IOs and FOs and institutional support activities and transversal activities. In fact, the link between institutional support/transversal activities and the FOs is currently not made explicit in the programme design, and the set of activities within each IP seem to be working in silos. The activities seem to match better with the prevailing national agenda, especially for the national and transversal components, than with the programme. Certain components currently read as a list of institutional needs which are “solved” through implementation of activities, with only few logical clusters (e.g. small dams); this hampers the coherence and intervention logic for certain projects and the programme as a whole.

Inconsistencies between programme components could have been prevented through an elaborated Programme Proposal and external assessment. The only documents at programme level are the BeMo, which is drafted by the EKN and cannot be considered as a document that is owned by the IPs, and the MoU. The programme as a whole did not follow a fully external Quality at Entry assessment (Q@E). Four of the five individual proposals were externally reviewed. Three of these reviews were conducted by a consultant that was close to the former programme, with the feedback given as a review to make improvements rather than a Q@E. The fourth proposal (of DNAAS) was screened as Q@E (with a positive assessment) but also this consultant had been very close to the project design (of the other proposals). The ARA-Zambeze proposal was not externally assessed at all. The proposals for DNAAS, DNGRH and PRIMA had not yet been using the overall Logical Framework and result areas, as defined in the BeMo. Also, contract finalisations was done in a period that the former EKN WASH secretary was leaving, the successor arrived two months after, while a part of the two months gap was filled by hiring one of the Q@E screeners.

As introduced previously, activities and the way they are categorized might not link to the right FOs – for example the monitoring of sediment transport from ARA-Centro that is currently linked to FO2, should also be linked to IO1 (better water knowledge) and therefore FO4 (availability; as they lead to dam construction). Similarly, the National Groundwater Development and Management Plan to be completed by DNGRH is currently classified as an institutional support activity, although there should be a direct link to the “ground water” realm of activities that are linked to IO1 (and FO1 (allocation), although also here FO4 (availability) could have been better). Finally, the revision of regulations (related to Decree 30/2003 and 15/2004) implemented by DNAAS is classified as a transversal activity, but their impact can be linked directly to FO3 (water quality). These examples³⁰ show how many activities cannot be solely categorized as being support activities or linked to specific outcomes, as their degree of influence is multifaceted. Categorizing activities under an assigned programme design that did not necessarily fit the already pre-identified activities results into a scarce coherence amongst its components.

³⁰ Other examples can be seen in the de-constructed ToC in the Mural in Annex 5, with newly defined links between activities – IOs – FOs have been created (and coloured in pink).



Another issue in the programme logic is linked to the lack of consequence in the way activities are currently categorized – namely some activities should be logically connected to others, or grouped under one umbrella as they need to materialize together in order for the objective to be achieved.³¹

Finally, the impact statement is also not logically connected to the outcomes and outputs. While from a programmatic perspective the four identified FOs should in fact increase water security for the targeted population, it is unclear how the identified activities are contributing to better water security to 1.5 million people. It is unclear how this target will be measured, and which IP/activity is contributing to its achievement. No guidance is provided by the MFA on its principle central target for IWRM. It should at least distinguish beneficiaries that are better protected against flood risks from people for which the access to (drinking) water is better secured in times of disasters (droughts, floods, pollution, pipe bursts) or have even got better access to (drinking) water (such as under FO4 with storage dams or identified fresh aquifers).

How do you judge the external coherence, in terms of synergies and interlinkages between the four (4) Mozambican projects, and synergy or overlaps with other programmes, if any (for example through the World Bank and African Development Bank)?

The coherence between the four Mozambican projects is rather weak. Generally there seems to be little coordination between the different IP projects, with few exceptions (e.g. lake Niassa office; small dams and groundwater). The projects are managed in silos by the IPs and there are little interactions between them except for exchange of information during SC meetings. There are no joint activities such as joint action plan on outcomes of Organisational Risk and Integrity Assessments (ORIAS), shared TA plan, trainings/seminars, joint external communication such as a programme website, but more incidental collaborations.³²

In terms of programme design, there are clear differences in the programme logic interpretations by the different IPs. For example, PRIMA II considers its 'agreement' to be directly linked to FO2 (risk reduction), while DNGRH and DNAAS have it under transversal activities. The same applies for the development of information systems. ARA-Centro classified its water resource studies under FO4 (availability), but ARA-Norte has included them under FO1 (allocation). Finally, the interpretation of institutional support and transversal activities amongst IPs differ and is not consistent, and considering the range of planned activities (and budget allocated, as will be shown later) related to these, they should be linked to FOs directly for clarity.

The MTR team has developed a reconstructed ToC in the Mural platform (Annex 5) that represents to what extent identified activities and objectives are coherent within IPs projects, and across different IPs.³³ In the Mural, MDF has assigned different pathways of influence (in pink) that in our view better link activities with the identified IOs and clarifies the currently missing link between institutional support, transversal activities and activities supposedly directly related to IOs/FOs. The MTR team used the Mural to define new and better suited pathways of change that would more adequately represent the links between activities from all the IPs (including PRIMA II, which was excluded from the FM ToC).


³¹ For example, P1.2022.DNAAS.ATR needs to be completed and its outcome will inform P2.2022.DNAAS.ATR, or the purchase of material and equipment for the telemetric stations is a pre-condition for their installation. Other activities could have been grouped, such the ARA Centro activities in support of Nhartanda Verde for ARA Centro, or the small dams related activities of ARA Centro and ARA Norte (please refer to the Mural for more examples and details).

³² A consultation of the websites of the four Mozambican IPs also show that this medium is hardly used for programmatic communication, such as news, tender calls, publication of monthly bulletins. The information on the ARAs at the DNGRH website is fully outdated, despite the claim made in the 2021 annual report that it was kept up to date. Links to each other are absent (except at the ARA-Norte website) and the ARA-Centro website seems to be hardly used.

³³ The ToC was reconstructed on the basis of the ToC as presented and developed by the FM, the consolidated RF with identified indicators, and annual reports from FM that assigned activities to FOs,



Figure 2: Reconstructed ToC IWRM



In this reconstructed ToC, MDF has especially factored in the contribution of institutional support in achieving the FOs, and for which IO4, IO7 (a and b, as newly defined), IOZ and IOX all contribute to, and added a new FO (Institutional capacity) which captures the range of activities that fall within IO6 (Financial Sustainability), as well as Outputs 3 and 4 from PRIMA II. Output 2 now links directly to IO4, while Output 1 is the result of Outputs 2-3-4 combined and links directly to FO1 and FO2. The FM support is now included in the institutional outcome group because of their contribution to project management’s technical assistance, and the Expert Facility (and others) have been included in the thematic intermediate outcome group, which has not changed in its essence. IPs will have to define in which way the previously categorized IO7 (Gender Mainstreaming) can be de facto integrated into the programme design, as for now the identified activities contributions to it are limited. Finally, the Final Impact of reaching 1,5 million people with safe water is still relevant and it is directly linked to the four main FOs.

Regarding external coherence, there are a number of external but similar programmes in Mozambique. Other parallel initiatives and programmes, whether financed through MFA (e.g. Blue Deal, Beira Master Plan, NUFFIC, etc.) or other donors (e.g. SINAS, PRAVIDA, and World Bank projects, such as the National Water Resources Development Project³⁴), are to be linked to the Netherlands-supported programme. There is significant complementarity with Blue Deal, and coherence is actively sought, which is especially done through the Blue Deal coordinator in Mozambique, who is also providing advisory services for the IWRM programme in ARA-Centro and is an observer in the SC. Blue Deal is also partly engaged in the transboundary relations for the Incomati and Maputo Basins. Cooperation is less so for NUFFIC, which Orange Knowledge project is more focused on the integration between IWRM and agriculture³⁵. Also, Beira Master Plan activities are not visible in this IWRM programme.

³⁴ <https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/432801624030222109/pdf/Mozambique-Water-Resources-Development-Project.pdf>

³⁵ NUFFIC (September 2019) Mozambique - Country Plan of Implementation Orange Knowledge Programme, second revised version September 2019.

The IWRM programme builds further on an earlier World Bank support programme (the National Water Resources Development Project), which also had a combination of Institutional Strengthening and concrete works (with a major component for the works related to the Corumana Dam). Although this programme mainly focused on the South of Mozambique, there were parallel components which covered Zambeze Basin and the institutional support services were extended to ARA-Centro and ARA-Norte. For PRIMA II, there could have been complementarity with REMCO (twinning of the three country basin authorities for Incomati and Maputo rivers with Dutch and German Water Authorities covering Vecht Basin), but this is hardly visible and also Blue Deal is not actively related to them. Montepuez and Metuge activities were initially transferred to other donors, however there are efforts made to realign the Montepuez activity to this IWRM programme.

Donor coordination on water is chaired by the EKN until September 2022. For IWRM there is a working group chaired by the World Bank. During Covid-19 this working group had been rather passive and needs a re-boot.

How do you judge the roles of the Steering Committee and Fund Manager to create internal and external coherence?

The programmatic set up of having a Fund Manager and a Steering Committee was expected to reduce the bureaucratic load for the EKN, maximize the ownership of IPs over the programme, and bring more (internal) synergy on institutional development components and as such leverage the interest of other donors. At the same time, the BeMO indicated that since the Netherlands coordinates the subgroup of IWRM related donors, those donor meetings would be used to stimulate cooperation and prevent overlap³⁶, hence a role for EKN to ensure external coherence. At this moment there does not seem to be leadership taken at programme level. The current design does not specify leadership between EKN, FM and/or SC, and who should bear responsibility for what.

FM was expected to give support to internal coherence, however FM has remained relatively passive on this point. While there is progress on uniformity of the RF and annual reports, this does not yet contribute to internal coherence and synergy.

The IPs could have taken joint leadership over the programme in the SC, but the MoU is not describing that role. The coordination of the SC itself rotates among IPs. The SC is called 'Comité de Acompanhamento' in Portuguese. The term acompanhamento translated more into providing guidance than directing. This is also reflected in the MoU of November 2019, in which the following functions are mentioned: 1) discuss aggregated annual plans and reports (p. 22), 2) endeavour harmonization and alignment (p. 24), 3) discuss relevant external and national issues (p. 24), and 4) discuss MTRs and end-evaluation (p. 47). While harmonization and alignment could be interpreted as ensuring coherence, currently, the SC mostly provides space for exchange but does not ensure leadership on internal and external coherence. Since some of the key documents such as the ORIAS and aggregated plans and annual reports were not ready during the short inception phase and at the time of the initial SC meetings, this further hampered ensuring the internal coherence of the programme.

