



FINAL REPORT

**EVALUATION OF DCA HUMANITARIAN
MINE ACTION & CLUSTER MUNITION
2016-2020 PROGRAMME**

Client: DanChurchAid

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the findings of an independent evaluation of the four year Dutch funded DanChurchAid (DCA) Humanitarian Mine Action and Cluster Munition Programme that was implemented in Mali, Libya, Lebanon and South Sudan between September 2016 and August 2020. The programme has focused on three main elements: technical aspects related to landmine and explosive ordnance removal and identification; risk education to communities; and building national capacities to cope with these two challenges. The evaluation focused on five key criteria and, nested within these, seven specific objectives. The focus of the assignment was on both taking stock and learning.

The assignment was commissioned by DanChurchAid and conducted by Tana Copenhagen using a two-person team, as well as external Quality Assurance, and was executed remotely between January-March 2021. A Utilisation Focused approach, which called for direct engagement with the client throughout the assignment and serves to ensure that the end product is one that best aligns with client needs, was used and data was collected through document review, key informant interviews and an online survey.

The evaluation's key findings are:

Relevance

- At a broad level, the programme was relevant to the needs of the target population across all four countries.
- The programme was also relevant to the objectives of the donor and well aligned with the DCA area of competence.
- The linkages between outputs and outcomes are not so clear cut. The outcomes assume a certain level of contextual progression and stability which is not present in most of the contexts where this programme was implemented. Therefore, while relevant to conduct the activities the results were often more output level than outcome or impact.

Effectiveness

- The Donor confirms that reported results are well aligned with expectations, and a review of documents and supplementary interviews confirms this alignment. There are no concerns regarding the effectiveness of the programme given the contextual conditions experienced. However, the data suggest that reported results do not provide a complete picture of the experience and that improved indicators could have better reflected the complexities of the programme intervention and challenges faced.
- Opportunities to learn from experiences across the programme were not capitalized upon because all reporting was by countries to HQ, with limited, if any opportunities for cross-country discussion.
- Cross-cutting issues, such as gender, conflict sensitivity and environment, were not applied in a consistent manner across all interventions. Indeed, the requirement to include them in certain instances appeared cumbersome and forced. In instances when DCA staff perceived

these issues as directly relevant to ensuring the effectiveness of activities conducted, the relevant cross cutting issue was applied to the implementation of the activity. For example: women and gender was included in Mali and conflict sensitivity was considered when dealing with national authorities in Libya. However none of these inclusions have been systematically reasoned or documented. Environment was not applied at all in any of the programme implementation locations.

- Activities conducted as part of this programme were not consistently linked to other development activities conducted by either DCA or other actors. There were, however, individual examples of instances where links could, and were, made. This apparent shortcoming does not mean that the links do not exist, but rather that they are not clearly visible and hence, if existent, cannot be effectively documented.

Efficiency

- The results are perceived as aligned with the input. Meaning that DCA staff feel that the expectations of the programme were realistic and aligned with the funds received. The review of documents, interviews and survey support this view. However, it is noted that there were no documented assessments that systematically explored if different activities could lead to similar outcomes or if different procurement decisions would have led to different expenditures.
- The reporting by country offices was well aligned with the reporting expectations detailed by DCA HQ and responded to the demands of the donor. However, the reporting framework used was not able to provide a realistic link between outputs and outcomes and failed to allow for a real world representation of what had taken place on the ground. For this reason reporting was often cumbersome and contributed little, if anything, to institutional learning.

Impact

- Reliably evaluating the impact of the activities conducted at this time is not possible. First, the activities were too recent, and second there were clear challenges with the linearity between outputs and outcomes, which means it is also unclear what the impact might actually be. Still, it can be expected that, if conflict does not resurface, cleared areas will be maintained and impact from these activities will be gleaned at some stage because these areas have been reported as being in zones where they are relevant to infrastructure, agriculture and or other direct human use.
- Risk education activities are likely to have an impact that is more direct and immediate given the volatile environments where this programme was implemented. Indeed, even if conflict increases again, the information provided will allow community members to make more informed decisions that may in turn increase their safety and security. However, the degree to which community members will be able to make safer decisions, given other factors contributing to decision making, is not clear.

Sustainability

- The data collected and reviewed suggest that outputs of the intervention are sustainable, particularly removal of explosive ordnance. Similarly knowledge shared is expected to be

maintained by those who directly benefited. However, the difficulty in determining outcomes makes it impossible to know if any outcomes and or impact will be sustainable.

- The capacities developed locally are sustainable can be expected to be sustainable for some time in so far as the training has met recognised standards and all those trained have met the requirements expected of them, although the degree to which these will be effectively capitalized on (outcome) is less clear. This depends on those trained having access to employment where their skills can be effectively used. In addition, if the skills are not effectively used, the knowledge will be lost.

Recommendations full format

To DCA:

1. For large programmes such as this one, DCA HQ should consider having a dedicated staff member who can support country programmes and support cross learning between the different countries. This would enable the establishment of a stronger learning culture and the capitalisation from experiences across different program locations.
2. DCA should ensure that the use of indicators (even when donor prescribed) are understood, documented and efforts are made to ensure consistent reporting across countries and across years.
3. DCA should capitalise on its field knowledge in the development of programme interventions and not rely so exclusively on HQ staff.
4. DCA should engage in discussions with country programmes and donors regarding what type of indicator may best reflect the work they are doing. This will be important to ensure that a) progress is effectively and realistically reflected; b) monitoring processes actually serve to support real-world learning and self-assessment.
5. If DCA finds itself in a position to discuss indicators with a donor, as was the case here, it will be important to ensure that these opportunities for dialogue are capitalised upon.
6. DCA should consider doing cost-benefit assessments ahead of large programmes to establish if their approach is the most cost -effective or if alternatives might be better suited.
7. DCA should conduct conflict sensitivity analysis to ensure that conflict sensitivity is well integrated into the programme and potential challenges well understood. It should not be a task which is responded to on an ad hoc basis and based only on the local knowledge of staff who have no formal conflict assessment expertise.
8. DCA should explore how environment as a cross cutting issue can be integrated into programmes and what integrating the environmental cross cutting issues means within their work context.
9. DCA should assess how to integrate gender so that its integration is systematic and relevant and well understood by all parties.
10. DCA should systematically explore when/where linkages between humanitarian activities can be made with development activities. These linkages should be clearly defined and understood by those implementing activities.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank DanChurchAid for entrusting us with this assignment and for working closely with us throughout the evaluation process. Although everyone who participated deserves our gratitude, permit us to extend particular appreciation to Lene Rasmussen, for ensuring that we had access to the right documents, right people and accompanying us throughout. Her support was invaluable, particularly given the short time frame for the task.

We are also grateful to all current and former DCA staff who agreed to be interviewed for engaging with us, being open to discussions and candid with their reflections. We also thank them for supporting the inclusion of field staff members, partners and other stakeholders, in the data collection process. These perspectives are the foundation for this evaluation and without them our work would not have been possible.

We thank you all.

ACRONYMS

DCA	DanChurchAid
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
HMA	Humanitarian Mine Action
HQ	Head Quarters
KII	Key Informant Interview
LibMAC	Libyan Mine Action Centre
LMAC	Lebanon Mine Action Centre
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
RE	Risk Education
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TS	Technical Survey
VBIED	Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices

1 INTRODUCTION

This report presents the findings of the four year Dutch funded DanChurchAid (DCA) Humanitarian Mine Action and Cluster Munition Programme that was implemented in Mali, Libya, Lebanon and South Sudan between September 2016 and August 2020.

The overall aim of the evaluation was seven-fold:

1. Assess the relevance of the programme outcomes for the beneficiaries and stakeholders,
2. Assess the relevance of the outputs for achieving the outcomes
3. Assess the effectiveness in converting inputs to outputs
4. Assess the efficiency of the quality of information management and reporting from the country office
5. Evaluate the sustainability of the different outputs in accordance with the outcomes.
6. Furthermore, include a focus on assessing and evaluating the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the programme in COVID-19 times hence in year 2020.
7. Make a record of lesson learned, challenges, successes, positive and negative experiences etc.

In line with the above objectives, the evaluation paid specific attention to the following programme elements:

1. Measurement of cost-efficiency
2. Donor expectations about results-based reporting
3. Links between mine action, and humanitarian work by DCA
4. DCA's emphasis on community-based and capacity building approaches
5. Conflict sensitivity and risk management.

The evaluation was guided by 30 evaluation questions (See Annex 1: ToR) which were nested within five criteria: Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. These criteria are used in the report to guide discussion on specific issues.

2 THE PROGRAMME

This programme was funded through a single grant, of 14.1 Million EUR (for actual expenditure see table 1), but covered four countries with distinct mine/unexploded ordnance problems and contexts. The programme was part of Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs efforts in the Security and Rule of Law sector and pursued three overarching goals:

- 1.1. All forms of violence against citizens, including sexual violence, and threats to safety are reduced.*
- 1.2. Agencies responsible for security carry out their tasks effectively and in a coordinated way, respond to people's needs and account for their actions.*

1.3. Local communities and civil society contribute independently and in collaboration with the responsible agencies to greater security and a culture of peace.

In pursuit of alignment with the above noted overarching objectives, and the type of activities conducted, the programme focused on three specific outcomes, and its corresponding indicators listed below each:

Outcome 1 – *Security and stability is enhanced, risk of death or injury to individuals and in communities is enhanced or removed.*

- Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting feeling safer following land release and (Risk Education - RE) activities
- Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting increased knowledge of ERW/mines following RE activities
- Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed demonstrating increased safe behaviour towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities

Outcome 2 – *Improved access to resources, improved livelihoods and socio-economic reconstruction.*

- m2 (%) of land released through Technical Survey (TS)/clearance used for agriculture
- m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for community development
- m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for housing
- m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for infrastructure
- Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting improved livelihoods
- Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting improved access to services and infrastructure

Outcome 3 – *Sustainable capacity improvements at national and local level.*

This outcome was documented in different ways in each country. Listing specifically activities conducted.

The above indicators/reporting modalities, found below each of the outcomes, were expected to effectively convey the conduct of the following type of activities: technical aspects related to landmine and explosive ordnance removal; risk education to communities, support to victims and building national capacities to cope with these two challenges.

Specifically, the Theory of Change (ToC) in the proposal presents the following change pathways:

- By removing ERW risks through clearance, **IF** the land or resources cleared are put into use and **IF** benefits are shared with communities, **THEN** there will be a socio-economic benefit.
- By conducting risk education, **IF** behaviour is changed, **THEN** risks posed by ERW can be reduced. Reduced risk is an outcome that directly benefits safety and thus human security sub-goal.
- By marking contaminated areas, **IF** marking is effective and communities understand and respect the marking **THEN** risks are reduced and access to resources is improved. **IF** resources are used, this also enables improvements to livelihood and production, which is a socio-economic benefit.

- By providing victim assistance, including psychosocial support, **IF** victims become more integrated with in a community **THEN** social cohesion will be improved. Improved social cohesion and inclusion is both a socio-economic benefit and supports human security sub-goal.

This ToC reflects a nuance that is not reflected in the reporting for the programme (see annex 5).