As a consequence, EKN had to take more management roles than it envisaged at the start, and by its design EKN has probably become the real owner of the programme.

4.1.3 Effectiveness

To what extent are the programme and projects on track to achieve their goals, objectives and results?

The programme is generally not on track, both in terms of activity implementation and budget expenditure. There are several reasons that can explain the major delays in implementation –

³⁶ EKN Maputo (2019) Activity Appraisal Document ODA Integrated Water Resource Management Fund Public BEMO, p. 23



external factors such as the impact of Covid-19 and confrontations in the north of the country clearly hampered progress, although the main reasons for delays could be attributed to internal management and contextual factors. The programme set-up, with confusion on how the programme was to be managed by FM and EKN, can explain the slow start and the difficulty in coordinating the rollout of activities. Moreover, the heavy and inefficient procedures for contracting and procurement were mentioned by all IPs as being a major delay factor, to which the FM had offered little support. As for the international component of the programme, it had to first move from eSwatini's government funding to the IWRM contract, and had no office nor staff initially. Hence, 1 to 1,5 years was lost before external services could be provided, and the inception period was too short to accommodate this. Budget expenditures stand at 15% of total by 31/12/2021, which is quite low considering that the programme just entered its third year of implementation, and it is to be noted that the most prominent budget expenditures relate to institutional support and transversal activities.

As mentioned in the coherence section, it is unclear how the impact target of an increased number of 1,5 million of people with improved water security was determined and most importantly how it is going to be measured, or which entity within the IWRM programme implementation (EKN, FM or IPs) is responsible for its tracking. Descending from the impact statement and by looking at the progress on the four main FO, progress is still unclear. Judging by budget expenditures the number of activities completed/on track, and capacity to spend budget allocated for the year, FO2 seems to be most on track.

For tracking actual progress on implementation, the use of 30 sub-indicators of SDG6.5.1 to measure progress could be a good yardstick, as DNGRH is making such reports (2016 and 2020) and 70% of the indicators are addressed by the programme. This could be a valuable indicator for the Institutional Strengthening efforts. The below 2020 reference could act as baseline, as the programme had not yet really started by then.

Table 5: SDG 6.5.1 indicator scoring³⁷

SDG 6.5.1 indicator scoring	National		Local		Transboundary		Total	
	Baseline	2020	Baseline	2020	Baseline	2020	Baseline	2020
1. Policy context	90	93	55	70	40	60	70	80
2. Institutions and participation	90	94	60	35	80	80	84	78
3. Water management	32	46	47	57	80	90	42	54
4. Financial resources	40	35	40	35	40	40	40	36
Overall	63	67	50	49	60	68	59	62
		4		-1		8		3
Number of indicators	15	15	8	9	4	4	27	28
Number to which progr contributes	10	11	6	6	3	3	19	20
	67%	73%	75%	67%	75%	75%	70%	71%
scoring of those to which it contributes	66	71	45	57	67	77	59	68
<i>Increase of score</i>		5		12		10		8

The organized trainings (budgeted for within IPs budgets) were positively assessed by the IPs, although they are still few in number. At institutional level, the action plans of the ORIAS, contracting of new staff and experience with outsourcing have overall contributed to better capacity on project-oriented modality.

The following two graphs represent the percentage of the number of activities³⁸ that are currently not implemented/of which progress is unclear (grey), or limited progress (yellow), in progress (light green), completed (dark green) or cancelled (red). The first graph disaggregates the status of

³⁷ SDG 6.5.1 scores as derived from the Mozambique national reports for baseline (year not provided) and October 2020. The full list of indicators can be found in the DNGRH report (Oct 2020)


³⁸ The source used to determine the level of progress on activities for both graphs are the 2021 annual reports from IPs, approved by EKN.

activities by FO/Transversal Activity/Institutional Support, while the second graph shows the level of achievement by IP by 31/12/2021.

Figure 3: Activities implementation progress by FO/Institutional Support/Transversal Activities as of 31/12/2021



Figure 4: Activities implementation progress by IPs as of 31/12/2021



Amongst all IPs, PRIMA II seems to be the component with the slowest progress on their activity implementation. In the first two years (2020 and 2021) the progress was minimal with most of the activities not being implemented, nor contracted with suppliers, which was also related with the fact that funding had to be reorganized from eSwatini government channels to the programme channel. However, 2022 has seen slightly more progress as Terms of Reference and tenders have been drafted and issued respectively (i.e. the Management Information System, Comprehensive Agreement and the Disaster management plan for the INCOMATI), and recruiting office staff has commenced. The achievement of PRIMA II objectives will depend on retaining/procuring key staff, how efficiently the tenders will be managed and when activities will actually start, as for now there has not been significant progress, especially in the achievement of the FOs.

DNGRH seems to be well on track especially in relation to the FOs, particularly FO 1, 2 and 3. The studies are at their final stages (water quality standards and hydrological potential of Nacala), some tenders have been launched (for UCCS, small dams) and the standard model for the functioning of basin committee has been completed. While DNGRH has well advanced in the activities that are directly linked to the FOs, it shows a slower progress for the transversal activities and the institutional support. While equipment has been purchased, the digitalization of documents is ongoing, HR has been recruited and the webpage is operational (although outdated in some aspects), some other transversal activities such as developing a water resources database, develop dam safety standards, the reinforcement of cross border cooperation, and the M&E missions are at very early stages of implementation with low expenditures. The tender for the audit has been launched, as well as the contest for the strategic plan of human resources. Other activities show no progress at all, both for institutional support and transversal activities, for example the National Plan for the Development and Management of groundwater or the MIS (for which the hiring process has begun, but no expenditures so far).

DNAAS cannot count on many achievements so far regarding the activities directly linked to the FOs (DNAAS contributes to FO1, 2 and 3), as the strategies have not been developed, the market analysis of the faecal sludge management should be under the expert facility implementation (although its progress is unclear), and the expression of interest for the workshop on the (bulk) water resale experience is now being requested. As for institutional support and transversal activities, results are

mixed –on one hand there has been good progress on the HR recruitment and various equipment purchase, while on the other hand the regulations and agreements show a slower progress (either at expression of interest or ToR phase). It must be noted also that most of the progress emerged recently and DNAAS needs to focus on the activities directly linked to the FOs, which are well behind schedule of project implementation.

Contrary to the central institutions, the activities of ARA-Centro that are directly linked to the FOs are generally progressing well with mixed results per FO—those related to the better understanding of flood and drought risk (IO2) and the development of instruments and capabilities leading to the water quality and quantity improvement (IO5), and the increased knowledge (IO1) show tangible progress, while implementation is still at very early stages for those activities in relation to the reinforcement of the hydrographic network monitoring system (IO3). As for the institutional support and transversal activities such as on Niassa with ARA-Norte, seems to be well advancing also in terms of expenditures.

The results for ARA-Norte are quite mixed, with the exception of the institutional support that is either completed or well on track for most of its activities – although offices construction/rehabilitation have not started yet. Especially when it comes to the completion of activities in direct relation to the FOs, ARA-Norte seems to have progressed less than ARA-Centro, as only the equipment purchase and the training of technicians seems to be in progress, while other activities, such as the construction of telemetry stations, are at its very early stages. In addition, compared to other IPs, many activities of ARA-Norte have been cancelled and for others the progress is nil or unclear, such as the gross water users registration campaign and the aquifer studies. In addition, all activities related to small dams are not advancing, compared to a reasonable progress on the same activities from ARA-Centro. It must be noted though that the vast majority of activities was not implemented due to the security situation, the lack of resources and the fact that some activities are to be implemented through the Expert Facility, for which procurement is long and delayed.

To what extent has the support of the Fund Manager contributed to a more effective and a higher quality of implementation, for example through their support to procurement of goods and services?

While deliverables have seen extensive delays and multiple feedback rounds were needed to enhance the quality, the outputs and guidance provided by the FM has gradually improved over time. The benefits of the TA from the FM have increasingly become recognizable and encompass a range of different types of support. While the finalization of the action plans and the ORIA was severely delayed, their preparation and especially the remarks generated from them have led to a general performance improvement from the IPs. Similarly, the hiring of a well known Mozambican IWRM specialist that came from the same institutional networks as the IPs has helped the FM to increase acceptance vis-à-vis the IPs and gain a better understanding of the water resource management programme activities and expectations. Other visible improvements relate to the annual reporting format which shows some improvement from 2020 to 2021, with an attempt to code and consolidate activities within FOs or institutional support/transversal activities, which provided some form of programme feeling to what in 2020 seemed like a mere list of activities with scarce internal coherence and link with other projects implemented by fellow IPs. Despite this, there are several inconsistencies between the annual plans and the annual reports, both in terms of budget expenditures and information on the implementation of the activities – these inconsistencies affect the reliability and validity of the data and information presented, and the FM should have ensured a more thorough quality control on these deliverables. Although individual Results Frameworks have finally not been developed, contrary to what was agreed during the inception period, the FMs eventually managed to consolidate IPs contributions to FOs, defining IOs and indicators within a consolidated Results Framework, keeping in mind the necessary improvements that will have to be acted upon in order to make the tool more accurate and comprehensive (as explained under Relevance). Thorough comments from FM to IPs on expenditures, which constitutes an essential element of a sound programme management, also show consistent support in the reporting process.



Despite the efforts of the FM to provide the necessary guidance and support to the IPs in the programme management, the lack of leadership within the programme and the lack of knowledge of national regulations made them too bureaucratic and dependent on EKN, who in turn would have expected a higher involvement of the FM in the programme management. The FM also seems to lack a sound understanding of ToRs (their contribution to the procurement ToRs is weak; and they are sometimes by-passed by the IPs) and logics of activities, which also resulted in the activities of the programme being managed in silo with the FM having a marginal role in creating links among them. Finally, the procedure manual was well received by all parties, but it is still under review for simplification.

How do you judge the involvement of Technical Assistance by external service providers including the Expert Facility?

The Expert Facility was incorporated in the programme set-up as an instrument through which long and short term IWRM expertise could be hired, and as such decrease the TA procurement time. There was also an assumption related to the EFs contribution to private sector engagement and the Dutch aid to trade policy objective, as noted in the BeMO. "As the Expert Facility will be managed by three leading Dutch consultancy firms, with associated or subcontracted Mozambican firms, it is expected that the cooperation programme will contribute to the strengthening of business links between the Netherlands and Mozambique."³⁹ The expectations on type of TA differed between the EF consultancy firms and the IPs. EF consultancy firms expected short-term advisory roles⁴⁰, while in reality more large-scale projects are requested.

The three Dutch firms have had varying experiences with the EF so far, as interviews with their representatives indicated. One firm has successfully tendered for the three ToRs that have been shared via the EF since its inception. The other two firms have so far not won any of the tenders⁴¹, and also lamented the expectation raised at the time of the RfP for the framework agreement.

The EF is currently not working well. The consultancy firms have not received much information on the programme so far, nor on expected ToRs in the pipeline. Considering they need to respond to a ToR with a short proposal in a short time span of 2 weeks, they feel that it is very difficult to present a well-developed and fully feasible plan for the complex questions in remote areas that are raised in the ToRs. There is no jointly developed TA plan in the programme, so ToRs are based on individual IPs needs. The ToRs are often considered unrealistic by the receiving consultancy firms⁴², and it is unclear to them who performs QA on ToRs (EKN or FM). IPs drafted the ToRs, the FM was responsible for reviewing and improving them, and finally the EKN approves them before they are shared with the Dutch firms.⁴³ The contract had indicated that the FM would deliver "support to drawing up the ToRs, selection of experts from short-listed candidates and monitoring the experts' performance".⁴⁴ In practice however, the FM has remained largely invisible to the three consultancy firms and the firms were surprised by the poor quality of outgoing ToRs. Furthermore, the role of EKN performing the contract management as per the framework agreement, is considered problematic when during execution of a project difficulties or risks materialize. The tendency of the firms is to discuss difficulties with EKN first since they have consequences on contracts and costs, while IPs are intended to be the main sparring partners for the firms. This does not contribute to good collaboration and trust between the IPs and consultancy firms on the won tenders. The TA scope of EF is limited to IWRM issues (not institutional development or project management TA needs) which

³⁹ EKN Maputo (2019) Activity Appraisal Document ODA Integrated Water Resource Management Fund Public BEMO, p, 18

⁴⁰ The Framework Agreement documents refer to the service of individual experts, indeed suggesting a rather simple advisory role

⁴¹ One consultancy firm did not submit any proposal, the other lost one of its bids.

⁴² Examples given include drilling programmes without pre-feasibility studies, no time to find the necessary local sub-contractors for drilling, proposed 60,000 EUR budgets inadequate for the expected activities amounting to 160.000.

⁴³ FM (2020) Manual de Procedimentos IWRM, p. 26

⁴⁴ Public Service Contract Fund Management for IWRM Programmes in Mozambique, between the state of the Netherlands, and Act for Performance in combination with Prowater Consultores, 26th July 2019.



IPs consider too narrow. Furthermore, IPs consider EF companies not flexible enough and EF experts to be too expensive. In the programme budget there are two additional reservations for TA (an additional € 1 million for institutional TA and € 0,5 million for the EF) which could have been used to solve budget shortages with the EF bidding and to cover TA needs on organisational strengthening. The MTR team concludes that the EF did not function as had been intended owing to a mismatch in expectations on budgets and expected delivery of services, procedural challenges, and finally lack of quality assurance on the ToRs and visible guidance by the FM.

4.1.4 Efficiency

To what extent did programme stakeholders timely executed their tasks and duties within the framework of the programme?

As partly mentioned in the Effectiveness section, the programme has experienced significant delays in its implementation and that is reflected in slow progress on IP activities rollout, as well as in the delayed submission of key deliverables needed for the proper management of the programme. The limited progress made at IP level is reasonably in line with the limited budget spent. This is different for the FM, which did use all its budget, while not having delivered all the required output.⁴⁵

The plans and reports submission from IPs was not done in a timely fashion (several delays in their submission since the start of the programme) and, as it is visible from the detailed portfolio analysis, the development of the ToRs for contracts/service provision was also considerably delayed and only started becoming consistent as from 2021. The delays in producing the requested annual reports specific for the Dutch funding also had a trickle-down effect in the review and approval of these documents. The FM reports, as they are based on the IPs individual reports, were also delayed and in turn EKN, probably due to HR constraints, seem to be slow in the formal approval of documents (plans, reports and ToRs), which adds to the delays in the entire process. Furthermore, the drafting of and quality assurance of ToRs did not go smoothly, and considering that the programme implementation is heavily dependent on procurement and tenders, the delays in the approval of ToRs had a direct effect in the timeliness of activity execution, which can only start once the procurement process is finalized.


How do you judge the efficiency of resource use (human resources and financial resources) to achieve the outcomes and outputs of the projects?

The analysis of the planned and actual expenditures per FO (including institutional support and transversal activities) for every year of implementation provides a good overview of how budgets have been allocated and spent by the IPs since the start of the IWRM programme.

Figure 5: Planned vs Actuals budget by FO 2020-2022 in EUR

⁴⁵ Their input has been about 2 full time equivalents per year, which reduced a bit during the Covid-19 pandemic.





First, budget allocations have varied considerably since 2020. For all FOs, institutional support and transversal activities, the budgets have increased every year, with a very prominent spike in the planned budgets for the activities from 2021 to 2022 for FO1, FO3, FO4 and institutional support, while FO2 and transversal activities for this year have stabilised at the same level as for 2021.⁴⁶

Not only budget allocations varied from year to year, but also the budget allocated per FO has varied since the programme inception: in 2020 most of the direct budget for the FOs was covered by FO1 and FO2, while in 2022 FO1 has the highest budget together with FO4, which had the lowest allocated budget in 2020. As most of the activities connected to FO4 relate to infrastructure creation (small dams), the discrepancy could be due to an underestimation of expenses during the first year of implementation, before launching any tender.

Another consideration regarding the planned budgets relates to the difference between the activities that are directly related to the FOs and the institutional support and transversal activities –the latter have a considerably higher budgets (1.67 million for the institutional support and 1.8 million for the transversal activities, as planned for 2022) with very similar expenditures when compared to the totality of expenditures for the FOs. For example, the sum of all expenditures for the four FOs since 2020 amounts to 1.6 million, while the institutional support and transversal activities together are at 1.5 million during the same period. The higher budget allocated for these two, especially for the transversal activities since 2020, indicates the multi-objective nature of most of the activities of this programme that encompass several FOs, as well as the strong institutional support focus for HR recruitment, equipment purchase and information systems and software support. A common denominator for all FOs and other activities is that generally annual plans are overbudgeted, and the slow implementation since the start of the programme (due to internal and external factors) do

⁴⁶ We considered the planned expenditures for the year as the most reliable budget reference from the IPs annual reports and that yearly budgets cannot be summed up from year to year as they are intended to be consumed within the year in which they were generated. This means that if activities were initially planned to be implemented (and budget associated to them) within a certain year and they did not materialize, the budget allocated to them is re-budgeted for the same activity in the following year. The variation on the budget allocated from every year of implementation can also be explained by this factor and not necessarily by a miscalculation in the planning of the IPs.



not seem to have been factored in adequately in the planned expenditures. While in general annual plans are overbudgeted, some individual activities seem to be underbudgeted if looking at the planned and actuals for 2020 and 2021 – this overspending leads to inefficiency in resource use.

When it comes to the expenditures, FOs perform differently. FO2 seems quite on track with its plan/actuals since the start of the programme, and activities for FO3 managed to reach a satisfactory level of expenditures in 2021 (compared to the planned). For all other activities, in particular those related to FO1 and FO4, the planned expenditures are considerably higher compared to the actuals, which is probably due largely to the project implementation delays and possibly some overestimation of the budget needed to conduct them. In general, the underspending for all activities of the programme is significant and estimations suggest that by the end of 2022, only 33% of the total budget will be spent, with another 15% committed. If the programme will not receive a no-cost extension, implementation and absorption capacity needs to be considerably strengthened. Here below we have added a planned/actuals expenditures table to compare budgets from 2020 to 2022.

Table 6: Planned and Actuals for 2020, 2021 and 2022 per FO and Institutional/Transversal type of (in EUR)

Row Labels	Plan 2020	Actuals 2020	Plan 2021	Actuals 2021	Plan 2022	Actuals 2022
F01: Equitable allocation of water	255,235	10,390	258,400	29,459	797,470	121,798
F02: Flood risks reduced	274,000	183,025	513,094	465,733	563,434	106,727
F03: Water quality improved	206,000	12,333	207,553	198,086	534,044	90,012
F04: Increased availability of water	147,000	25,034	589,538	204,446	783,073	158,119
Institutional support	745,940	288,189	1,019,759	444,828	1,677,312	201,401
Transversal activities	638,494	7,033	1,798,423	420,366	1,801,258	164,802
Grand Total	2,266,669	526,005	4,386,768	1,762,917	6,156,592	842,859

The slow use of budgets can be explained by several factors. As for procurement, this has taken much more time than planned, which partly hindered the progress on implementation and caused delays. It must also be noted that while the collaboration with EKN was positively perceived by the IPs, the (human) resources allocated to the programme management from EKN side are insufficient to the current programmatic demands, which leaves a significant burden of coordination and approvals related to programme implementation to one person only, whose reactivity is not sufficient considering the number of projects to be implemented. Human resources to carry out the activities are also scarce from the IP side, who try to manage the volume of activities related to IWRM with the existing HR structure, with only a change manager for this programme within each institution. The FM also shares this concern as they have identified the lack of staff from the IP side to be one of the slowing factors that explain the inefficiency of programme implementation until now. Lastly, the project management TA that the FM is supposed to perform in support to the IPs could benefit from clarification on expectations from all sides, as the FM manages this only partly (for example the budget preparation/report support, as well as the results framework consolidation) and its services do not seem to be exploited in their full potential (according to the FM because of a lack of allocated time for their staff).

When looking at the use of FM staff in the FM annual reports from 2020 and 2021, it can be noted that many of the key programme support staff (General project manager, financial management expert, project assistance and IWRM expert) worked for more days compared to what was initially planned (on average 10-15% more days), and the reasons mentioned refer to a higher effort needed in the support of the IPs deliverables, Covid-19, and general quality control tasks that were not

foreseen. The efficiency of these resources is low when outputs are so delayed and need multiple feedback rounds.