At a country by country level, there was some variation:

- In Lebanon, the focus was on clearance and in supporting the development of capacity within a national NGO (Laminda), as well as supporting the Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) with capacity, and some victim assistance through vocational training activities conducted by Balamand University.
- In Libya the focus was on clearing explosive ordnance. DCA also trained military personnel working on behalf of Libya, through cooperation with the national authority (Libyan Mine Action Centre - LibMAC) to train personnel on EOD clearance. In addition, DCA also trained national actors in Risk Education.
- In Mali the focus was on the provision of risk education and the conduct of non-technical survey, which serves to identify threats.
- In South Sudan the focus of the support risk education and land clearance and release.

At the onset the resources were more less evenly distributed between Lebanon and South Sudan, with Libya securing a little less funds. Of the four programmes, the one that secured the least financial support through the programme was Mali (see table 1). However this distribution shifted to generate a more even distribution between Libya and Lebanon and somewhat lower funds, proportionally, for South Sudan. Mali remained with the most limited budget (see Table 2).

*Other challenges are included in the text.

As pertains to finances, the expected financial distribution when the contract was first issued (see table 1) was lower than the final allocation (see table 2). In addition, a separate grant for Libya (Derna) for 1.5 Million EUR (reported in 2018 Annual report). A further EUR1.026.979 grant for activities in Sirte Libya for the 2016-2017 period was also granted. The grant for Sirte was reported to separately in 2018 (financial and narrative reports). This also included a separate audit report.

Table 1 Financial distribution at contract¹

Overall budget	Lebanon	Libya-Tunisia	Mali	South Sudan	Cross Cutting	Total per Year
Budget 2016	249,175	216,070	161,844	599,777	3,661	1,230,527
Budget 2017	735,583	799,105	286,497	1,354,843	3,844	3,179,872
Budget 2018	1,017,730	845,300	292,686	956,191	4,036	3,115,943
Budget 2019	1,021,367	827,891	297,369	725,263	4,238	2,876,128
Budget 2020	676,139	315,084	161,557	0	80,750	1,233,530
TOTAL BUDGET	3,699,994	3,003,450	1,199,953	3,636,074	96,529	11,636,000

¹ The initial financial agreement, according to the contract was 14.1 EUR

BUDGET IN %	31.8%	25.8%	10.3%	31.2%	0.8%	100.0%
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Table 2 Final financial allocation²

Overall budget	Lebanon	Libya-Tunisia	Mali	South Sudan	Cross Cutting	Total
TOTAL REVISED BUDGET	4.151.623	4.367.885	649.959	3.886.076	80.457	13.136.000
Totals Actuals 2016-2020	4.168.194	4.373.789	650.719	3.883.153	59.573	13.135.430
Forecasts 2020	437.848	516.843	196.845	247.764	68.647	1.467.946
Actuals 2020	619.974	1.039.321	218.362	205.513	47.421	2.130.592
Deviation 2020	-182.127	-522.478	-21.518	42.251	21.226	-662.645
Deviation 2020 %	-41,60%	-101,09%	-10,93%	17,05%	31%	-45%
Deviation 2016-2020	-16.571,71	-5.904,29	-760,62	2.922,93	20.883,84	570,16
Deviation 2016-2020	-0,40%	-0,14%	-0,12%	0,08%	25,96%	0,00%

3 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

This assignment was conducted between January and March 2021, by a team of two consultants: Ananda S. Millard, PhD as Team Leader and Grace Muchunu as Research Assistant and Project Manager. Julian Brett (Tana, peace and security specialist) provided Quality Assurance.

3.1 APPROACH

The evaluation was anchored on the Utilization Focused Evaluation Approach which served to ensure that its deliverables provide the highest level of utility to the client and other stakeholders (field implementing agencies) and that the data collection process served as an opportunity for internal reflection within the client and partner organisations. Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, all data collection, client engagement and presentations of findings were managed remotely.

3.2 TOOLS

The following tools were used for data collection:

Document review: Programme documents, relevant policies and guidelines were reviewed in order to a) respond to evaluation questions; b) refine lines of inquiry. The data extraction from documents was conducted using a systematic data extraction tool that is aligned with the evaluation questions (see Annex 2 – Bibliography).

Key Informant interviews (KIIs): 22 individuals were interviewed in either individual or group meetings. All, but one respondent, were current or former DCA staff. These interviews were foundational as they constituted a considerable portion of the original data collected. For a full list of respondents see Annex 3 – List of Respondents.

Survey: A survey to include operational staff in each partner organisation was used. A total of 16 staff responded to the survey. We do not know the response rate because DCA shared the survey link with their staff and have not provided the number of expected respondents with the evaluation team. The

²This financial distribution was reported in the annual report for 2020 and in the project audit report for 2020 which includes final distribution of costs.

survey questions can be found in Annex 4.

Video verification: This tool had been suggested at the start as a way by which data from the field could be viewed by the evaluation team. No new video was collected and shared with the evaluation team, but the team did review video from Libya showing the area of work and type of operations.

3.3 LIMITATIONS

All data collection was done remotely, using Zoom, Team Meetings and Survey Monkey. While there are solid tools to collect data remotely, there were some target groups that could not be engaged due to the remote nature of the assignment. For example, it was not possible to engage with any programme beneficiaries since doing so would have raised considerable ethical concerns regarding data validity and verification. In addition, historical memory within DCA presented a clear challenge as multiple staff involved in the programme are no longer engaged with DCA and were not available for interview, or who did not recall with certainty the events related to the assignment. It was also noted that since the programme is over and some partners are no longer engaged by DCA in joint activities, partners were also reluctant to grant interviews. Indeed, in Lebanon, where two partners were engaged with the programme, Laminda and Balamand University, neither responded to requests for interviews.

3.4 ANALYSIS

All data was uploaded to MAXQDA, a qualitative data analysis software, and analysed within the software. This ensured the systematic analysis and triangulation of data. Both tools and data sources were triangulated with the approach taken for this assignment.

4 FINDINGS

In this section we focus on the main findings of this evaluation. These are presented according to the specific criteria in the ToR and respond also to the evaluation questions.

4.1 RELEVANCE

This section focuses on assessing the relevance of the programme in relation to both beneficiaries and other stakeholders as well as the relevance of achieved outputs and outcomes. The questions that guided the data collection on relevance focus on issues concerning coherence with national and developmental strategies; quality of problem analysis and programme logical framework; extent to which the intervention responded to known challenges, as well as adaptation to contextual challenges. The section also focuses on the relevance of the approach including the partners chosen, and stakeholder engagement.

Key Findings

- At a broad level, the programme was relevant to the needs of the target population across all four countries.
- The programme was also relevant to the objectives of the donor and well aligned with the DCA area of competence.
- The linkages between outputs and outcomes are not so clear cut. The outcomes assume a certain level of contextual progression and stability which is not present in most of the contexts where this programme was implemented. Therefore, while relevant to conduct the activities the results were often more output level than outcome or impact.

4.1.1 RELEVANCE OF PROGRAMME OUTCOME FOR BENEFICIARIES AND STAKEHOLDERS

At an overarching level, what DCA provided through this programme responded to the overall expectations of the Donor and needs of the countries where programmes were implemented. More specifically the removal of devices (unexploded ordnance and other explosives) inherently increases the safety of people living or using the affected area. Similarly, having an improved knowledge of the risks associated with unexploded ordnance and other explosive devices is a positive step towards improving the safety of those provided with knowledge. Therefore, at this high level of analysis, despite the fact that each of the four countries faces a distinct challenge, the efforts were consistently relevant. On the victim assistance support provided in Lebanon, through work with Balamand University, the high-level outcomes are less clear and not specifically reflected in the indicators. It was not possible to engage the implementing partner, Balamand University, and respondents interviewed raised some questions regarding the relevance of income generating activities and potential challenges regarding their appropriateness.

The broad alignment mentioned is also reflected in the way programme activities were nested into

broader national or regional efforts. More specifically, however, alignment with national strategies means little since the strategies themselves cannot be implemented due to instability within the respective countries. For example, in Libya there is a national development plan, but as DCA rightfully notes in their proposal, the ability to effectively implement it is contingent on greater stability in the country. Likewise, in Mali the Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction remains valid, but, as noted by DCA, the ability of the government to effectively implement it is limited given its focus on the conflict zones. In South Sudan the Development Plan that was to expire in 2013 was extended to 2016 due to national instability. In effect, only Lebanon is stable enough to allow for work to be effectively nested in a broader strategy. In the Lebanese case this is ensured by LMAC determining who can do what and where. The degree of LMAC capacity to effectively align its priorities to the national strategy and effectively ensure that activities support the country's development was not assessed as part of this assignment.

Therefore, while relevant that DCA linked their efforts to national development plans; the real-world impact of this is not so clear given the different levels of instability locally. Basically, while in Lebanon there is a working Mine Action Authority in the other countries the management and the implementation of the national development priorities is far less clear, and often made difficult by contextual challenges in terms of security and stability. For example: conflict activities can change the nature of contamination, lead to re-contamination of areas once cleared, force people to flee which means that information on contamination is lost.

Still, consistently, across all countries, interview data and documents reviewed underscored that all interventions were well aligned with what could be understood to be the national priorities or general objectives/responses. As noted above in Lebanon, this was very clear and visible since the LMAC has detailed priorities and works closely with implementing partners to ensure that their work is well aligned with their national objectives and expectations. In fact, no operator is permitted to determine their own tasks or priorities unilaterally, but indirectly operators do have a role to play as they influence the development of prioritization criteria and relevant systems for priority setting under the coordination of relevant UN Agencies. In the other three countries, although a clear national strategy for mine action was not available, all interview respondents and available documents confirmed that the interventions were well aligned with the known problem. Known problems were assessed by the responsible authority and in certain instances, when tasked to do so, by DCA itself (example: technical survey). In this context it is critical to underline that in certain instances, South Sudan, for example, the extent of the problem is unclear as the population has fled the affected regions prior to the conduct of surveys. In Libya it was noted that some of the problem is known, but that the continued instability means that the conditions on the ground have changed during the programme lifecycle and that the programme was forced to adapt to it. Changes in contamination and challenges with information were also reported in Mali.

Translating national level relevance to end line beneficiaries was more challenging. In some cases, the activities were modified to be able to better target beneficiary groups (see effectiveness). While in others the absence of beneficiary groups in contaminated areas meant that the activities are relevant to a population which is currently absent. For example, in South Sudan where the population fled to Uganda during the last increase in hostilities in 2016. Moreover, the assumption that people will automatically return because land has been decontaminated is too simplistic and does not sufficiently consider the fact that displacement is a complex dynamic affected by multiple factors, not only land

contamination. Return is equally complex and determined by a multiplicity of factors including decontaminated land, general security, the conditions refugees experience in their host environment, etc.