Contract management by EKN has become more strict. The relative high flexibility of the original Sector Wide support in the first ASAS contracts is now opposed by a level of control in which approval is required from the Embassy on small deviations (10%) on each activity budget line, whether large or small. It is important to note here that there is so much underspending on the one hand, while on the other hand the IPs have little flexibility on the individual activity lines.

To what extent has the administrative setup (Agreements with IPs and EKN, MoUs between FM and IPs) been appropriate for the proper (results-based) project- and programme management?

The inconsistencies between the FM contract and the MoU/IP agreements and the wording (Fund and Fund Manager) have created a lot of confusion, while IPs were not used to this type of TA provider and had expected a Programme Management Unit (PMU) function. The table below provides a comparison of defined roles. In the column named "FM contract" (left) the responsibility/role as was defined in the FM contract is described and the reference clause is indicated. The middle columns describe what the MoU and IP-Agreements say (M16 means clause 16 in the MoU; A is Agreement(s) and A note means the note in the IP Agreement referring to the role of the FM with regard to plans and reports); the right column is what we observe in practice.

Figure 6: Overview of changing role of FM

Role	FM contract			MoU&Agr&SC		Reality
Steering Committee	Secretary	1.3.2	=	Secretary	M20-26	Secretary
ORIA	Conduct	1.3.1	=	Conduct	M16	Heavily delayed
Action Plans	Design	1.3.1	>	Support IPs	M19	Heavily delayed
Implementation of Action plans	Lead	1.3.1	>	Support IPs	M19	Heavily delayed
Result Framework IPs	Design	1.3.2	>	Support IPs	M29	Heavily delayed
Overall Result Framework	Design	1.3.2	=	Design	M29	Heavily delayed
Draft IP annual plans, budgets	Unclear	1.3.3	>	Quality check	Anote	Quality checks, but some IPs very late
Final IP annual plans, budgets > EKN	Responsible	1.3.3	>	(recommendation*)	Anote	Sent through FM
Aggregated annual plan and budget	Responsible	1.3.3	=	Responsible	Anote	Responsible, but depending on quality of drafts IPs
Draft IP annual narrative and financial reports	Unclear	1.3.3	>	Quality check	Anote	Quality checks, but some IPs very late
Final IP annual narrative and financial reports	Responsible	1.3.3	>	(recommendation)	Anote	Sent through FM
Aggregated narrative and Financial Reports	Responsible	1.3.3	=	Responsible	Anote	Responsible, but depending quality of drafts Ips
IATI data reporting	Responsible		=	Not mentioned	A	IPs are responsible and would be instructed by MFA
Liquidity requests for IPs	Responsible	1.3.3	>	Support IPs	M35	Unclear
Choice for local consultants or Exp Facility	Assess jointly	(1.3.4)	=	Assess jointly	M37	Unclear
ToRs for Consultants (local or Exp Fac)	Support Ips	1.3.4	=	Support IPs	M38/39	Support was poor
Contracting consultants	No role	(1.3.4)	>	Support IPs	M38/39	EKN has only role for 'no objection' (MoU 38/39) but has taken more active role
Procurement	Assist	1.3.2	>	Monitoring procedures	M36	Unclear
Procedure design		implicit		Find workable practice	M36	Manual, final version approved by SC

* SC 13/3/2020 minutes, point 1a

From this table it becomes evident, that the mandate of the FM changed considerably from the moment the MoU was drafted at the end of inception. The motivation provided by the EKN was that in the MoU set-up, the IPs would assume more ownership. The FM director also stated that he agreed on a more supportive role, as the budget didn't allow to take all the tasks defined in the original contract. The FM contract (and Fund label) have not been changed, however, which created a lot of confusion up till now.

Making one programme from the five individual IP projects has not yet materialized and the costs (financial and administrative burdens) so far have been higher than the gains. The expected gains at the side of EKN did not materialize and the administrative work load rather increased in practice.

Bringing the five components under one programme without the correct structure is one of the main reasons for delays.

To what extent did the FM contribution in the programme ensure an efficient, coordinated and organized rollout of the activities?

For the first one and half years, the FM has not been effective in ensuring an efficient, coordinated and organized roll-out of the activities. In fact, at the beginning of programme implementation, the FM mostly had an administrative role, although they later brought some harmonisation and structure in the individual plans and reports from the IPs. The quality, structure and coherence of the IP deliverables indeed slightly improved over time, when looking at the annual plans and reports from 2020 to 2021. This is especially visible in the categorization of the programme activities, which are now coded and of which contribution to specific FOs/Institutional Support/Transversal Activity is now made explicit.

The work of the FM on the ORIAs, although delayed and initially lacking quality, was considered helpful by the IPs and its results and recommendations had a positive impact on the rollout of the programme. This being said, the quality of support that the FM could provide to the IPs varied depending on the project management need. The financial management support throughout the years has been significant and appreciated from the IPs, and the manual and forms that were developed were considered supportive by the IPs and are now used for project management purposes. On the other hand, the FM provided insufficient guidance on the quality assurance and guidance of ToRs and procurement processes.

The FM experienced serious delays in submission time and quality of its own deliverables, such as ORIAs and Result Framework(s), as well as their annual reports. This is partly explained by the fact that the FM deliverables depend on the timeliness of submission of plans and reports from the IPs, which was often delayed. These delays also resulted in inconsistencies between reported figures, since different stages of the reporting cycle were not well aligned.⁴⁷

4.1.5 Sustainability

To what extent is there a clear strategy for sustainability of impact, and which strategy is adopted?

Sustainability of this programme is assessed through level of ownership on the one hand, and invariably also on the level of financial sustainability that is sought and achieved. Regarding the sense of ownership of IPs, the MTR team sees this mostly materialized on the level of the project-specific components, and less on the programme as a whole. Also, prioritization of the programme activities at DNAAS seems less compared to other IPs, possibly due to the fact that IWRM is not their core activity. One quite crucial element of ownership that has been achieved is visible at PRIMA II, for which the member states have shown commitment towards the secretariat and its continuation beyond 2024. Related to ownership are the recent improvements of IPs management and planning capacities that will likely lead to sustainable institutional practices.

The procedure manual that was produced by the FM, is valued as an output that is considered likely to endure and continued to be used, and thus a sustainable output. Maintenance and retention of trained staff is verbally considered, but not addressed in practice. The quality of the works that were inspected during the MTRs field visit shows that sustainability of the works is at risk when not properly monitored and maintained. The ARAs need to develop operation and maintenance plans, which also define the required budget and the responsible staff or agencies. The poor condition of the new gauging rods at the Luenha river also show that sustainability already starts with the site

⁴⁷ In order to submit them at the beginning of each year, FM's annual reports are based on estimated expenditures of the past year, which is why they do not correspond to the figures in the IP reports.



selection, the design and the craftsmanship of the works, and the need to include the surrounding population in order to avoid and report on vandalism.

There are currently no programmatic sustainability or exit strategies developed by the programme, other than some explorations of (new) funding mechanisms. The initial appraisal document, or BeMO, showed an expectation of the programme being able to leverage other donors to ensure institutional consolidation and financial sustainability as a result of capacity building and the chosen set-up of the programme. "When the proposed organisational structure with a Fund Manager and an Expert Facility proves to be a success, other donors might be interested to join in with their contributions to the IWRM agenda in Mozambique and be part of the Steering Committee".⁴⁸ However, this leverage is left as an assumption without a strategy assigned to it in the programme. There is an expressed need from various IPs for capacity building/institutionalising the function of Fund Acquisition.

Central government IPs have explored some other funding options or increased state budget allocation. These institutions are executing a government function without a substitute. The BeMO in 2019 already highlights that the main focus for the self-sustainability of the ARA's should be on obtaining (more) financial autonomy. Licensing is revenue basis for organisations such as ARAs, to show commitment to sustainability and a requirement to hold their independent administrative status. It is also justification of continued existence after donors resign. Despite the fact that the ARAs were legally granted institutional autonomy in 2020, the MTR team has not found indication that progress has been made on establishing more financial self-sustainability so far.

Beyond the elaboration on financial sustainability in the BeMO, the aggregated result framework had highlighted some (external) risks to the programme, such as Covid-19, insecurity in the North, and organisational and policy changes. However, no mitigation strategies were formulated leaving the risk analysis without much value for ensuring and safeguarding the sustainability the programme.

The factors and/or circumstances that may negatively affect the sustainability of the programme are weak human and institutional resource capacity, continuing uncertainty over (coordination and management) roles within the programme, and lack of funding of an international position, for retention of expertise in the international component of PRIMA II. A further risk to sustainability is that certain components rely too much on one person (e.g. PRIMA II and ARA-Norte). Although PRIMA II now has a secretariat with additional office staff, the key position that oversees the programme strategically, leads and brings it forward, still relies on one person alone. Without funding this position in an internationally competitive way, PRIMA II runs the risk of only acquiring the "hardware" (an office and office staff), but without completing the content-specific and strategic activities that it was supposed to complete. Without resolution as to who would fund this position during the remainder of this programme (member states or EKN), this could lead to another large gap between a PRIMA II and PRIMA III, with further gains becoming eroded.

4.2 SWOT analysis

The ToR requested that the MTR includes a SWOT analysis of the partnership between IPs and the FM. A good basis for the SWOT analysis was provided by the individual ORIA's conducted per IP during the inception phase, and reported on in the FM 2021 annual report. It lists short SWOT tables for each IP and the text provides a lot of elements for the overall SWOT, including the actors FM and EKN. It is observed, that there is a large variation among the different actors with regard to the strong and weaker elements. For several mentioned weak points, there is at least one IP which forms a positive exception, which makes it difficult to generalise. At ARA level, the original ARA Zambeze was more developed than the ARA it merged with (former ARA-Centro), while the original ARA-Norte

⁴⁸ EKN Maputo (2019) Activity Appraisal Document ODA Integrated Water Resource Management Fund Public BEMO, p, 23



was less developed than the ARA it merged with (ARA-Centro-Norte); meaning that the strengths/weaknesses have changed over time.