From an ownership perspective, DCA aims to generate local ownership as part of their working model. They focus attention on build capacity amongst partners locally, for example the local mine action authority, or partner organisations identified/approved by the mine action authority, as well as training local staff to conduct key activities. However, this is harder to do when systems locally are weak or do not exist. Unsurprisingly, therefore, of all the programmes the one with the clearest local ownership was that of Lebanon, because the LMAC is well established and they have an approach to working with agencies such as DCA that ensures the national authority keeps control over all activities conducted. This does not mean, however that in the other three countries efforts were not locally owned, but rather that securing local ownership, and specifically clarity around ownership was more difficult. In Libya, DCA had supported efforts to establish a local coordination office and worked towards ensuring it could be operationalized. In South Sudan, the relationship was with UNMAS and also at a more local level focused on the town level as well. For example, by meeting directly with local government leadership such as city majors. In Mali the coordination was done with local authorities, but also with local groups of women, youth and other more loosely defined associations which could be used as a way to share information and secure local ownership and legitimacy.

It was noted that 10 of the 16 survey respondents described their engagement with partners/stakeholders. The engagement is detailed as continuous and focused on information exchange. It was noted, however, and as confirmed by other data, that the design of the programme was done largely at HQ and not in close collaboration with stakeholders. However, on the day-to-day operations DCA was continually able to adapt to emerging local needs by working (operationalising) the project objectives in a way that responded to stakeholder needs locally with whom DCA was in direct contact. The stakeholders that information was provided to varied from country to country, but it is clear that DCA locally exercised a high level of responsiveness. A number of survey respondents also noted that their engagement with community members (end beneficiaries) also served to explain what they were engaged in and ensure that community members understood the tasks carried out and felt comfortable with DCA's presence. In addition, a limited number of respondents mentioned that beneficiary feedback was used to inform planning. This suggests that the flexibility that field operations could exercise had a direct impact on ensuring relevance of activities at the local level.

Overall the data shows that the programme design was led and managed from DCA HQ, and that the interventions at the design stage, by the in-country teams, was very limited. However, the approach taken appears to have been flexible and responsive to risks as they arose (see effectiveness) and this helped promote that the intervention remained relevant for the duration of the programme process. It is noted however that risk assessment appears to not have been systematic, but rather responsive to visible challenges faced by implementors on the ground, and hence their identification left to the discretion of field staff.

4.1.2 RELEVANCE OF OUTPUTS FOR ACHIEVING OUTCOMES:

In this sub section we focus attention more specifically on the relationship between outputs and outcomes and the relevance of these.

In general, the objectives appear well aligned with the needs at the field level. However, there seems to be a much stronger degree of relevance of outputs than outcomes. Specifically, some of the outcomes are not well suited to the contexts where the programme was implemented because the context does not permit the output -> outcome evolution expected in the indicators (see section on efficiency for a more detailed discussion of these challenges). Other than in Lebanon, all other contexts were far more volatile and experienced considerable changes during the intervention and therefore there were multiple factors, external to DCA, that could have directly affected the results and which would have influenced outcomes. For example, in South Sudan, the population has fled the area due to the conflict which occurred after the start of the programme which has meant that decontaminated land has not equated with the use of the territory for the purpose intended. This does not mean that the land will not be used at some point, or that having cleared it was not important; indeed, the evaluation team is not in a position to affirm either; but it does mean that the indicators were not well aligned with the contextual realities in the field. Similarly, perception of threat is affected by a myriad of factors. An increase or reduction in the perception of risk may or may not be linked, in any way to risk education received, and indeed risk education could lead to a perception of more or less risk and both could be a sign of positive change. Lastly the ability of DCA to support national capacity in a structured and constructive way is limited in countries that are so unstable. This does not mean that efforts were not made, indeed there have been. For example, the training of military personnel on EOD in Libya, training of Risk Education focal points in Mali and training of deminers in South Sudan.

However, the linearity because the output and expected outcome is not so direct, which means that there is a need for a number of other elements to be present/absent to secure the expected outcome. For example, the use of national staff and providing them with skills on subjects that are likely to be relevant to their respective countries for a long time to come (ex: EOD skills in Libya, Demining in South Sudan and Risk Education in Mali) is certainly positive and indeed could be an asset to the country in later years. However, this does not mean that a verifiable national capacity has been generated.

Overall it is not the relevance of the output which is questioned, but rather the design of the indicators (see efficiency). This presents a couple of challenges, one that reporting provided at outcome level perpetuates an incorrect assessment of the conditions experienced on the ground, but perhaps more problematic, that the reporting tool did not allow for an accurate reflection of the field experience and the outcomes that may have actually been verifiably achieved. Indeed, multiple respondents across different countries noted that they faced difficulties making results align with the indicators chosen for the programme. The general view amongst staff was that the indicators did not permit a nuanced analysis that was context specific.

The review of documents and interviews suggest that there were some challenges regarding how indicators were understood in different contexts and over time. It was noted that none of those interviewed played a role in the development of the indicators, and in fact there was some lack of clarity regarding how the indicators had come about. Some respondents felt that the indicators had been prescribed by the donor, while others thought they had been developed at DCA HQ. In fact the indicators were co-designed, it seems, by the donor with DCA and other agencies part of the same

programme. The lack of clarity seems to be a product of the time that has lapsed, changes in staff across all offices involved and lack of clear communication between offices. While all respondents agreed that, during their respective tenures, efforts had been made to ensure that the measurements taken were consistent, all respondents agreed that there was some confusion regarding the use of indicators over the whole programme cycle. It was also noted that reporting was done by the different countries to HQ, but that there was no documented effort to have discussions between different country offices regarding challenges faced and how these were solved. This means that each country operated in a siloed manner and hence there was no capitalization of field experiences to the benefit of the whole programme.

The above is problematic because it means that DCA could not effectively report its actual outcomes and this in turn means that lessons, experiences, and more nuanced understandings about what and how to measure progress may have been missed. In turn it is not possible to know how relevant the reported outcomes are because the nuance needed to know if they were in fact achieved and the challenges with meeting them is not included. The discussion of indicators is further elaborated upon in the section focusing on efficiency.

4.2 EFFECTIVENESS

Turning attention to the effectiveness of the programme. This section focuses on reporting and donor expectations, the links between mine action and other humanitarian interventions by DCA; as well as

Key Findings

- The Donor confirms that reported results are well aligned with expectations, and a review of documents and supplementary interviews confirms this alignment. There are no concerns regarding the effectiveness of the programme given the contextual conditions experienced. However, the data suggest that reported results do not provide a complete picture of the experience and that improved indicators could have better reflected the complexities of the programme intervention and challenges faced.
- Opportunities to learn from experiences across the programme were not capitalized upon because all reporting was by countries to HQ, with limited, if any opportunities for cross-country discussion.
- Cross-cutting issues, such as gender, conflict sensitivity and environment, were not applied in a consistent manner across all interventions. Indeed, the requirement to include them in certain instances appeared cumbersome and forced. In instances when DCA staff perceived these issues as directly relevant to ensuring the effectiveness of activities conducted, the cross-cutting issue of relevance was applied to the implementation of the activity. For example: women and gender was included in Mali and conflict sensitivity was considered when dealing with national authorities in Libya. However none of these inclusions have been systematically reasoned or documented. Environment was not applied at all in any of the programme implementation locations.
- Activities conducted as part of this programme were not consistently linked to other development activities conducted by either DCA or other actors. There were, however, individual examples of instances where links could, and were, made. This apparent

on community based work, conflict sensitivity and risk management. These issues are explored through responses to a wide number of questions including the effectiveness of perceived benefits, the flexibility of management and its impact on effectiveness; the existence and effect of unintended outputs; the link between cross cutting issues and effectiveness and lastly the degree of complementarity between the DCA interventions and other development cooperation activities.

4.2.1 RESULTS-BASED REPORTING (EFFECTIVENESS OF INPUTS RELATED TO OUTPUTS) AND DONOR EXPECTATIONS

At a general level, programme outputs were well met by the DCA intervention across the four countries. Interviews and the review of available documents showed that the DCA programme was well aligned with donor overarching objectives (See Programme and relevance) and that results reported met expectations. Moreover, there were no concerns raised regarding the effectiveness of the interventions conducted in relation to reaching expected outputs. The donor was very flexible and willing to explore alternatives when these were required. For example, in response to increased hostilities in South Sudan or due to COVID-19, at times, activities could not be conducted as initially planned. These challenges did not so much affect the effectiveness of the activities as designed, but rather restricted the possibility that activities could be conducted and therefore had an overall impact on outputs.


The approach taken to manage the intervention appears to have been very siloed with each country programme reporting to DCA HQ and limited, if any, opportunity for discussion across countries. This approach did not allow cross country learning based on the implementation experiences. At the strategic level the activities and reporting mechanisms were centralized, but the operationalization of activities done locally. This meant that where activities achieved additional results or where outcomes did not realistically linearly translate to the expected results, the reporting could neither address the challenge, nor could institutional learning be clearly derived from these experiences.

The indicators used are an important element that warrants discussion. During interviews it was confirmed that the indicators were agreed upon in 2016 as a result of a workshop that included DCA, HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group, as well as the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. None of the staff interviewed from DCA had participated, so it is unclear how exactly these came about and/or the degree to which the challenges with the indicators were voiced by DCA or any other mine action organization present.

As briefly noted above (relevance), while indicators can reflect well the outputs, interviews and review of documents does challenge the linearity between outputs and outcomes (these challenges are discussed below). The experience also questions the degree to which some outcomes can be expected from similar outputs across countries that are experiencing very different contextual realities. Some respondents highlighted that there were considerable nuances missed by the indicators and that effectively reporting was often challenging. Moreover, multiple interview respondents noted that they felt that the reports failed to fully reflect the achievements of their activities and lost the nuance that could have better reflected the realities of the interventions and therein the efficiency of the programme because the reporting mechanisms was pre-established. It was noted that reports also include anecdotes of cases and changes made, but these are not systematic and rather anecdotal using a most significant change type modality which inherently has a bias towards positive results which are illustrative of programme intentions. It is noteworthy that the view that reporting did not permit a full account of field activities was not shared by junior staff, who responded to the survey, where the findings show that most respondents felt that the reporting mechanisms were adequate.

Figure 1 National staff survey

Were your progress reports an accurate reflection of the work that you did?



Still, the questions about reporting raised by the management teams in the different countries deserve attention and provide a key opportunity for future learning for DCA, and donors, and hence are further discussed here. It is noteworthy that the 2019 programme evaluation which included all organizations funded under the Dutch funded programme highlighted the challenges partners had faced with understanding and applying the programme theory of change. Indicators used and challenges with these are not particularly mentioned in that evaluation.

Some of the observations presented in the next pages were raised during the inception phase of this evaluation. Here we include the findings from the data collection where the indicators were further explored. In the next pages each indicator is discussed separately. However, before delving into the indicators some general observations are warranted. The 2018 annual report provides an explanation as to how the indicators were calculated. While this explains the mathematical calculation and reasoning, it does not resolve the overarching challenge: do the indicators fully reflect an expected reality in relation to outcome and potential impact. Likewise, the donor also provided a guidance document to use the indicators, but this document also fails to address the underlining challenges with the indicators.

In the next pages outcome indicators, as presented in the reporting to the donor are discussed and problematized. This discussion is directly relevant to this evaluation because the annual reports by DCA on the programme reported on the outcomes listed here, following the indicators identified below without addressing any of the challenges that are presented (see annex 5).