For the following SWOT analysis of the partnership, next to FM we have added the EKN and the partnership between the IPs themselves. A partnership can be defined as the cooperation between parties to reach a common goal. The common goal is here defined as the programme goal, being institutional strengthening and improved water security for 1,5 million people. A partnership has mostly very specific elements, such as leadership/ownership, governance, structure, coordination, internal communication, external visibility, mutual responsibility, mutual gains, mutual support, trust and harmonisation and respecting the rules and regulations. The below SWOT is made in a confrontation between these elements and the programme reality.

Figure 7: Partnership SWOT

<p>S1. MoU between the partners in the Mozambican partnership</p>		<p>W1. No designated programme owner and hence no real lead in partnership (MoU not supportive)</p>	<p>W2. Absence of an integrated programme approach</p>	<p>W3. Little in common between Mozambique group and PRIMA</p>
<p>S2. Joint procedures developed for internal programme processes</p>	<p>S4. Some joint capacity building (esp on financial management)</p>	<p>W4. Role FM unclear and disputed, initial lack of confidence</p>	<p>W5. FM mainly administrative and not pro-active</p>	<p>W6. No central budget for learning and exchange</p>
<p>S3. Some overlapping themes with coherence (small dams, groundwater)</p>	<p>S5. Some incidental mutual support (L.Niassa office,)</p>	<p>W6. Absence of a joint agenda for organisational capacity building</p>	<p>W7. Absence of a joint agenda for thematic capacity development</p>	<p>W8. No real joint learning</p>
		<p>W7. Little internal programme communication between IPs</p>	<p>W8. No external presentation of the Partnership (creating also a feeling of jointness)</p>	<p>W9. Not any attempt on Partnership development</p>
<p>Strong Opportunities</p>		<p>Weak Threats/Considerations</p>		
<p>O1. One national policy framework</p>	<p>O2. Good institutional framework</p>	<p>C1. COVID did not contribute to build partnership and was main obstacle in communication and TA tasks</p>	<p>C2. Imposed Co-operation and Framework</p>	<p>C3. Legal obstacle for external coordinator</p>
<p>O3. Decentralisation means transfer of tasks from national to Basin level (shared agenda)</p>	<p>O4. All Ips have comparable TA needs</p>		<p>C4. Insecurity in North</p>	
<p>O5. Complementarity (national; more advanced ARA; less advanced ARA).</p>	<p>O6. Blue deal (complementarity)</p>	<p>C5. Autonomy of ARAs brought change in relationship to National level;</p>	<p>C6. Implications of merger ARAs not well understood</p>	

The analysis shows that the partnership in the programme was weak. IPs worked in silos and the FM and EKN did not manage to develop the partnership, well. This has mainly to do with the 'forced' merge of the individual projects in one programme without a clear ownership/leadership and with a RF that didn't automatically match with the designed projects. Originally the EKN had designed the FM-function to take that coordinating role, but due to legal and ownership considerations, this central role had disappeared in the MoU. This reformulation of responsibilities was only adapted after the formal inception phase (the MoU is from end November 2019). The FM had to build a relationship and trust with IPs, which was challenging in the beginning and became even more difficult when the Covid-19 pandemic started in April 2020. Mozambique was not ready for the lock-downs, in which people had to work remotely without proper internet or even computers. Physical encounters had been essential to solve miscommunication and building of trust. The FM did choose to work with the



individual IPs as this was the easiest way during the Covid-19 pandemic. Hence, it did not develop a joint TA agenda or other joint activities. The same happened to other programmes, such as Blue Deal, but other programmes were capable of reintroducing face-to-face meetings earlier than the IWRM.



5 Conclusions

On Relevance

The EKN supported IWRM programme has continued relevance for national and regional policies and priorities, and the SDGs. It is a continuation of achievements in past programmes, most notably of ASAS, WB IWRM, PRIMA I, ARA-Zambeze I. However, in the case of PRIMA I to II a long gap between programmes has eroded the gains achieved in the previous phase.

The design of the programme followed lessons and recommendations from the IOB country study especially with regard to the focus of the programme, inclusion of national level actors and the way capacity development was provided to ARAs before, such as the implementation of activities supporting capacity development. The first IOB recommendation also included the suggestion to create a fund manager, which was followed up albeit with an alternative set-up that put emphasis on ownership at IP level. The programme design could have incorporated more observations from the IOB country study as well as from the overall IOB evaluation.⁴⁹

The programme shows a useful combination of institutional development and practical implementation, in which the latter serves the capacity building. As the consolidated Result Framework is focused on the practical implementation, the relevance of the institutional and other non-technical components remain largely invisible. The sources of information for monitoring are also not adequate and unclear. The annual report is supposed to present the results but it is not a working document where IPs can track progress towards the end of programme. Finally, risks and assumptions are incomplete and generalized.

On Coherence

The underlying five different projects have been developed before the overall IWRM programme logics were conceptualized, which resulted in projects that have a list of activities that show weak links between each other. In fact, the link between institutional support/transversal activities and the Final Outcomes (FOs) is currently not made explicit in the programme design, and the set of activities within each IP seem to be working in silos. This hampers the coherence and intervention logic for certain projects and the programme as a whole.

The coherence between the four Mozambican projects is also rather weak. One of the missing elements in the programme is a sense of active partnership. It would be expected that actual coordination to allow for synergies, complementarity and correct sequencing of activities would increase the overall impact at the programme level.

External coherence is actively sought with the Blue Deal programme, and less with others. The SC mostly provides space for exchange but does not ensure internal and external coherence, nor is the support by FM contributing to internal coherence at programme level. The Covid-19 lock-down was a complicating factor, as building trust and synergies was difficult by lack of physical contact. While there is progress on uniformity of the RF and annual reports, this does not yet contribute to internal coherence and synergy. The current design causes confusion about this leadership between EKN, FM and/or SC, and who should bear responsibility for what part. As a consequence EKN had to take more management roles than it envisaged at the start, and has become the de facto programme owner.

On Effectiveness

The programme is generally not on track, both in terms of activity implementation and budget expenditure. There are external factors such as the indirect impact of Covid-19 and insecurity in the north of the country but also lack of implementation capacity and project teams within the IPs.

⁴⁹ IOB Evaluation (Dec 2017) Tackling major water challenges, Policy review of Dutch development aid policy for improved water management, 2006-2016; no. 418



Moreover, the heavy and inefficient procedures for contracting and procurement were mentioned by all IPs as being a major delay factor. PRIMA II had to first move from eSwatini’s government funding to the IWRM contract, and had no office nor staff initially. The inception phase was too short to become ready for implementation, while it was missing an element of partnership development. Hence, 1 to 1,5 years was lost.

Figure 7: Activities implementation progress by IP as of 31/12/2021



Progress on the FOs by individual IPs is mixed. For ARA-Norte results are mixed, often due to unfavourable external context, lack of resources, and reliance on the Expert Facility (EF). For PRIMA-II, lack of initial progress is due to the reorganization of the funding channel, and challenges with staff recruitment. While DNGRH is well on track and has advanced in the activities that are directly linked to the FOs, it shows a slower progress for the transversal activities and the institutional support. DNAAS cannot count on many achievements so far regarding the activities directly linked to the FOs, the relation of the activities to IWRM is often rather weak, and some get lower priority as they are not part of the core activities of DNAAS. Some small progress for DNAAS is emerging recently. ARA-Centro is showing quite some tangible progress except on the reinforcement of the hydrographic network monitoring system. So far, 2022 shows the same level of progress with regard to budget use and implementation, although there is a huge bunch of activities in a stage towards contracting, which leads to an estimation that about 50% of the contract budget will be committed by the end of 2022 and almost 60% when all activities planned for 2022 will come under contract.

Despite the efforts of the FM to provide the necessary guidance and support to the IPs in the project management, the unclarities on its role within the programme and the lack of knowledge of national regulations made them too bureaucratic and dependent on EKN, who in turn expected a higher involvement of the FM in the programme management. Furthermore, their support to procurement processes did not lead to higher quality.

The EF has not been successfully used. The expectations on type of TA from the EF differed between the EF consultancy firms and the IPs. EF consultancy firms expected short-term advisory roles by single experts, while in reality more large-scale complex projects are requested. The TA scope of EF is limited to IWRM issues (not institutional development or project management TA needs) which



IPs consider too narrow. The quality of the ToRs has not been sufficiently assured. Furthermore, IPs consider EF experts to be too expensive and EF companies not flexible enough.

On Efficiency

The limited progress made at IP level is reasonably in line with the limited budget spent. The plans and reports submission from IPs was not done in a timely fashion and the development of the ToRs for contracts/service provision was also considerably delayed, and only started becoming consistent as from 2021. The severe delays in producing key documentation that was intended to be ready at the end of the inception period also had a trickle-down effect in the review, aggregation and approval of these documents. The aggregated plans and annual reports by FM were also considerably delayed and in turn the formal approval of documents by EKN as well.

Budget allocations have varied considerably since 2020. For all FOs, institutional support and transversal activities, the budgets have increased every year, with a very prominent spike in the planned budgets for the activities from 2021 to 2022 for FO1, FO3, FO4 and institutional support, while FO2 and transversal activities for this year have stabilised at the same level of 2021.

The underspending for all activities of the programme is significant and estimations suggest that by the end of 2022, only 33% of the total budget will be spent, with another 15% committed. The slow use of budgets can in part be explained by slow procurement, HR shortage at IPs and EKN, and delays in and underutilization of FMs programme management support.

Making one programme from the five individual IP projects has not yet materialized and the costs (financially and administrative burdens) so far have not led to the desired administrative gains and synergies. In summary, the main factors why the programme was faced with so many difficulties were:

- That there was no clear and shared programme proposal.
- That the programme merger and the definition of the Result Framework is rather artificial, and did not sufficiently cover the main component of the hybrid programme, being the institutional development.
- That the structure and TA-service solutions did not match with the expectations, quality of the procurement process and ToRs was not sufficient, and EF experts considered too expensive and inflexible.
- That the EKN does not have sufficient HR capacity for the programme ownership/management function, while the current programme form requires high involvement of the EKN, also in the way it is applying a more strict way of contract management.
- When the original idea of an outsourced PMU was abandoned during programme design phase, the programme lost a clear ownership and effective coordination mechanism at programme level, while it was probably strengthened at IP project level.