Outcome 1: Security and stability is enhanced, risk of death and injury of individuals and communities reduced.

At an overarching level all respondents would agree that security was enhanced and that the risk of death and injury reduced. In certain instances, stability was dependent on a much wider set of factors over which DCA had limited control and hence while not consistently secured, DCA cannot be faulted for the shortcoming.

Indicator 1: Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting feeling safer following land release and RE activities

The indicator presumes that there is a direct relationship between knowledge and fear/perception of safety, and fails to account for the highly complex nature of perceptions and the factors that lead to changes in perception. The survey used focused on asking perceived safety related to land release and mine risk education, but land release could lead to other sources of insecurity. For example, losing the rights to land, or being subject to attacks from warring factions because the land is safe. Similarly mine risk education may not lead to perceptions of safety, but could easily lead to more concern based on improved awareness (see indicator 2). This indicator seems to make a number of assumptions about what is achieved when clearing land and or providing risk education and also about what perceived dangers are and what these translate into.

The problem with context

Libya provides an excellent example of how context affects results and can render indicators meaningless. In 2018 it was reported that: "...increased randomness of the threats and risks, with more Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) and attacks than previously experienced. This type of circumstance will clearly affect how the population perceive their security and the impact that interventions will have on the target population and on the overall impact of DCA activities undertaken.

In addition, the reporting appears to not account, in any way, for respondent bias. Meaning that respondents will have most likely known that the question sought to secure a positive result, therefore they would have been more keen to respond in this specific way.

Indicator 2: Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting increased knowledge of ERW/mines following RE activities

This indicator seems to be more realistic in its objective, in so far as it looks for improved knowledge. It was noted that 3 of the 4 questions focused on geographical location of threats, and only one focused directly on activities that can increase/decrease risk. This is somewhat problematic because it is presumed that the location of threats is the information that is most often known locally, and how to handle threats is what is conveyed during risk education. This means that the way the measurement was taken to explain the indicator has limited opportunities to effectively convey the knowledge shared and how that knowledge was understood.

Indicator 3: Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed demonstrating increased safe behaviour towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities

The questions identified for the third indicator do focus on improved knowledge and its utilisation for the purpose of increasing safety. A review of some of the questions in the tool raised concerns as they appear not to have provided all plausible/relevant response options and therefore may not have accurately and effectively described reductions in risk.

Importantly, and something that the indicators do not do in their effort to respond to the outcome, is to account for contextual reasons for why behaviour may still be risky even if one knows about the risks. For example, in areas that have been heavily bombarded or where people have no alternatives, but to use land, the risk may not diminish drastically following education, but it may diminish for some and it may serve to empower the population to make more informed decisions.

At the general level, it is also important to note that although all surveys included both men and women the data is not disaggregated, and this means it is not possible to know if different groups received information differently or reacted differently. It is also unclear if the mechanism to collect data were the same across all countries or if the approach described in the 2018 annual report was consistently used across all years.

Outcome 2: Enhanced resilience of vulnerable groups through improved access to resources, livelihoods, and socio-economic reconstruction.

Indicator 1: m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for agriculture

Indicator 2: m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for community development

Indicator 3: m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for housing

Indicator 4: m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for infrastructure

First it is important to underline that at a very basic level the removal of explosive devices and ordnance generates safety for those in their proximity. This safety may or may not be tied to development and indeed the link to development is very context specific. In Lebanon, for example, the LMAC representative underlined that the efforts to decontaminate the country would lead to development, but the evaluation team had access to no independent data that would attest to this. In South Sudan, for example, the risk of increased violence prevents the return of people who have fled to neighbouring countries. Therefore, there are instances where cleared land does not equate automatically with an increase in agriculture/agricultural production or other community development or infrastructure development, although of course it could contribute to these. These examples illustrate the complexity of making a link between these types of indicators and the outcomes outlined. Moreover, in most cases there is a time lapse between clearance and use of cleared areas, and therefore, at best the indicators would have expected a change within a time frame that was entirely too short to allow for the actual recording of outcomes (expected annual reporting).

It is also noted that the explanation of how the survey was understood and deployed, found in DCA's 2018 annual report excludes these four indicators, so it is unclear how the measurement was done. However, the evaluation team found it odd, and somewhat troubling that for all three countries that reported on this indicator (Libya, Lebanon and South Sudan) all clearance was reported as "used for" one of the categories listed above. This would suggest that 100% of the land was instrumental to development activities. The evaluation team is not in a position to determine precisely the reasons for this, but one option is that instead of reporting what the land was currently (at the time of reporting) used for, the report focused on what the land had been used for prior to contamination or as what the land was expected to be used for (aspirational outcome).

Indicator 5: Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting improved livelihoods

Indicator 6: Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting improved access to services and infrastructure

These indicators too prove problematic. The way they are defined presumes that the context is stable and that the lives of beneficiaries are not negatively affected by other factors outside the realm of DCA work. In some ways the challenges with these indicators are similar to those listed in relation to the previous three. Mainly that given the complexity of the context where this programme was implemented it would be unrealistic, in all cases except for maybe Lebanon, to speak about improved livelihoods as a result of the activities conducted by this programme alone.

Outcome 3: Sustainable capacity improvements at the national and local levels.

This last indicator has a sustainability burden attached to it, which raises the complexity of its application. Sustainability expects that the benefits will continue once the intervention has ended. This is problematic because the complexity of the context makes it virtually impossible to know if efforts carried out during the programme will remain. As has been mentioned in the relevance section, of the four countries, the only one with an established and stable Mine Action Centre was Lebanon, which means that in all other instances the capacity developed is not being absorbed by a well-established, robust and functioning system. This means that efforts made by DCA have the aspiration of building capacity and intend to contribute to national capacity, but may or may not be sustainable. In turn it means that the reporting is not accurate and that the challenges faced by DCA at the country level are not effectively documented/addressed by the indicators used.

In reality the operationalisation of efforts in the four countries meant that in Lebanon and Libya the efforts made were at the organisational and national level and supported the strengthening of local authorities and civil society actors (Lebanon only), while in Mali and South Sudan efforts have focused on the development of technical capacity on the assumption that this capacity is of utility to the country more broadly longer term irrespective of whether or not DCA continues to run operations there.

The challenges presented above illustrate the problems with reporting and effectively documenting progress, and not necessarily challenges with operationalizing activities. Across all programmes that approach used by DCA was very flexible and adaptable to current conditions and demands. In all instances, DCA personnel noted that not only were their systems for implementing the programme very flexible, but that the donor allowed a degree of flexibility which was very realistic (aligned with the operational contexts where the programme was implemented). These factors positively contributed to the effectiveness of the response.

Supporting local capacity

- In Libya, army engineers trained on EOD IMAS certification. The document further notes that the training of 10 army engineers to EOD International Mine Action Standards level 2 and 3 who consequently cleared land equal to 203,200 m2 and completed EOD spot tasks. The reporting on DCA notes that these efforts led to community housing, development and access to infrastructure (how these latter parameters are defined is not clear),
- In Lebanon the review of the National Mine Action standards was supported.

4.2.2 CROSS CUTTING ISSUES AND THE LINKS BETWEEN MINE ACTION AND BROADER HUMANITARIAN WORK

The inclusion of cross cutting issues was a demand from both the donor and a standard of operations by DCA HQ. However, what it meant in each country, how meaningful it was and how it influenced the work conducted varied. Cross cutting issues included gender, conflict sensitivity, and environment. The former two have been more clearly and systematically applied and are better understood across DCA than the latter. Indeed, there are no indicators that the latter was applied in any deliberate way.

In relation to **gender**, the findings suggest that its application has consistently varied. The data collected at the field level to support reporting on the predefined indicators (see previous section) was not gender disaggregated. This means that there is no way of knowing if some genders were more affected or impacted than others or generally assess response patterns by gender. In Lebanon, data on gender was collected and disaggregated, but DCA staff note that the data was not used and did not lead to any modification in approach. It is worth noting that in Lebanon DCA's activities were implemented through two partners and that neither agreed to an interview despite multiple requests. Therefore, it is unclear if gender played an important role in securing the effectiveness of the intervention or not.

There are, however, examples of instances where gender played an important role in securing the effectiveness of the interventions. For example, in Mali it was noted that reaching women was recognised as a challenge, therefore DCA worked with female focal points at the community level to ensure access and the ability to disseminate information to all target groups effectively. In Mali it was also documented, in the 2018 annual report, that certain women, particularly age 13-18, were the most at risk of being excluded from information provision.

In Libya, it was recognised from the start that reaching women generally, and particularly female headed households, as well as other marginalised groups such as the disabled and those internally displaced would require specific attention. This meant that the programme focused particular attention on these target groups from the start in an effort to ensure that not only they were included in a meaningful way and that relevant information reached them effectively.

Conflict sensitivity also played a more important role in some instances. Specifically, in Libya, South Sudan and Mali. In Libya, awareness about the complexity of the conflict and recognising these challenges enabled DCA to play an important role (self-reported) in supporting the different government parties/factions to work together and permit the establishment of a coordination office to oversee the removal of explosive devices in the eastern part of the country. In South Sudan, conflict sensitivity manifested itself in how DCA ensured that demining staff were accepted at the community level and navigated the government demands (using former combatants) with community concerns regarding who deminers were (ethnicity). In Mali, engagement with local authorities were used as a mechanism to ensure that trust on their work was granted and that the presence of DCA was not misunderstood or attributed to a particular faction. Despite the importance of the conflict context the documentation reviewed, and interviews conducted, show that there was no systematic assessment of conflict issues and/or do no harm principles.

In relation to the **linkages** between DCA's interventions and other development efforts the findings generally show that there was limited effort on behalf of the programme to identify and pursue this type of complementarity. Still, there were instances where the level of complementarity was clearer

than others. For example, LMAC would argue that all interventions that take place in Lebanon are well aligned with other development interventions. The respondent interviewed from LMAC was not able to provide specific examples of this. However, due to the remote nature of this evaluation, these claims could not be confirmed. In Mali, Libya and South Sudan, the precarious peace means that efforts to pursue development may or may not yield the expected results. In these contexts, it would be unrealistic to expect that efforts by DCA will be able to secure long term development, however they may, depending on how things develop, contribute towards it. That said there are some examples of DCA activities which could contribute to, or enabled, other activities. For example, in Libya, DCA was informed that a school, which was contaminated, was going to be further refurbished. Since the school was intending to remain operational and use the contaminated areas once refurbished having the area cleared before refurbishment was important. Not only would this allow for safe refurbishment, but also for safe use thereafter. This is a good example of the links between clearance and development opportunities. In this instance, the school's headmaster contacted DCA directly and requested their support ahead of the other intervention. In South Sudan, the removal of devices is expected to allow for the return of displaced people from Uganda. However, it is clear that their return is not only hampered by the presence of explosive devices, but also by the limited security enjoyed in the area. Within this context, it is not realistic to expect that development can take place without a range of other pre-conditions being met. Although tangible and well established collaboration examples do not exist yet, it was noted by some respondents that South Sudan and Mali show the greatest promise in this areas and are most likely to develop into types of work that have clear links with development work. Moreover, while humanitarian mine action is an important humanitarian activity that does not need to have direct linkages to development activities, there are circumstances where the links can be made, and making them is important. Therefore distinguishing between cases where links to development are relevant and those where they are not, is important. This should allow for more clear efforts to make links to development activities in instances where it is possible and relevant to do so.