On Sustainability

The choice for the programme set-up has led in part to a trade-off between efficiency and sustainability in which ownership and capacity building of IPs on programme management and planning overrides efficiency of programme management itself. Regarding the sense of ownership of IPs, the MTR team sees this mostly materialized on the level of the project-specific components, and less on the programme as a whole. There are currently no programmatic sustainability or exit strategies, other than some explorations of (new) funding mechanisms. While the main focus for the self-sustainability of the ARAs should be on obtaining (more) financial autonomy, little progress has been made in this regard, despite the fact that the ARAs were legally granted institutional autonomy in 2020.



The procedure manual that was produced by the FM, is valued as an output that is considered likely to endure and continued to be used, and thus sustainable. Maintenance and retention of trained staff is verbally considered, but not addressed in practice. The field visit also showed the need for better operation and maintenance and assigning responsible staff and agencies for this.

The factors and/or circumstances that may negatively affect the sustainability of the programme are weak human and institutional resource capacity, continuing uncertainty over (coordination and management) roles within the programme, and insecurity about for retention of expertise in the international component of PRIMA II. Related to this, a further risk to sustainability is that certain components rely too much on one person (e.g. PRIMA II and ARA-Norte).



6 Recommendations

The recommendations presented here were discussed with programme stakeholders during the sensemaking workshop. We distinguish between recommendations for the remainder of the programme, and recommendations for a potential next programme after 2023. Most short-term recommendations also apply to designing of new programmes.

6.1 Recommendations until the end of the IWRM EKN grant

On Programme design:

- Seek more space to collaborate between IPs, developing joint activities, trainings and other programme components

On Programme set-up:

- The role of SC could be strengthened to create more synergy. Expand the SC to serve as a platform of coordination of the IWRM programme, rather than internal exchange of IP information.
- The functioning of TA needs to be clarified, both for thematic and project management TA. Consider using EF and additional FM budgets for additional project management TA such as organisation of joint trainings.
- Improve the description of the mandate of the project management TA provider (FM; if continued) and let them act in line with this. FM should become more pro-active and involved in the process.
- Since too much work is still going to the EKN, contract and resources for the FM should be reconsidered to be able to deliver in line with expectations from EKN and IPs. Expectations should be better communicated to all and define processes to allow these expectations to materialize.

On Human Resources:

- The EKN should arrange more capacity, for instance by attracting new staff to act as programme manager. Additionally, find ways to limit the current programme management burden on EKN, such as other definition of threshold for need for approval; a more stepped procurement set-up; more mandates and some operational budget. Alternatively, the current set-up can be abandoned and continued as individual projects, while formulating the present FM function to a TA function on project management.
- Incentives (e.g. training opportunities) to staff would help improve efficiency and sustainability).

On Programme management:

- Planning and approval (of annual plans, with associated budgets) by EKN should be concluded by September of the preceding year.
- The budgets need a full revision. The planned figures might be accurate now, but absorption capacity is hindered by slow and inefficient processes, hence planned expenditures could be revised to bring them closer to implementation reality. Financial projections also need to include commitments made in contracts.
- For improved use of time and resources, there could be more harmonisation with national planning cycles.
- In order to increase the impacts of the activities of the programme in risk reduction DNGRH should promote a better alignment between the activities within the ARAs i.e Blue Deal project dealing with flood forecasting and early warning systems in several rivers basins in



the country but also with the World Bank funded project at INGD that is investing in disaster earlier warning systems in the country.

- To enhance the sustainability of the programme activities and results, it is recommended to still formulate an exit strategy for all components as part of the annual plans, pursue leverage from other donors, and organise additional joint trainings to consolidate capacity on programme management and planning at IP level to maintain gains beyond the programme's lifetime.
- With regards to sustainability, priority should go to activities that lead to increase of revenue (register, licensing, fees) and capacity on fund acquisition in line with expectations on financial sustainability.
- Add a one-year budget-neutral extension to the programme to compensate the loss of the first 1.5 years in delays. Components for which this budget neutral extension would be most beneficial are the ARAs that could be allowed to materialize the progress on starting activities, as well as work on their increase of revenues that ensures financial sustainability. For PRIMA II a close next year would likely mean that a new programme would start from scratch again, while current gains on establishment of the secretariat means momentum to start delivering results is finally there.

6.2 Recommendations beyond 2023

Programme design:

- Conduct a programme design workshop to jointly re-formulate the programme's Theory of Change. Activities should be related to each other to jointly contribute to the programme outcomes, and institutional Outcome(s) and transversal activities should be better linked to the Intermediate and Final Outcomes of the programme. After re-designing the ToC of the programme, the Result Framework can be revised to better link activities to outputs, define outputs, define which IP is contributing to what in detail, and set output and outcome indicators. Discuss how gender mainstreaming (and to a certain extent private sector development) can be made more visible and explicitly aligned in the programme, its components and activities. The new Result Framework should also better describe how indicators are going to be measured, and the means of verification should refer to actual tools (and not just reports) that are used for project management (training records, meeting minutes, list of attendees, project documents, surveys, etc.). Make use of the 30 sub-indicators of SDG6.5.1 to measure progress on institutional development⁵⁰. Finally, assumptions and risks should be developed per Intermediate Outcome at least, so to contextualize them and propose mitigating measures that are tailored to the planned objectives. Please refer to Annex 7 to appreciate how a consolidated programme results framework should be structured and what is the level of detail necessary for its composing elements.
- Redefine the programme by moving from silos of implementation to joint activities: aim for fewer and clearer themes, have a common strategy and TA agenda, joint projects, trainings, tenders and communication.
- Alternatively, 1) the idea of one programme can be abandoned, and continued as individual projects, with the FM function reformulated as a TA function on project management alone, or 2) a PMU can be designed to coordinate the programme while it continues to strengthen and safeguard ownership of the programme at IP level.

⁵⁰ DNGRH already produces such reports and 70% of these SDG sub-indicators are addressed by the programme.



- Partnership building should be included as a focused activity during inception. The Dutch Sustainable Development Fund had developed excellent tools for this, in co-operation with the PPP-Lab⁵¹. In addition, ORIA's should be repeated in line with the changes at organisation levels, such as the merged ARAs.

On Programme set-up:

- An EF should be closer to the programme, and more informed on its activities. Clarify the process flow, who is responsible for what, ensure that ToRs receive better quality and feasibility checks, and expectations and risks are well communicated.
- Ensure that IPs adequately budget for the necessary staff for the implementation of activities.

⁵¹See for example 'Building Partnerships' - <https://www.ppplab.org> > PPP-Serie-A2-spreads1



Annex 1 Bibliography

Next to the provided Programme documentation (Tender documentation for FM and Expert Facility), Project proposals of IPs, MoU, Contracts (with FM and with IPs), ORIA reports, the final versions of IP plans and annual reports, FM plans and annual reports, Minutes, versions of Result Framework etc, the following information was consulted and mentioned in this report:

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Annex 2 KIIs guide

Evaluation question	Programme implementers	Programme support system	Government departments	Donors	Other relevant stakeholders
Introductory questions					
	Please briefly introduce yourself and your role in the programme and vis- à-vis the role of other actors involved in the programme.	Please briefly introduce yourself and your role in the programme and vis- à-vis the role of other actors involved in the programme.	Please briefly introduce yourself and your role within your institution/organization in regards to the water management sector in Mozambique.	Please briefly introduce yourself and your role within your institution/organization in regards to the water management sector in Mozambique.	Please briefly introduce yourself and your role within your institution/organization in regards to the water management sector in Mozambique.
			What is your level of familiarity with the IWRM programme being evaluated?	What is your level of familiarity with the IWRM programme being evaluated?	What is your level of familiarity with the IWRM programme being evaluated?
Relevance					
1. Do the programmes and projects, their outputs and outcomes have continued relevance to the Mozambican national and regional water policies and the SDGs that are targeted?	Q 1.1 What according to you are the priorities within Mozambique's national water policy? How does the programme address those?	Q 1.1 What according to you are the priorities within Mozambique's national water policy? How does the programme address those?	Q 1.1 What according to you are the priorities within Mozambique's national water policy? How does the programme address those?	Q 1.1 What according to you are the priorities within Mozambique's national water policy? How does the programme address those?	Q 1.1 What according to you are the priorities within Mozambique's national water policy? How does the programme address those?
	Q 1.2 To what extent does the project intervention address priorities within Mozambique's national water policy?	Q 1.2 To what extent does the project intervention address priorities within Mozambique's national water policy?	Q 1.2 To what extent does the project intervention address priorities within Mozambique's national water policy?	Q 1.2 To what extent does the project intervention address priorities within Mozambique's national water policy?	Q 1.2 To what extent does the project intervention address priorities within Mozambique's national water policy?
	Q 1.3 What factors have influenced the relevance of the programme and projects?	Q 1.3 What factors have influenced the relevance of the programme and projects?	Q 1.3 What factors have influenced the relevance of the programme and projects?	Q 1.3 What factors have influenced the relevance of the programme and projects?	Q 1.3 What factors have influenced the relevance of the programme and projects?



	Q 1.4 Which elements of the programme should be changed, if any, to make it more relevant to existing needs or circumstances?	Q 1.4 Which elements of the programme should be changed, if any, to make it more relevant to existing needs or circumstances?	Q 1.4 What are the existing needs in regards to the IWRM in Mozambique, and how this programme could better address them?	Q 1.4 What are the existing needs in regards to the IWRM in Mozambique, and how this programme could better address them?	Q 1.4 What are the existing needs in regards to the IWRM in Mozambique, and how this programme could better address them?
	Q 1.5 What according to you are the priorities within Southern Africa regional water policies? How do PRIMA II programme interventions address those?	Q 1.5 What according to you are the priorities within Southern Africa regional water policies? How do PRIMA II programme interventions address those?	Q 1.5 (Only for PRIMA II related stakeholders) What according to you are the priorities within Southern Africa regional water policies? How do PRIMA II programme interventions address those?	Q 1.5 (Only for PRIMA II related stakeholders) What according to you are the priorities within Southern Africa regional water policies? How do PRIMA II programme interventions address those?	Q 1.5 (Only for PRIMA II related stakeholders) What according to you are the priorities within Southern Africa regional water policies? How do PRIMA II programme interventions address those?
2. Were the objectives of the projects clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established schedule and with the allocated resources (including the additional external management support and technical assistance)?	Q 2.1 To what extent was the project objective clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established schedule and with the allocated resources?	Q 2.1 To what extent was the project objective clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established schedule and with the allocated resources?			
	Q 2.2 To what extent did the project design address your organization needs and priorities as IP?	Q 2.2 To what extent did the project design address your organization needs and priorities as IP?			
	Q 2.3 How would you judge the external management support design (FM and technical assistance) to assist the achievement of the IWRM programme objectives?	Q 2.3 Only EKN and SC How would you judge the external management support design (FM and technical assistance) to assist the achievement of the IWRM programme objectives?			
	Q 2.4 How would you judge the clarity of the role of the technical assistance support?	Q 2.4 How would you judge the clarity of the role of the technical assistance support?			



3. To what extent have the programme and projects been taking into account the lessons learned from past IWRM programs in Mozambique?	Q 3.1 To what extent have the programme and your project been taking into account the lessons learned from past IWRM programs in Mozambique?	Q 3.1 To what extent have the programme and your project been taking into account the lessons learned from past IWRM programs in Mozambique?	Q 3.1 What are the main lessons learned of previous IWRM programmes in Mozambique? To what extent have they been taking into account in the current IWRM programme?	Q 3.1 What are the main lessons learned of previous IWRM programmes in Mozambique? To what extent have they been taking into account in the current IWRM programme?	Q 3.1 What are the main lessons learned of previous IWRM programmes in Mozambique? To what extent have they been taking into account in the current IWRM programme?
	Q 3.2 To what extent did the current IWRM ensured a continuation of the achievements of past IWRM programmes in Mozambique?	Q 3.2 To what extent did the current IWRM ensured a continuation of the achievements of past IWRM programmes in Mozambique?	Q 3.2 To what extent did the current IWRM ensured a continuation of the achievements of past IWRM programmes in Mozambique?	Q 3.2 To what extent did the current IWRM ensured a continuation of the achievements of past IWRM programmes in Mozambique?	Q 3.2 To what extent did the current IWRM ensured a continuation of the achievements of past IWRM programmes in Mozambique?
4. How appropriate are the results frameworks and its elements?	Q 4.1 How are results being measured and monitored?	Q 4.1 How are results being measured and monitored?			
	Q 4.2 Are the means of verification adequate? Why?	Q 4.2 Are the means of verification adequate? Why?			
Coherence					



<p>5. How do you judge the coherence between the various components within each project (in terms of consistency and synergy, i.e. whether the components are logic and contributing to the same outputs and outcomes)?</p>	<p>Q 5.1 How do you judge the coherence between the various components within your project (in terms of consistency and synergy, i.e. whether the components are logic and contributing to the same outputs and outcomes)?</p>	<p>Q 5.1 How do you judge the coherence between the various components within your project (in terms of consistency and synergy, i.e. whether the components are logic and contributing to the same outputs and outcomes)?</p>			
	<p>Q 5.2 To what extent did the Annual Plans rationalise the overall IWRM programme and created more value than the sum of its projects?</p>	<p>Q 5.2 To what extent did the Annual Plans rationalise the overall IWRM programme and created more value than the sum of its projects?</p>			



6. How do you judge the external coherence, in terms of synergies and interlinkages between the four (4) Mozambican projects, and synergy or overlaps with other programmes, if any (for example through the World Bank and African Development Bank)?	Q 6.1 How do you judge the level of synergy with the other Mozambican projects? Did you have exchanges with the other IPs during project implementation? What are the similarities and/or inconsistencies?	Q 6.1 How do you judge the level of synergy with the other Mozambican projects? Did you have exchanges with the other IPs during project implementation? What are the similarities and/or inconsistencies?			
	Q 6.2 Are there any synergies or overlaps with other similar programmes funded by other donors? [probing] (DFID, WB, ADB). If yes, what are they?	Q 6.2 Are there any synergies or overlaps with other similar programmes funded by other donors? [probing] (DFID, WB, ADB). If yes, what are they?	Q 6.2 Are there any synergies or overlaps with other similar programmes funded by other donors? [probing] (DFID, WB, ADB). If yes, what are they?	Q 6.2 Are there any synergies or overlaps with other similar programmes funded by other donors? [probing] (DFID, WB, ADB). If yes, what are they?	Q 6.2 Are there any synergies or overlaps with other similar programmes funded by other donors? [probing] (DFID, WB, ADB). If yes, what are they?
	Q 6.3 How do you judge the level of coordination and joint planning with the fellow IPs?	Q 6.3 How do you judge the level of coordination and joint planning amongst the 4 projects?	Q 6.3 What is your view in regards to the internal coordination of activities amongst the IPs?	Q 6.3 What is your view in regards to the internal coordination of activities amongst the IPs?	Q 6.3 What is your view in regards to the internal coordination of activities amongst the IPs?
	Q 6.4 To what extent does the FM play a role in the coordination of the 4 projects?	Q 6.4 (To all but FM) To what extent does the FM play a role in the coordination of the 4 projects?			
	Q 6.5 To what extent does the Steering Committee play a role in the coordination activities?	Q 6.5 (To all but SC) To what extent does the Steering Committee play a role in the coordination activities?			
		Q 6.6 (Question to SC only) To what extent were you able to play a role in the coordination of programme activities?			



7. How do you judge the roles of the Steering Committee and Fund Manager to create internal and external coherence?	Q 7 How do you judge the roles of the Steering Committee and Fund Manager to create internal and external coherence?	Q 7 (Question to EKN only) How do you judge the roles of the Steering Committee and Fund Manager to create internal and external coherence?			
8. Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more coherent?	Q 8 Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more coherent?	Q 8 Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more coherent?	Q 8 Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more coherent?	Q 8 Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more coherent?	Q 8 Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more coherent?
Effectiveness					
9. To what extent are the programme and projects on track to achieve their goals, objectives and results?	Q 9.1 To what extent are the programme and projects on track to achieve their goals, objectives and results?	Q 9.1 To what extent are the programme and projects on track to achieve their goals, objectives and results?	Q 9.1 (Only to relevant Government departments) To what extent are the programme and projects on track to achieve their goals, objectives and results?		
	Q 9.2 What are the reasons for any underachievement and/or overachievement?	Q 9.2 What are the reasons for any underachievement and/or overachievement?			
	Q 9.3 Which types of interventions worked 'well' and which did not? What are the reasons?	Q 9.3 Which types of interventions worked 'well' and which did not? What are the reasons?			
	Q 9.4 Are there any activities/results that are likely not to be implemented before the end of the project?	Q 9.4 Are there any activities/results that are likely not to be implemented before the end of the project?			



	<p>Q 9.5 Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more effective and/or to ensure that outcomes and outputs will be achieved?</p>	<p>Q 9.5 Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more effective and/or to ensure that outcomes and outputs will be achieved?</p>			
	<p>Q 9.6 What are the internal and external elements that contributed to the progress on the results? [probing: talk about internal and external factors, actors that have been/not have been particularly involved and motivation/lack of motivation for success and achievement of the results]</p>	<p>Q 9.6 What are the internal and external elements that contributed to the progress on the results? [probing: talk about internal and external factors, actors that have been/not have been particularly involved and motivation/lack of motivation for success and achievement of the results]</p>	<p>Q 9.6 What are the internal and external elements that contributed to the progress on the results? [probing: talk about internal and external factors, actors that have been/not have been particularly involved and motivation/lack of motivation for success and achievement of the results]</p>	<p>Q 9.6 What are the internal and external elements that contributed to the progress on the results? [probing: talk about internal and external factors, actors that have been/not have been particularly involved and motivation/lack of motivation for success and achievement of the results]</p>	<p>Q 9.6 What are the internal and external elements that contributed to the progress on the results? [probing: talk about internal and external factors, actors that have been/not have been particularly involved and motivation/lack of motivation for success and achievement of the results]</p>
<p>10. To what extent has the support of the Fund Manager contributed to a more effective and a higher quality of implementation, for example through their support to procurement of goods and services? (somewhat linked to question 15)</p>	<p>Q 10.1 To what extent was the FM supporting the achievement of programme objectives?</p>	<p>Q 10.1 (To all but the FM) To what extent was the FM supporting the achievement of programme objectives?</p>			
	<p>Q 10.2 What was the role of the FM in the use of programme’s resources?</p>	<p>Q 10.2 (To all but the FM) What was the role of the FM in the use of programme’s resources?</p>			
	<p>Q 10.3 What was the role of the FM in support to the procurement of goods and services?</p>	<p>Q 10.3 (To all but the FM) What was the role of the FM in support to the IPs the procurement of goods and services?</p>			



	Q 10.4 How do you assess the communication and cooperation with the FM?	Q 10.4 (To all but the FM) How do you assess the communication and cooperation with the FM?			
11. How do you judge the involvement of Technical Assistance by external service providers including the Expert Facility?	Q 11.1 How was the technical assistance supporting the achievement of programme objectives?	Q 11.1 (To all but the EF) How was the technical assistance supporting the achievement of programme objectives?			
	Q 11.2 To what extent is the Steering Committee involved in the projects management and implementation?	Q 11.2 (To all but the SC) To what extent is the Steering Committee involved in the projects management and implementation?			
		Q 11.3 (To all but the SC) How do you judge the IPs capacity to implement the project? Could you give an overview for each IPs?			
Efficiency					
12. To what extent did programme stakeholders timely executed their tasks and duties within the framework of the programme?	Q 12.1 To what extent were you able to timely execute your tasks and duties within the framework of the programme?	Q 12.1 To what extent did programme stakeholders timely execute their tasks and duties within the framework of the programme?			
	Q 12.2 To what extent were you able to timely submit your deliverables as in the Agreement? If were there delays, what were the reasons?	Q 12.2 To what extent have the IPs timely submitted the deliverables as in their respective Agreements?			