4.2.3 COMMUNITY-BASED AND CAPACITY BUILDING APPROACHES

As mentioned earlier, in relation to outcome 3, DCA did pursue capacity development at the local level. For example by training military staff in EOD in Libya, deminers in South Sudan and Risk education educators in Mali. In Lebanon the support was provided to a local NGO with the expectation that this would allow for capacity to remain operational and in country.

The support for community based approaches can be more easily identified in the case of Mali and South Sudan where efforts to train local community members, as mentioned above, was most relevant. In the case of Lebanon capacity, within national NGO were made, but its long term effectiveness is less clear. It is notable that it was not possible to interview the local partners and that respondents familiar with the partner noted that they are not likely to survive in the long term.

Likewise in Lebanon community based capacity building was included in the work by the Balamand University as part of victim assistance. However, the team was unable to speak with University representatives and the interviews conducted challenges the appropriateness of the approaches undertaken by the university. It appears that there were no clear assessments made to ensure that the capacity provided would, in fact, generate the expected outcomes.

In addition, as noted earlier, a large proportion of survey respondents mentioned that they engage

with community regularly and that their approach of working is one that focuses considerable attention on community level dialogue.

The data collected was unable to demonstrate the likelihood that the capacity building approaches taken are sustainable in the long term and will therefore yield results. Rather these seem to be focused on good will and based on the intent that they will be relevant. Despite these challenges the approaches used may be effective, but clearly mechanisms to measure effectiveness and assess progress appear to be missing.

4.2.4 RISK MANAGEMENT

As pertains to assumptions of risk, and management of these, **all** respondents felt that by and large the analysis of risks had been relevant and adept. However, aside from risks mentioned in the proposal, which focus largely on logistical concerns and contextual volatility, there appear to be no systematic periodic risk review.

The principal unanticipated threat was COVID-19. In some instances, Mali, for example, it was noted that management of risk was something that had to be on-going and real-time. Likewise, in South Sudan and Libya it was noted that the security conditions could change rapidly and that this could have a direct impact on the performance of programmes such as the one under evaluation. Indeed, it was noted that during the programme implementation both Libya and South Sudan experienced time periods where operations needed to be halted due to security concerns. It was also stressed that the policy from HQ is to halt operations if these are considered to place an undue threat on the DCA staff.

Overall, it appears that DCA places considerable responsibility on local staff to both identify and respond to risks, without having a clear and systematic approach to determine risks and examine responses to these. This means that the approach is highly dependent on the skill and competence of individuals.

4.3 EFFICIENCY

Turning attention to the efficiency of the programme. Here the report focuses on the efficiency of the activities conducted and specifically to their cost efficiency and the efficiency of quality of information. These issues have been pursued through a series of questions which have focused on cost effective implementation/use of resources; the effective identification of risks that could affect efficiency; how donors, beneficiaries and other actors were engaged in order to ensure efficiency; efficient management of information, as well as monitoring of quality of results.

Key Findings

- The results are perceived as aligned with the input. Meaning that DCA staff feel that the expectations of the programme were realistic and aligned with the funds received. The review of documents, interviews and survey support this view. However, it is noted that there were no documented assessments that systematically explored if different activities could lead to similar outcomes or if different procurement decisions would have led to different expenditures.
- The reporting by country offices was well aligned with the reporting expectations detailed by DCA HQ and responded to the demands of the donor. However, the reporting framework used was not able to provide a realistic link between outputs and outcomes and failed to allow for a real-world representation of what had taken place on the ground. For this reason reporting was often cumbersome and contributed little, if anything, to institutional learning.

4.3.1 COST-EFFICIENCY

Overall, given the data available it is not possible to conduct a cost efficiency assessment because there were no assessments done either at the country or at the overall level of alternative ways of achieving similar results or of alternative sourcing (procurement). DCA did not explore aspects such as the availability of alternative approaches that could have yielded a more cost efficient use of resources. In the absence of this type of documentation or of an-depth cost analysis that permitted the exploration into local costs and comparative expenditures, which fell out of the scope of this assignment, it is not possible to determine the cost efficiency of the programme. That said, DCA does use the currently recognised most cost-efficient practice, including land release, spot checks and BAC clearance.

In addition, the cost efficiency of the priorities identified by the different interventions also could not be measured because these type of markers were not available. The only partial exception to this was the Lebanon case where the interview with the Mine Action Centre representative revealed that UNDP has done an efficiency assessment for the whole country and that this document was utilised as a foundation for the identification of priorities. However, the document was not available for review by the evaluators and the links between the findings of the report and the identification of priorities also not fully clear.

The only clear challenge to the efficiency of the approach chosen was noted in relation to Lebanon, where the identification of a local partner and indeed working with one was questioned as potentially not the most efficient (or effective) way of working. This has been further challenged since the local NGO is not currently fully operational. Whether or not it would have been more cost efficient to conduct activities directly as DCA instead of through a local partner is not known, but certainly the questions raised do challenge the idea that using a local partner is, as a matter of course, the most efficient approach.

A final point worthy of mention regarding cost efficiency is the budget development. It was noted that the donor permitted the drawing of annual plans, which allowed for more flexibility, response to current threats and improved the cost efficiency potential of the interventions.

4.3.2 ASSESS THE EFFICIENCY OF THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING FROM THE COUNTRY OFFICE

The quality of information management needs to be understood at two levels. First at the field level regarding the technical implementation of activities, and second, at the programme level in relation to reporting to HQ.

At the field level, each programme responded to their own monitoring requirements. In Lebanon this was to the LMAC; in South Sudan and Mali to the UN and in Libya to the local mine action coordination office. The degree of competence for monitoring of activities and efficiency of this monitoring was hard to establish and appears to have varied from case to case. It is clear that the quantification of activities and found ordnance was most systematically recorded and straight forward. However, it is important to underline that the quantification of ordnance and activities does not necessarily equate to a particular impact (higher ordnance found or activities means higher impact or vice versa). In addition, all technical work complied with DCA's own quality controls and reporting. This means that it meets internal Standard Operational procedures that are aligned with international expected practice.

In relation to reporting to HQ, there were more challenges. These have already been discussed in the previous section (efficiency). At a gender level the challenge was that reporting did not align as well as it could have (should have) with the field experience. In turn this means that it was not efficient use of resources because the reporting could not be used as a platform for programme learning, but rather focused primarily on meeting a donor requirement.

Overall it appears all reporting on this programme at the global level was done in relation to the indicators mentioned earlier (see effectiveness), which makes the indicators all the more relevant. In this instance, where the indicators presented clear challenges, the ability that DCA has to make clear links between its activities (outputs) and their actual results (outcome) is considerably impeded.

4.4 IMPACT

Turning attention to the impact, this section focuses on the degree to which expected impact has, or might be achieved; elements that may impact the Theory of Change (ToC) and lessons learned regarding the potential impact of the programme; embedding in local institutions and the opportunities for leaving capacity behind are also explored. Lastly, lessons learned previously are documented.

Key Findings

- Reliably evaluating the impact of the activities conducted at this time is not possible. First, the activities were too recent, and second there were clear challenges with the linearity between outputs and outcomes, which means it is also unclear what the impact might actually be. Still, it can be expected that, if conflict does not resurface, cleared areas will be maintained and impact from these activities will be gleaned at some stage because these areas have been reported as being in zones where they are relevant to infrastructure, agriculture and or other direct human use.
- Risk education activities are likely to have an impact that is more direct and immediate given the volatile environments where this programme was implemented. Indeed, even if conflict increases again, the information provided will allow community members to make more informed decisions that may in turn increase their safety and security. However, the degree to which community members will be able to make safer decisions, given other factors contributing to decision making, is not clear.

At an overall level it is not possible to know what the overarching impact of the activities undertaken will be. This is not a product of shortcomings in the programme itself, but rather a challenge related to the unstable contexts where this programme was implemented, the time lapse required to identify impact and the fact that no beneficiary level data could be collected for this assignment due to the remote data collection approach taken, due to COVID-19. These challenges aside, most respondents noted that having a four-year programme did have considerable benefits in terms of impact potential and certainly permitted for programme adaptation and alignment to needs and contextual changes as these arose. Still despite this, it is important to recognise that the interventions were limited given the complex nature of the problem across all countries and therefore any expectation of impact must be carefully assessed. The ToC for the programme defines its overarching expected impact as: *To promote legitimate stability in fragile states with a view to resolving and preventing armed conflict, protecting people and laying the foundations for sustainable development.* However the reporting is unable to determine if this has in any way been achieved because reporting focuses on the indicators mentioned and there are already clear flaws on how outcomes are reported (see effectiveness).

Still, it is clear that the scale of the problem has been reduced and that the programme has supported the safety and livelihoods of the target populations through the removal of explosive devices and provision of risk education. Even though the link between outputs and outcomes, as assumed by the indicators cannot be made, it is clear that devices were removed from certain areas and knowledge increased amongst the target populations (see outputs listed in annex 5). However, the degree to which the nature of the problem changed depends on a wide range of factors. Not least that in three of the four countries (South Sudan, Mali and Libya) the political and conflict situations are not stable, and were not stable during the programme cycle. Therefore, even if impact is limited, this does not mean that the programme did not contribute, but rather attests to the complexity of the situation and recognises that any progress is positive.

As pertains to the overarching Theory of Change, that makes the links to the donor objectives, is very high level and cover all activities funded under the same programme which include those of other actors aside from DCA, and therefore lack the granularity needed in order to determine the DCA's

contribution to it. The ToC that was developed by DCA, and is listed in the proposal, follows the sentiment of donor described indicators but makes the “contribution” element. This means that the linearity assumed by the indicators used is less strict in the DCA ToC. Therefore although the ToC addresses some of the concerns regarding preconditions that need to be met in order for outcomes to be achieved, within the ToC, this is not reflected in the actual reporting or use of the indicators.

In terms of embedding knowledge into local institutions, as was noted earlier in this report (see effectiveness), the possibilities to do this were clearer in Lebanon and Libya, than Mali and South Sudan. In the latter the capacity building focus was on local capacity development with the hope that this could develop into providing a national capacity baseline. Importantly the conditions needed to make these efforts effective were not described in the Theory of change.

Lastly it is important to note the unintended consequences or effects of this programme. It was noted that respondents were not able to identify unintended consequences. In addition, the vast majority of respondents noted that the interventions were context sensitive, even though no systematic context and conflict assessments have been done at the overall level. Therefore the view is subjective and cannot be verified as part of this assignment. Not all staff, however, agreed that conflict sensitivity was sufficiently integrated or addressed. In South Sudan for example the deminers were Dinka (ethnicity/tribe) and the areas where the programme worked were inhabited by other groups and this could prove problematic, and would have, according to some, required a more in-depth assessment. In Mali, it was noted that engaging local actors, including women’s groups were mechanisms adopted to minimise unexpected consequences (see gender).