	Q 12.3 To what extent has the EKN timely and adequately provided information on expectations, documents and information?	Q 12.3 (Question to all but EKN) To what extent has the EKN timely and adequately provided information on expectations, documents and information?			
	Q 12.4 To what extent has the EKN timely and adequately responded, in terms of approval of documents and disbursement requests?	Q 12.4 (Question to all but EKN) To what extent has the EKN timely and adequately responded, in terms of approval of documents and disbursement requests?			
		Q 12.5 (To all but the SC) How do you judge the IPs capacity to implement the project? Could you give an overview for each IPs?			
13. How do you judge the efficiency of resource use (human resources and financial resources) to achieve the outcomes and outputs of the projects?	Q 13.1 How do you judge the efficiency of resource use (human resources and financial resources) to achieve the outcomes and outputs of the projects?	Q 13.1 How do you judge the efficiency of resource use (human resources and financial resources) to achieve the outcomes and outputs of the projects?			
	Q 13.2 To what extent were activities adequately budgeted for?	Q 13.2 To what extent were activities adequately budgeted for?			
	Q 13.3 To what extent was the project staff sufficient for activities' implementation?	Q 13.3 To what extent was the project staff sufficient for activities' implementation?			
	Q 13.4 What areas of budget and resources use could be adjusted, and why?	Q 13.4 What areas of budget and resources use could be adjusted, and why?			



	Q 13.5 Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more efficient?	Q 13.5 Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more efficient?			
14. To what extent has the administrative setup (Agreements with IPs and EKN, MoUs between FM and IPs) been appropriate for the proper (results-based) project- and programme management?	Q 14 To what extent has the administrative setup (Agreements with IPs and EKN, MoUs between FM and IPs) been appropriate for the proper (results-based) project- and programme management?	Q 14 To what extent has the administrative setup (Agreements with IPs and EKN, MoUs between FM and IPs) been appropriate for the proper (results-based) project- and programme management?		Q 14 To what extent has the administrative setup (Agreements with IPs and EKN, MoUs between FM and IPs) been appropriate for the proper (results-based) project- and programme management?	
15. To what extent did the FM contribution in the programme ensure an efficient, coordinated and organized rollout of the activities?	Q 15.1 What role did the FM play to support the rollout of your activities in an efficient, coordinated and organized manner?	Q 15.1 (To all but the FM) What role did the FM play to support the rollout of the IPs activities in an efficient, coordinated and organized manner?			
	Q 15.2 To what extent did Fund Manager help in the management of the programme?	Q 15.2 (To all but the FM) To what extent did Fund Manager help in the management of the programme?			
	Q 15.3 What role did the Fund Manager play in the submission time and quality of deliverables of the Agreement? (i.e. Annual plans, reports, etc.)?	Q 15.3 (To all but the FM) What role did the Fund Manager play in the submission time and quality of deliverables of the Agreement? (i.e. Annual plans, reports, etc.)?			
	Q 15.4 What role did the Fund Manager play in your internal (financial) procedures and management?	Q 15.4 (To all but the FM) What role did the Fund Manager play in the IPs internal (financial) procedures and management?			



	Q 15.5 How would you judge the activity of the FM in the procurement procedures, including Terms of References?	Q 15.5 (To all but the FM) How would you judge the activity of the FM in the procurement procedures, including Terms of References?			
Sustainability					
16. To what extent is there a clear strategy for sustainability of impact, and which strategy is adopted?	Q 16.1 To what extent is there a clear strategy for sustainability of impact, and which strategy is adopted?	Q 16.1 To what extent is there a clear strategy for sustainability of impact, and which strategy is adopted?			
	Q 16.2 Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more sustainable?	Q 16.2 Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more sustainable?	Q 16.2 Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more sustainable?	Q 16.2 Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more sustainable?	Q 16.2 Which interventions (if any) would you recommend to make the programme and projects more sustainable?
	Q 16.3 How can sustainability be improved?	Q 16.3 How can sustainability be improved?			
	Q 16.4 What are factors and or circumstances that affect or might affect the sustainability of the programme?	Q 16.4 What are factors and or circumstances that affect or might affect the sustainability of the programme?	Q 16.4 What are factors and or circumstances that affect or might affect the sustainability of the programme?	Q 16.4 What are factors and or circumstances that affect or might affect the sustainability of the programme?	Q 16.4 What are factors and or circumstances that affect or might affect the sustainability of the programme?
		Q 16.5 Which progress have IPs made in their capacity in result-based project management, financial management, procurement, reporting and monitoring?			
		Q 16.6 How do you judge the level of ownership of IPs?			
Closing questions					



	What have been your main lessons learned, and what would you, or should the programme, have done differently if it was starting again?	What have been your main lessons learned, and what would you, or should the programme, have done differently if it was starting again?	What have been your main lessons learned, and what would you, or should the programme, have done differently if it was starting again?	What have been your main lessons learned, and what would you, or should the programme, have done differently if it was starting again?	What have been your main lessons learned, and what would you, or should the programme, have done differently if it was starting again?
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Annex 3 Reconstructed ToC




IWRM Mozambique
Mural (1).pdf




Annex 4 Importance/Difficulty matrix on Recommendations

Importance/Difficulty Matrix



Annex 5 Maps indicating high-risk zones in Mozambique



From: UEM (2015). Mind that the Sedimentary Coastal Basin in Cabo Delgado is not marked as high flood risk, while Kenneth cyclone did bring a lot of flooding (see map below).






Figure 1: The areas highlighted in blue represent the extent of flooding due to Cyclone Kenneth. The flood extent data was processed by Copernicus using Sentinel satellite data. (Data source: Copernicus Emergency Management Service)

The next map shows a more specific map on flood risk levels along the rivers.

Flood Risk Zones in Mozambique



The two following maps show the projection of changes for the coming decades. They do not show the actual probability of risks.




Projected Change in Flood Occurrence

This risk indicator is based on a multi-model simulation that applies both global climate and hydrological models from the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISIMIP), and subsequent flood modeling with the global inundation model CaMa-Flood. The 100-year discharge is calculated for pre-industrial conditions (1661-1860), and defined as the flood threshold. Then years are counted in which occurs a 100-year discharge or greater, and it is estimated the probability that an event of at least this magnitude occurs in a given year. Results are expressed in terms of percentage change in probability between pre-industrial and the time that the average global temperature reach 2°C warming (around the year 2050, based on RCPs 2.6 and 6.0).

Frieler et al. (2017)



<https://waterriskfilter.org/explore/map>



Projected Change in Drought Occurrence

This risk indicator is based on a multi-model simulation that applies both global climate and hydrological models from the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISIMIP). The 2.5th percentile of soil moisture is calculated for pre-industrial conditions (1661-1860), and defined as the drought threshold. Then years are counted in which soil moisture falls below this threshold for at least 7 consecutive months, and it is estimated the probability that an event of at least this magnitude occurs in a given year. Results are expressed in terms of percentage change in probability between pre-industrial and the time that the average global temperature reach 2°C warming (around the year 2050, based on RCPs 2.6 and 6.0).

Frieler et al. (2017)



<https://waterriskfilter.org/explore/map>



Annex 7 Template for a revised Results Framework

Level	Expected result	Indicators	Definition of the indicator	Means of verification	Baseline value	Target year					Target final year	Risks and assumptions
						Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5		
PROGRAMME IMPACT	Increased water safety for at least 1,500,000 people.	Number of people who have had their water security enhanced by the activities of the IWRM programme	<i>[Here it is essential to understand what the indicator refers to, and especially how the indicator will be measured. For example for this indicator, it should be clear how the number of people will be calculated - what is going to be considered for the calculation? Numerator/denominator? Same applies for all indicators]</i>	<i>[Means of verifications need to be specific and possibly not refer to too many sources. Examples could be project logs, surveys, reviews, training logs, meeting minutes, etc. Same applies for all indicators]</i>								<i>Risks and assumptions should be defined for every Impact, FO and IO and the mitigation strategies should be specific to them</i>
PROGRAMME OUTCOMES	FO 1: Equitable allocation of water	[Define an overarching Outcome indicator for FO1 that can be monitored by the FM]										
	FO2: Reduced risk of floods and droughts	[Define an overarching Outcome indicator for FO2 that can be monitored by the FM]										
	<i>[FOs may be added]</i>	<i>[Programme-specific outcome indicator related to the FO may be added]</i>										
Intermediate Outcome 1	Increased knowledge of water resources	[Define an overarching Outcome indicator (change of status, improvement) for IO1 that can be monitored by the FM]										
OUTPUT 1.1: Studies	Output 1.1.1: Example: Aquifer studies are conducted and finalized	[Define an Output indicator (goods and services provided) related to <u>one single IP</u> that could contribute to Output 1.1.1 Example: Number of Aquifer studies. IP: ARA-Norte]										
	Output 1.1.2:	<i>[Project-specific output indicator may be added]</i>										
	Output 1.1.3:	<i>[Project-specific output indicator may be added]</i>										
	<i>[Outputs may be added]</i>	<i>[Project-specific output indicator may be added]</i>										



OUTPUT 1.2: Campaigns	Output 1.2.1: Example: Develop water availability and demand models	[Define an Output related to <u>one single IP</u> that could contribute to Output 1.2.1. For example: Number of water availability and demand models developed for the Revúbuè sub-basin. IP: ARA-Centro]														
	Output 1.2.2:	<i>[Project-specific output indicator may be added]</i>														
	<i>[Outputs may be added]</i>	<i>[Project-specific output indicator may be added]</i>														
OUTPUT 1.3: Add as needed	Output 1.3.1:	<i>[Project-specific output indicator may be added]</i>														
	Output 1.3.2:	<i>[Project-specific output indicator may be added]</i>														
Intermediate Outcome 2	Better understanding of the risk of floods and droughts	[Define an overarching indicator for IO2 that can be <u>monitored by the FM</u>]														
OUTPUT 2.1: Disaster management plans	Output 2.1.1: Example: Disaster management plans developed	[Define an Output related to <u>one single IP</u> that could contribute to Output 2.1.1. For example: Number of disaster management plans developed. IP: PRIMA II]														
	Output 2.1.2:	<i>[Project-specific output indicator may be added]</i>														
	Output 2.1.3:	<i>[Project-specific output indicator may be added]</i>														
	<i>[Outputs may be added]</i>	<i>[Project-specific output indicator may be added]</i>														
OUTPUT 2.2: Add as needed	Output 2.2.1:	<i>[Project-specific output indicator may be added]</i>														
	Output 2.2.2:	<i>[Project-specific output indicator may be added]</i>														
	<i>[Outputs may be added]</i>	<i>[Project-specific output indicator may be added]</i>														
	<i>[Project outcomes and outputs may be added]</i>	<i>[Project-specific outcome and output indicators may be added]</i>														





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