As pertains to lessons learned that were documented in DCAs own reports and which could generate improved impact. These include:

- In 2017 the need to expand the pool of survey respondents to better reflect different groups within society was already highlighted. This did not only call for an improved gender distribution within the sample but also age. This was reflected in the final report.
- In Lebanon, the need to adapt mine risk education content to effectively address the local level of knowledge was also documented.

Lessons derived from this assignment are found in the conclusions.

4.5 SUSTAINABILITY

Turning attention to the sustainability of the programme. Here we focus on the sustainability of the different outputs and corresponding outcomes. Given the nature of the programme and the challenges experienced with the use of specific outcome indicators (see effectiveness) the sustainability of the programme will be examined in two ways: first are the outputs sustainable; and second are the outcomes sustainable.

Key Findings

- The data collected and reviewed suggest that outputs of the intervention are sustainable, particularly removal of explosive ordnance. Similarly knowledge shared is expected to be maintained by those who directly benefited. However, the difficulty in determining outcomes makes it impossible to know if any outcomes and or impact will be sustainable.
- The capacities developed locally are sustainable and can be expected to be sustainable for some time in so far as the training has met recognised standards and all those trained have met the requirements expected of them, although the degree to which these will be effectively capitalized on (outcome) is less clear. This depends on those trained having access to employment where their skills can be effectively used. In addition, if the skills are not effectively used, the knowledge will be lost.

At the output level it is clear that the resources invested have led to sustainable outputs. The activities to remove ordnance are sustainable, certainly; and efforts to build capacity amongst affected populations suggest that knowledge was imparted and well received and these may be sustainable. Since this assignment could not include end beneficiaries it is not possible to assess the sustainability of the second output (risk reduction education).

For reasons previously mentioned the outcomes are less easily identified and their sustainability questioned. This is a general problem because of how outcomes were designed. As was noted in the efficiency section, it is very unclear if these were achieved or were aspirational. Indeed, if aspirational the hope was that they may be achieved at some stage and may reach sustainability. However, given the volatility of the contexts where the programme was implemented the future is uncertain across the different contexts. This also means that there could be sustainable results that have not been documented.

COVID -19 and mine action

The data collected during the assignment shows that in certain instances, due to the lockdowns, operations had to stop or be drastically reduced. Aside from this impact, the pandemic did not affect the programme.

As pertains the capacities developed locally, the sustainability of these is largely at the personal level. In addition, given the long history of the Lebanese Mine Action Centre it can be expected that capacity built there will be sustainable. As noted earlier, the sustainability of the capacity built amongst Lebanese partners is questionable. Efforts to build capacity locally amongst authorities in Libya is deeply dependent on the country’s stability, a factor that cannot be attributed, in any way, to DCA. As for efforts in South Sudan and Mali, these focus particularly on individuals and hence the sustainability of the contribution will depend on whether or not trained individuals are able to be part of future efforts to conduct like activities.

Importantly, the degree of sustainability is highly dependent on local stability. In this sense even exploring the sustainability of efforts made may be ill advised since in three of four contexts, the situation remains volatile, at best.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

This evaluation has arrived to some clear conclusions and lessons learned. These are presented here:

Relevance: This evaluation has found that the activities undertaken were relevant across all four countries. However, the approach taken to measure results and confirm relevance over time were not so adept to the task.

Effectiveness: That efforts were effective in generating outputs. Some clear challenged on how outcomes were identified and measured. The fact that the programme demanded the use of indicators that had considerable flaws built into them means that little can be said about the actual outcomes of the programmes. Reports focused on outcomes that do not reflect reality and outcome that may actually reflect what occurred are absent. Indeed without a more granular understanding of what has been reported it is impossible to know, from reports which outcomes have in fact been achieved. This doesn't mean outcomes were absent, but that reporting frameworks has limited their identification.

Efficiency: The review of audited reports note that the finances raised no concerns. However, it is noted that in the absence of any costs -efficiency assessment it is not possible to determine if alternative approaches would have been better suited to the tasks undertaken or if different procurement mechanisms would have yielded better results.

Impact and sustainability: Although a four year programme provides for a greater opportunity to establish/determine longer term implications (impact and sustainability), the context across the different countries was both complex and unstable and therefore determining sustainability at this stage is hard/to impossible. In addition determining impact is difficult because the indicators used and reported do not allow for a real-world assessment of what has been in fact achieved beyond the output level. Both impact and sustainability could be improved if the elements measured were better suited to the contexts and measured aspects of DCAs work that can be more linearly attributed to the intervention. These need not be more complex, but rather more nuanced and realistic.

Sustainability:

There some important lessons that can be learned from the experience.

- First DCA HQ benefited greatly from its ability to allow local level implementation of activities and modification at field level, but it did not capitalise on local knowledge or use the programme to support cross-fertilisation across countries and programmes.
- Second, the indicators and reporting presented clear and important challenges for the different programmes and importantly, did not facilitate learning and reflection, but rather focused on reporting with limited value.
- Third, the level of focus placed on cross cutting issues varied. There is both a need to have a more nuanced understanding of how these can be included and addressed, specifically conflict sensitivity and environment.
- Fourth, DCA has considerable knowledge and can use this knowledge to support dialogue with donors that can in turn lead to important and positive steps forward on how the sector is understood and progress measured.

6 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings for this assignment the following recommendations to DCA are made:

1. For large programmes such as this one, DCA HQ should consider having a dedicated staff member who can support country programmes and support cross learning between the different countries. This would enable the establishment of a stronger learning culture and the capitalisation from experiences across different program locations.
2. DCA should ensure that the use of indicators (even when donor prescribed) are understood, documented and efforts are made to ensure consistent reporting across countries and across years.
3. DCA should capitalise on its field knowledge in the development of programme interventions and not rely so exclusively on HQ staff.
4. DCA should engage in discussions with country programmes and donors regarding what type of indicator may best reflect the work they are doing. This will be important to ensure that a) progress is effectively and realistically reflected; b) monitoring processes actually serve to support real-world learning and self-assessment.
5. If DCA finds itself in a position to discuss indicators with a donor, as was the case here, it will be important to ensure that these opportunities for dialogue are capitalised upon.
6. DCA should consider doing cost-benefit assessments ahead of large programmes to establish if their approach is the most cost -effective or if alternatives might be better suited.
7. DCA should conduct conflict sensitivity analysis to ensure that conflict sensitivity is well integrated into the programme and potential challenges well understood. It should not be a task which is responded to on an ad hoc basis and based only on the local knowledge of staff who have no formal conflict assessment expertise.
8. DCA should explore how environment can be integrated into programmes and what integrating the environmental cross cutting issues means within their work context.
9. DCA should assess how to integrate gender so that its integration is systematic and relevant and well understood by all parties.
10. DCA should systematically explore when/where linkages between humanitarian activities can be made with development activities. These linkages should be clearly defined and understood by those implementing activities.

ANNEX 1 – TOR

To be added to final version as its in PDF.

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

• BACKGROUND INFORMATION

DCA has been implementing a four-year programme in Lebanon, Libya, Mali and South Sudan titled "DCA Humanitarian Mine Action & Cluster munitions 2016-2020". This programme has included humanitarian mine action activities such as area clearance and survey, explosive ordnance risk education (EO RE), victim assistance and training and development of local partners, stakeholders and national authorities. This ToR is in reference to the external evaluation of the programme. The external evaluation will be conducted in Jan/Feb/March 2021. The four-year programme (01 September 2016 to 31 August 2020) received approval from the Dutch Government on 25th of August 2016 and started operations from September 2016.

The projects under evaluation are implemented to benefit the population of Lebanon, Libya, Mali and South Sudan.

Monitoring: Programme-level monitoring is conducted in Lebanon, Libya, Mali and South Sudan through the DCA Programme Manager(s)/Country Director(s) in each country and coordinated at HQ level by the Team Leader Operations and the Programme Support Coordinator(s). All countries conduct monitoring and evaluation (M&E) procedures and submit regular reports to HQ, national stakeholders and the donors.

Partners and Stakeholders: DCA Lebanon is operating both via partner and via direct implementation, with key stakeholders including the Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC-Lebanon), local authorities in Lebanon and other (I)NGOs working in Lebanon. DCA Libya is operating via direct implementation, with key stakeholders including the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMac), the police and army, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior in Tripoli, the Military Council of Misurata, the Civil Defence of the National Safety Authority and other (I)NGOs working in Libya. DCA Mali is operating HMA activities via direct implementation with Dutch funds. DCA Mali furthermore coordinates with all key stakeholders i.e. relevant local/national authorities, UNMAS and other (I)NGOs working in Mali. Finally, DCA South Sudan, is operating via direct implementation, with key stakeholders including the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC-South Sudan), UNMAS, local and national authorities and other (I)NGOs working in South Sudan.

• CONTRACT OUTCOMES & JOINT OUTCOME INDICATORS

The programme has the following outcomes:

- **Outcome 1 – Security and stability is enhanced, risk of death or injury to individuals and in communities is enhanced or removed.**
 - Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting feeling safer following land release and RE activities
 - Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting increased knowledge of ERW/mines following RE activities
 - Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed demonstrating increased safe behaviour towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities
- **Outcome 2 – Improved access to resources, improved livelihoods and socio-economic reconstruction.**
 - m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for agriculture
 - m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for community development
 - m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for housing
 - m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for infrastructure
 - Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting improved livelihoods

- Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting improved access to services and infrastructure

- **Outcome 3 – Sustainable capacity improvements at national and local level.**

- **OBJECTIVES OF THE CONSULTANCY**

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to measure the achievements of the overall program outcomes and the individual project outcomes which are aligned and stated in the project proposal and log-frames; and give recommendations for future project development and improvement in humanitarian mine action including clearance, explosive ordnance (EO) risk education, victim assistance and partner/stakeholder capacity development. In addition, the evaluation should confirm adherence to policy objectives of the Netherlands Development Cooperation policy and the objectives outlined in the Call for Proposals published on 22 March 2016.

Furthermore, the external evaluation will document lessons learned, challenges and good practices of project implementation. Specifically, the external evaluation aims to:

1. Assess the relevance of the programme outcomes for the beneficiaries and stakeholders,
2. Assess the relevance of the outputs for achieving the outcomes
3. Assess the effectiveness in converting inputs to outputs
4. Assess the efficiency of the quality of information management and reporting from the country office
5. Evaluate the sustainability of the different outputs in accordance with the outcomes.
6. Furthermore, include a focus on assessing and evaluating the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the program in Covid19 times hence in year 2020.
7. Make a record of lesson learned, challenges, successes, positive and negative experiences etc.

NB: Aligned with the OECD Development Evaluation Criteria's – see detailed further below.

Objectives of the Netherlands Development Cooperation policy and the objectives outlined in the Call for Proposals published on 22 March 2016.

The Mine Action and Cluster Munitions Programme (MACM) 2016-2020 falls under the policy spearhead of security and the rule of law. Specifically, it is aimed at the following sub-goals of the first policy goal:

- 1.1. All forms of violence against citizens, including sexual violence, and threats to safety are reduced.
- 1.2. Agencies responsible for security carry out their tasks effectively and in a coordinated way, respond to people's needs and account for their actions.
- 1.3. Local communities and civil society contribute independently and in collaboration with the responsible agencies to greater security and a culture of peace.

The activities must help promote security and stability for citizens of the countries in question, and contribute to socio-economic reconstruction and local capacity building in order to ensure they have lasting impact

- **SCOPE OF THE SERVICES**

This external review will be directed towards learning and accountability. While Dutch has supported DCA operations since July 2012, this study will focus on the current project(s), which was launched in 2016.

The external evaluation shall comprise but not necessarily be limited to the following:

1. *Measurement of cost-efficiency*
2. *Donor expectations about results-based reporting*
3. *Links between mine action, humanitarian work and development*
4. *DCA's emphasis on community-based and capacity building approaches*
5. *Conflict sensitivity and risk management*

The Consultant(s) liaison from DCA will be, Mine Action Program Advisor (MAPA), based in DCA HQ in Denmark, who will provide support for day-to-day administrative, logistic and program clarifications. The consultant(s) liaison in-country will be Jennifer Reeves, CD Lebanon, Graeme Ogilvie, CD Libya, Dermot Hegarty, CD Mali, Alexandra Balmer, CD South Sudan. They will be the focal points for administrative and logistic clarifications in relation to each country, and for programme clarifications relating to each country's part of the programme.

• **TIMING, LOGISTICS AND FACILITIES**

The Contract duration will be 35 days between January 2021 and 20 March 2021. The external review was set to include field visits however due to the circumstance of Covid19 in 2020 the review is set to be a 100% desk review from the contractor's office location(s) and end no later than the 20 March 2021.

Desk research and remote interaction with the program is considered reasonable for the full evaluation. DCA MAPA will facilitate the coordination and interaction between the field/country offices and contractor.

• **EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

The questions are intended to guide the consultant(s) in addressing the objectives of the external evaluation:

Relevance - The analysis of relevance will focus on the following questions in relation to the design of the project:

- the project's coherence with broader strategies e.g. national clearance and development priorities
- the quality of the problem analysis and the project's intervention logic and logical framework matrix, appropriateness of the objectively verifiable indicators of achievement;
- the extent to which stated outcomes correctly address the identified problems and social needs, clarity and internal consistency of the stated outcomes;
- the extent to which the nature of the problems originally identified have changed
- the extent to which outcomes have been updated in order to adapt to changes in the context;
- the degree of flexibility and adaptability to facilitate rapid responses to changes in circumstances;
- the quality of the identification of key stakeholders and target groups (including gender analysis and analysis of vulnerable groups);
- the stakeholder participation in the design and in the management/implementation of the project, the level of local ownership, absorption and implementation capacity;
- the quality of the analysis of strategic options, of the justification of the recommended implementation strategy, and of management and coordination arrangements;
- the realism in the choice and quantity of inputs (financial, human and administrative resources)
- the analysis of assumptions and risks;

Effectiveness

The analysis of Effectiveness will therefore focus on such issues as:

- whether the planned benefits are being delivered, as perceived by all key stakeholders (including women and men and specific vulnerable groups);
- if the assumptions and risk assessments at output-level turned out to be inadequate or invalid, or unforeseen external factors intervened, how flexibly management has adapted to ensure that the outputs would still achieve the purpose; and how well has it been supported in this by key stakeholders
- how unintended outputs have affected the benefits received positively or negatively and how could have been foreseen and managed;
- whether any shortcomings were due to a failure to take account of cross-cutting or over-arching issues such as gender, environment and poverty during implementation;
- whether the programme complemented other initiatives (by other NGOs, national organisations, local government)

Efficiency

The assessment of Efficiency will therefore focus on such issues as:

- To what extent was the programme implemented in a cost effective manner? Could the outcomes have been achieved with the use of fewer resources? Or could the outcomes have achieved greater outputs with the same resources?
- operational work planning and implementation (input delivery, activity management and delivery of outputs), and management of the budget (including cost control and whether an inadequate budget was a factor);
- whether management of risk has been adequate, i.e. whether flexibility has been demonstrated in response to changes in circumstances;
- relations/coordination with local authorities, institutions, beneficiaries, other donors;
- the quality of information management and reporting, and the extent to which key stakeholders have been kept adequately informed of project activities (including beneficiaries/target groups);
- Quality of monitoring: its existence (or not), accuracy and flexibility, and the use made of it; adequacy of baseline information;
- Did any unplanned outputs/outcome arise from the activities so far?

Impact

At Impact level the final evaluation will make an analysis of the following aspects:

- Extent to which the outcomes of the project are likely to be achieved as intended, in particular the project planned objectives.
- whether the effects of the project:
 - a. have been facilitated/constrained by external factors
 - b. have produced any unintended or unexpected impacts, and if so how have these affected the overall impact.
 - c. have been facilitated/constrained by project/programme management, by co-ordination arrangements, by the participation of relevant stakeholders
 - d. have contributed to economic and social development
 - e. have made a difference in terms of cross-cutting issues like gender equality, environment, good governance, conflict prevention etc.

Sustainability

- Are the benefits from the project likely to continue after the project has ended? Why and why not?
- Has the programme provided policy support and have donor and national policy been aligned?
- The extent to which the project is embedded in local institutional structures; whether the institution appears likely to be capable of continuing the flow of benefits after the project ends (is it well-led, with adequate and trained staff, sufficient budget and equipment?); whether counterparts have been properly prepared for taking over, technically, financially and managerially;
- the adequacy of the project budget for its purpose particularly phasing out prospects;
- socio-cultural factors, e.g. whether the project is in tune with local perceptions of needs and of ways of producing and sharing benefits; whether it respects local power-structures, status systems and

beliefs, and if it sought to change any of those, how well-accepted are the changes both by the target group and by others; how well it is based on an analysis of such factors, including target group/beneficiary participation in design and implementation; and the quality of relations between the external project staff and local communities.

• **METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH**

The evaluation will draw on existing sources of information including Dutch annual report(s), and reporting to relevant stakeholders in country, Dutch proposal, budget, and annual plans including revisions, as well as any HQ field visits and interviews with beneficiaries, DCA staff and government officials, and stakeholders such as the national mine action centres and UNMAS and/or UNDP. All information will be sources in coordination with DCA MAPA and Covid19 restriction considerations.

The Consultants are free to choose whatever methods are necessary to fulfil the evaluation objectives. However, it is expected that, wherever possible, participatory approaches should be adopted. The Consultants should collect qualitative as well as quantitative data.

The evaluation approach will at a minimum include:

1. Desk review
 - a. A review and analysis of project proposal, revisions and reports in order to analyse to what extent outcomes and outputs have been reached.
 - b. A review of other related documents such as project research materials, manuals, activity reports, mid-term evaluation reports, etc.
2. Remote: Potential interviews with key stakeholders including project beneficiaries, government officials and DCA.
3. Remote: Potential Focus group discussions with key stakeholders (project beneficiaries, government officials, EU delegation)
4. Other methodologies as proposed by the evaluator

• **REPORTING**

The debriefing workshop prior to the Consultants' departure should present the preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations. The purpose is to inform DCA and other stakeholders of the Consultants' observations, and to gather feedback to improve the final report.

The external evaluation report should be produced after incorporating feedback from DCA and their partners. The final report should not exceed 29 pages (excluding annexes). A draft report should be sent to DCA by e-mail for comments within ten days after the debriefing workshop. The final report should be delivered to DCA, both as a hard copy and as a PDF file.

The evaluation report should be in DCA's 1-3-25 format, namely:

- 1 page of recommendations for future action
- 3 page (maximum) executive summary
- 25 page (maximum) report. The report should include:
 - Introduction (Objectives, Methodology, ToR, etc)
 - Context analysis, Background, History
 - The evaluated project
 - Findings
 - Conclusions
 - Lessons learned
- Annexes and case studies may be included

- **QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS**

For the comparison and evaluation of the technical proposals, the Contracting Authority shall take the following criteria into consideration, with the indicated weights:

Criteria	Percentage
Principal area of specialisation: Humanitarian Mine Action (Clearance, Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EO/RE), Victim Assistance (VA), Advocacy, Stockpile Destruction)	25/100
Additional area(s) of specialisation: Land Release, Training and Capacity Building of local partners and National Authorities.	15/100
Demonstrable ability to address the Terms of Reference and present an acceptable methodology including adequate man power and time spent to complete the evaluation	25/100
Experience in Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MLE) of programmes and/or regional projects in the Middle East/North Africa/Sub-Saharan Africa: 5 to 10 years	25/100
Demonstrated report writing skills (reference to and examples of three completed evaluation reports)	10/100

ANNEX 2 – BIBLIOGRAPHY

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- Tobias Juhler Maureschat (2018), *'Annual Narrative Progress Report 2'*, Safer Communities in South Sudan, Mali, Libya and Lebanon 2017, DCA

ANNEX 3 – LIST OF RESPONDENTS

1. Akonio Adbdoulaye Dolo (Konate) , DCA
2. Alexandra Blaisa Balmer, DCA
3. Alessandro Di Gusto, Former DCA staff
4. Annette Ludeking, DCA
5. Augustin Allard, DCA
6. Charlotte Billoir, former DCA staff
7. Dermot Hegarty , DCA
8. Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA
9. Greame Ogilvy, DCA
10. Jennifer Reeves, DCA
11. Lasse Marinus Jorgensen, DCA
12. Lene Rasmussen, DCA
13. Lt Col Fadi Wazed, LMAC
14. Mette Krarup Anderson, DCA
15. Mouhamed Chour , DCA
16. Mugove Chakurira, DCA
17. Olivia Douwes, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
18. Richard Loydell, DCA
19. Roger Fasth, DCA
20. Romee Cnossen, DCA
21. Sarah Alex, DCA
22. Wisam Kutom, DCA

ANNEX 4 – SURVEY QUESTIONS

DCA Mine Action Survey For project staff engaged in implementation

Dear respondent,

Tana Copenhagen ApS has been commissioned by DanChurchAid to conduct an evaluation of Dutchfunded DCA project interventions. Tana is a global consulting firm based in Denmark, a leading specialist in providing technical expertise within peace and security thematic areas. You are invited to participate in this survey because you have worked on the Dutch-funded DCA intervention. We ask that you make sure that all your responses are related to the Dutch-funded project only. All responses will remain anonymous. Thank you for your participation.

Q1. Gender

Female

Male

Other (please specify)

Q2. Country:

Mali

Lebanon

Libya

South Sudan

Q3. Employer:

DCA

DCA partner

Other

Q4. Please describe the type of activities in which you were engaged.

Q5. Did you engage with partner organisations?

Yes

No

Do not want to respond

Q6. If yes, for what purpose, please describe.

Q7. Did this engagement lead to any changes in how you did your job?

Q8. Did you engage with beneficiaries in the communities?

Yes
No
Do not want to respond

Q9. If yes, for what purpose, please describe.

Q10. Did this engagement lead to any changes in how you did your job?

Q11. Were there any risks, which affected your work, which you did not foresee?

Yes
No
Do not want to respond

Q12. If yes, what were these risks, please describe them.

Q13. Has the work you have done led to any unintended results?

Yes
No
Do not want to respond

Q14. If yes, what were they? Please, describe.

Q15. How did you report the progress you made? Please describe.

Q16. Were your progress reports an accurate reflection of the work that you did?

Yes
No
Do not want to respond

Q17. If no, what do you think would have been a better way to measure results?

Q18. Do you think project benefits will continue?

Yes
No
Do not want to respond

Q19. If yes, what benefits will continue?

Q20. If no, why not?

ANNEX 5 – PROGRAMME RESULTS

Joint Outcome Indicators

INDICATORS	LEBANON	LIBYA	MALI	SOUTH SUDAN
OUTCOME 1				
.1. Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting feelings safer following land release and RE activities	Baseline 2016/17 98% of respondents who were aware of contamination had concerns for family members' safety and their own	Baseline 2016/17 96% of respondents who were aware of contamination had concerns for family members' safety and their own	Baseline 2016/17 99% of respondents who were aware of contamination had concerns for family members' safety and their own	Baseline 2016/17 96% of respondents who were aware of contamination had concerns for family members' safety and their own
	Endline 2018 99% of respondents reported feeling safer following land release and RE activities (99% men, 100% women, 100% boys and 99% girls)	Endline 2018 97% of respondents reported feeling safer following land release and RE activities (99% men, 98% women, 99% boys and 95% girls)	Endline 2018 90% of respondents reported feeling safer following RE activities (95% men, 98% women, 86% boys and 70% girls)	Endline 2018 92% of respondents reported feeling safer following land release and RE activities (93% men, 91% women, 92% boys and 92% girls)
	Endline 2019 100% reported feeling safer following land release and RE activities (100% men, 100% women, 100% boys and 100% girls)	Endline 2019 93% reported feeling safer following land release and RE activities (100% men, 89% women, 94% boys and 93% girls)	Endline 2019 72% reported feeling safer following RE activities (76% men, 70% women, 64% boys and 79% girls)	Endline 2019 99% reported feeling safer following land release and RE activities (99% men, 100% women, 100% boys and 98% girls)
	Endline 2020 100% reported feeling safer following RE activities (100% men, 100% women, 100% boys and 100% girls)	Endline 2020 93% reported feeling safer following land release and RE activities (100% men, 89% women, 94% boys and 93% girls)	Endline 2020 61% reported feeling safer following RE activities (57% men, 62% women, 64% boys and 59% girls)	Endline 2020 99% reported feeling safer following RE activities (100% men, 100% women, 99% boys and 99% girls)
2. Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting increased knowledge of ERW/mines following RE activities	Baseline 2016/17 Baseline: 45% of respondents showed a lack of knowledge on the risks of ERW/mines.	Baseline 2016/17 Baseline: 67% of respondents showed a lack of knowledge on the risks of ERW/mines.	Baseline 2016/17 Baseline: 81% of respondents showed a lack of knowledge on the risks of ERW/mines.	Baseline 2016/17 Baseline: 37% of respondents showed a lack of knowledge on the risks of ERW/mines.
	Endline 2018 98% of respondents reporting increased knowledge on	Endline 2018 62% of respondents reporting increased knowledge on	Endline 2018 81% of respondents reporting increased knowledge on	Endline 2018 98% of respondents reporting increased knowledge on

	ERW/mines following RE activities (94% men, 97% women, 100% boys and 100% girls)	ERW/mines following RE activities (61% men, 51% women, 67% boys and 60% girls)	ERW/mines following RE activities (80% men, 89% women, 90% boys and 88% girls)	ERW/mines following RE activities (62% men, 69% women, 78% boys and 83% girls)
	Endline 2019 99% reported increased knowledge on ERW/mines following RE activities (100% men, 100% women, 100% boys, 99% girls)	Endline 2019 4% reported increased knowledge on ERW/mines following RE activities (33% men, 0% women, 11% boys, 3% girls)	Endline 2019 80% reported increased knowledge on ERW/mines following RE activities (87% men, 80% women, 82% boys, 81% girls)	Endline 2019 45% reported increased knowledge on ERW/mines following RE activities (30% men, 24% women, 51% boys, 54% girls)
	Endline 2020 99% reported increased knowledge on ERW/mines following RE activities (100% men, 100% women, 100% boys, 99% girls)	Endline 2020 47% reported increased knowledge on ERW/mines following RE activities (70% men, 37% women, 45% boys, 34% girls)	Endline 2020 61% reported increased knowledge on ERW/mines following RE activities (76% men, 77% women, 60% boys, 47% girls)	Endline 2020 63% reported increased knowledge on ERW/mines following RE activities (73% men, 64% women, 57% boys, 68% girls)
3. Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed demonstrating increased safe behavior towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities	Baseline 2016/17 Baseline: 14% of respondents showed signs of unsafe behavior towards mines/ERW	Baseline 2016/17 Baseline: 82% of respondents showed signs of unsafe behavior towards mines/ERW	Baseline 2016/17 Baseline: 79% of respondents showed signs of unsafe behavior towards mines/ERW	Baseline 2016/17 Baseline: 95% of respondents showed signs of unsafe behavior towards mines/ERW
	Endline 2018 97% of respondents demonstrating increased safe behavior towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities (93% men, 97% women, 98% boys, 100% girls)	Endline 2018 96% of respondents demonstrating increased safe behavior towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities (87% men, 86% women, 98% boys, 93% girls)	Endline 2018 94% of respondents demonstrating increased safe behavior towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities (61% men, 96% women, 89% boys, 95% girls)	Endline 2018 92% of respondents demonstrating increased safe behavior towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities (96% men, 91% women, 88% boys, 92% girls)
	Endline 2019 99% demonstrated increased safe behavior towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities (100% men, 100%	Endline 2019 83% demonstrated increased safe behavior towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities (100% men, 88% women,	Endline 2019 99% demonstrated increased safe behavior towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities (100% men, 99% women,	Endline 2019 96% demonstrated increased safe behavior towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities (96% men, 96% women,

	women, 99% boys, 100% girls)	76% boys, 86% girls)	99% boys, 97% girls)	97% boys, 96% girls)
	Endline 2020 100% demonstrated increased safe behavior towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities (100% men, 100% women, 100% boys, 100% girls)	Endline 2020 55% demonstrated increased safe behavior towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities (67.5% men, 64% women, 40% boys, 56% girls)	Endline 2020 97% demonstrated increased safe behavior towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities (98% men, 97% women, 97% boys, 96% girls)	Endline 2020 97% demonstrated increased safe behavior towards the dangers of ERW/mines following RE activities (97% men, 97% women, 96% boys, 97% girls)
OUTCOME 2				
4.1 m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for agriculture	2016-2017 184,721 m2 (98%)	2016-2017 None	N/A	2016-2017 32,647 m2 (47%)
	2018 156,036 m ² (99%)	2018 None		2018 48,243 m ² (27%)
	2019 157,692m2 (97%)	2019 None		2019 28,906 m2 (20%)
	2020 554,634 m2 (98%)	2020 99,900 m2 (4%)		2020 109,796 m2 (29%)
4.2 m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for community development	2016-2017 3,716 m ² (2%)	2016-2017 20,320 m ² (10%)	N/A	2016-2017 14,882 m ² (20%)
	2018 None	2018 99,480 m ² (13%)		2018 46,584 m ² (26%)
	2019 None	2019 333,605 m2 (47.9%)		2019 36,741 m2 (28%)
	2020 2,086 m2 (<1%)	2020 577,418 m2 (23%)		2020 98,207 m2 (26%)
4.3 m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for housing	2016-2017 None	2016-2017 71,120 m2 (35%)	N/A	2016-2017 12,685 m2 (18%)
	2018 None	2018 275,664 m ² (35%)		2018 45,692 m ² (26%)
	2019 4,440 m2 (3%)	2019 198,698 m2 (28.5%)		2019 35,859 m2 (28%)
	2020 4,860 m2 (1%)	2020 938,928 m2 (37%)		2020 94,236 m2 (25%)
4.4 m2 (%) of land released through TS/clearance used for infrastructure	2016-2017 None	2016-2017 111,760 m ² (55%)	N/A	2016-2017 8,774 m ² (13%)
	2018 2,008 m ² (1%)	2018 414,688 m ² (52%)		2018 38,389 m ² (21%)

	2019 None	2019 164,700 m2 (23.6%)		2019 28,477 m2 (20%)
	2020 5,193 m2 (1%)	2020 908,721 m2 (36%)		2020 75,854 m2 (20%)
5. Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting improved livelihoods	Baseline 2016/17 97% of respondents believed that livelihoods were negatively affected by contamination	Baseline 2016/17 88% of respondents believed that livelihoods were negatively affected by contamination	N/A	Baseline 2016/17 95% of respondents believed that livelihoods were negatively affected by contamination
	2018 100% of respondents reported improved livelihoods (100% men, 100% women, 100% boys, 100% girls)	2018 91% of respondents reported improved livelihoods (84% men, 83% women, 97% boys, 92% girls)		2018 91% of respondents reported improved livelihoods (92% men, 90% women, 91% boys, 92% girls)
	2019 100% reported improved livelihoods (100% men, 100% women, 100% boys, 100% girls)	2019 91% of respondents reported improved livelihoods (100% men, 91% women, 91% boys, 90% girls)		2019 99% of respondents reported improved livelihoods (99% men, 100% women, 100% boys, 99% girls)
	2020 100% reported improved livelihoods (100% men, 100% women, 100% boys, 100% girls)	2020 91% reported improved livelihoods (100% men, 91% women, 91% boys, 90% girls)		2020 98% reported improved livelihoods (100% men, 98% women, 98% boys, 98% girls)
6. Number of (%) direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting improved access to services and infrastructure	Baseline 2016/17 90% of respondents believed that mine/ERW contamination negatively affected their access to services and infrastructure	Baseline 2016/17 90% of respondents believed that mine/ERW contamination negatively affected their access to services and infrastructure	N/A	Baseline 2016/17 99% of respondents believed that mine/ERW contamination negatively affected their access to services and infrastructure
	2018 100% of respondents reported improved access to services and infrastructure (100% men, 100% women, 100% boys, 100% girls)	2018 90% of respondents reported improved access to services and infrastructure (91% men, 88% women, 89% boys, 90% girls)		2018 90% of respondents reported improved access to services and infrastructure (91% men, 88% women, 89% boys, 90% girls)

	<p>2019 100% of respondents reported improved access to services and infrastructure (100% men, 100% women, 100% boys, 100% girls)</p>	<p>2019 95% of respondents reported improved access to services and infrastructure (100% men, 91% women, 94% boys, 97% girls)</p>		<p>2019 100% of respondents reported improved access to services and infrastructure (100% men, 100% women, 100% boys, 100% girls)</p>
	<p>2020 100% of respondents reported improved access to services and infrastructure following DCA's clearance (100% men, 100% women, 100% boys, 100% girls)</p>	<p>2020 95% of respondents reported improved access to services and infrastructure following DCA's clearance (100% men, 91% women, 94% boys, 97% girls)</p>		<p>2020 99% of respondents reported improved access to services and infrastructure following DCA's clearance (100% men, 99% women, 99% boys, 99% girls)</p>